This article might explain the lack of targetting pods and PGM's in the VKS. Russia has almost a complete lack of ability to produce micro electronics. The extent that Russian weapons are reliant on foreign electronic components is much larger than previously thought. Mindful of the fact that the source for this is Ukraine and NATO countries you do need to take some of the things said in the article with a pinch of salt. But the truth may not be that far off.
Seems like a load of BS copium to me. If the Russians were that desperate, they could have bought all the components from China and stuffed them in a Russian built shell.
I think the part of issue is one of doctrine and mission set. Essentially, conventionally, the VKS were set up to deny NATO air superiority. So long as they can prevent NATO air power from pounding Russian ground forces to dust, they are confident their own ground forces would crush NATO ground forces in a fair fight. And I generally agree with that assessment.
The other major role the VKS was set up to do was strategic nuclear bombing, which probably eats up all their ‘bombing’ budget and leaves very little left for tactical bombing.
However, as with their ground forces ‘modernisation’, I think another significant problem is that they also tried to do their Air Force modernisation on the cheap.
They got modern targeting computers on their newer fighters and realised they could do Gulf War I standard ‘precision’ bombing with dumb bombs, so they didn’t really bother to purchase much in the way of PGMs and target pods that they offered for export.
That may be the case when you are bombing Xs in fields that don’t shoot back, but doing so in real life put your delivery aircraft at significant risk from enemy air defences, especially when it looks like they also didn’t invest in the kinds of SEAD and DEAD capabilities that the US had back in 90/91, which was the basis on which they were able to mount the air campaign.
That’s why we had so many high end Flankers shot down (needlessly) early in the war, and probably why the VKS has been conspicuously absent from the war ever since, apart from low level Su25 attacks.
This does fit with a telling story Guancha told during one of their talks (sorry, can’t remember which one) where a PLAAF pilot was puzzled by the total lack of PGM use during joint exercises with the Russians.
When he queried the Russians about it, they asked him back about how many PGMs he had dropped in training, which he told them, and was told in turn that the number of PGMs he had used was more than the sum total the entire Russian Air Force had dropped that year.