I agree that it would have been better to fund the Skat than the MiG-29 upgrades. I don't know what you mean about the Su-34 being a blunder though. Delayed, maybe, but it was eventually produced in decent numbers and it is much better than its predecessor.
It's a bit harsh, as - unlike the MiG-35 - the Su-34 is a world-class aircraft.
The problem is that it's an expensive platform which is rather extraneous for an air force with a large fleet of Tu-22M3 theatre bombers and access to Su-30MKI/SMs. Between the Backfire and the Su-30 (itself a powerful, F-15E-class strike aircraft), the money spent on the Fullback is just a bit of a waste - a cost which Russia, with its economic problems can ill afford. Thanks to the delays you mentioned, it would have been more efficient to pull the plug on the Su-34 and instead accelerate both the Tu-22M3M upgrade and Su-30SM deliveries (which started only in 2012 - the basic Su-30MKI had been around for almost 10 years by then!). This would also have streamlined logistics (ongoing operating cost) by eliminating one type from the inventory.
Strike payload/range (the main selling point of the Su-34) simply is not something the RuAF was ever particularly lacking in, making it a typical case of spreading scarce funding over too many projects. Perhaps if they'd axed the Tu-22M3 instead, but 3 different tactical strike platforms is just absurdly extravagant for a country in this budgetary position!
I think the reason for the dismal production numbers of the Il-76MD-90 or the Il-96 are because they are obsolete airframes with obsolete engines. The government basically funded these programs so the engineers would not be idle but they are not what the government actually wants to fulfill those requirements. Once the PD-14 and PD-35 engines become available then work on larger body aircraft can proceed. But if you examine it carefully the Russian requirements for large body civilian aircraft are quite limited to begin with. So it is more economically viable for them to import those. The exception is military transport and refuel aircraft which can be mostly handled with a regular widebody aircraft technology like the one they are developing with the Chinese for the CRAIC CR929.
As for the Il-96, I think you misunderstand the nature of my criticism of this project, I think it's a potentially sound aircraft which has been catastrophically mismanaged.
In no way do I condone the continued attempts to sell it as a passenger airliner (let alone efforts beyond what was actually done) - those should have been stopped once and for all in 2000 at the very latest. By then it was abundantly clear that the domestic market was too small to support production and foreign airlines were never going to accept the Il-96 no matter how much it was upgraded. Instead, all resources should have been concentrated on aiming it at those niche markets where it could still have been internationally competitive: civilian cargo and military tanker (where it outperforms the Il-78, even re-engined, by a very impressive margin). Obviously this would not have provided for a huge production run either (market volumes are small in both cases), but if the decision had been implemented in 2000 or soon after I would bet almost anything that the numbers would have been be vastly better than with the strategy actually implemented. Around that time there was a very favourable window of opportunity due to a convergence of 5 factors:
- the Il-96T freighter with Rockwell-Collins avionics and Pratt & Whitney engines had just received FAA certification in the USA, making the aircraft saleable to customers used to operating Western equipment in Western-oriented countries
- Boeing had just ended further production of the MD-11 (an aircraft with operating economics and performance very closely matched by the Il-96), cutting off supply of new-build freighters and capping the stock of second-hand passenger versions available for conversion
- Boeing failed to deliver a new-build successor for the MD-11F (the 777F) until 2009, and still has not launched a conversion programme for second-hand passenger 777s to this day
- Airbus likewise did not offer a comparable freighter (A330) as new-builds or conversions until 2010 and 2017 respectively
- the A330MRTT military tanker similarly did not enter the market until 2011
To appreciate how favourable the situation in the 2000s was you only need to consider the absurdly high prices passenger MD-11s (despite being roundly rejected for passenger duty in favour of Boeing & Airbus counterparts) commanded on the second-hand market at the time, simply because they were the only source of efficient freighters in that size category. While - like the MD-11 - the Il-96 was hopelessly outclassed by the 777, A330 and A340 as a passenger aircraft, it would (particularly with P&W engines) have easily held its own as a new-build on the cargo market (where used MD-11s would've been the only opposition for approximately a decade). Ilyushin wouldn't have secured a massive piece of this pie, but I think up to 24 sales is an entirely realistic estimate. For reference, of the 200 MD-11s sold almost 60 were already delivered as freighters from the factory (compare that 30% share to the 777 or A330) and a further 80+ (!!!) were later converted as second-hand aircraft.
In the military tanker market I'm pretty sure India would have been only too happy to take vastly superior Il-96 tankers instead of the D-30 powered (!) Il-78MKIs it actually got in 2003. That's 6 exports right there, and it would have made the aircraft a shoo-in for a follow-up order over another 6, which the re-engined Il-78 managed to lose *twice* to the A330MRTT because it is so outdated. While the Airbus offers lower fuel-burn, the Il-96 would have been the incumbent (crew training!) and had engine commonality with either the A-50EI (PS-90A) or C-17A (PW2000/F117). Finally, given how sensitive to sticker price the Indian GAO has proved to be, my guess is that Ilyushin would almost certainly have walked away with the second contract if the Il-96 rather than the Il-78 had been on offer (better than the A330 in performance, but still cheaper to buy). Then there's Algeria, who currently operate 4 Il-78s and are looking for a replacement - they have taken a good look at the MRTT and if it wasn't for the steep price they'd probably be on the books already. While the re-engined Il-78 was apparently not even considered, I dare say the an Il-96 based tanker would have been a much more formidable contender - quite possibly another 4 sales. Then there's China with its contract for 8 Il-78s that fell apart in 2006 or thereabouts due to the bankruptcy of the TAPO final assembly plant. Without considering less obvious candidates like Indonesia, Brazil, Egypt or Venezuela that's 24 excellent export prospects (very respectable for a tanker of this size and non-Western origin) against the re-engined Il-78's complete failure.
In fact, counting only export sales for both, this would put the Il-96 tanker ahead of Boeing's 767 tanker (*including* second-hand conversions by IAI)! Add 24 airframes for the Russian air force and just like that, without absurdly optimistic assumptions, we have boosted Il-96 production by some 70 aircraft, which is more than double its actual run (30 units, many of which would have been built anyway, so the total could be pushing 90*).
In summary, my argument runs thus: since the Russian government was apparently not prepared to let the Il-96 die, why not support the project in a way that maximises its market success, production numbers and utility to the military (*vastly* more capable tanker)? Instead of ordering more VIP passenger models than they themselves know what to do with and flushing money down the drain on a minor upgrade (Il-96-400) that is still doomed to failure in the passenger market and merely diverts resources away from the CR929.
* Worst case? 58: 18 tankers for the RuAF (basically the bare minimum for an air force with its kind of strategic bomber force), 18 exports (only 6 sales to India, as compared to above), only 6 civilian cargo sales beyond those achieved in reality (e.g. 4 Aeroflot Cargo, 2 Cielos Peru), 6 passenger models to Aeroflot (in service before 2000), 4 passenger models for Cubana (safe bet, simply because they have no alternative
), 4 freighters for Polet (the only ones to enter service in reality) and 2 presidential planes (the other VIP aircraft are basically pork-barrel subsidies that would likely not have materialised with the project in better shape like this). Still almost twice as many as they managed in reality with their nonsensical focus on the passenger market.
Best case? 24 RuAF tankers, 34 tanker exports, 24 civilian freighters (displacing virtually all MD-11 passenger conversions that didn't go to large-scale operators FedEx, UPS or LH Cargo in reality) plus the 16 actually delivered aircraft mentioned above, making a total of almost 100. Just let that sink in for a moment...
