Russian president Vladimir Putin has submitted a draft bill to the lower house of the Russian Federal Assembly which would see Russia develop a fully functional naval base at the Syrian port of Tartus.
The port is already in use by Russian warships which have been making port calls there since 1977.
Under the new agreement with Syria, which the Russian legislators plan to ratify by the end of 2017, the estate would be upgraded from a refueling facility to a permanent naval base capable of hosting larger ships, including Russia’s sole aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov.
The agreement will provide Russian Navy ships access to Tartus, and other Syrian ports, for an additional 49 years.
After new piers are built and waterways dredged, the base is expected to be capable of simultaneously accommodating over ten vessels.
Brown-water warships to become priority for Russian navy development - part 1
Russia is losing perspectives as a global sea power. Such conclusions can be drawn from official Defense Ministry statements about navy development priorities in the coming ten years. The so-called brown-water or inner maritime zone warships are to become a priority, expert Alexander Shishkin writes in the Vzglyad business daily.
Ivan Gren class landing ship and its predecessor, Ropucha class.
Analyse
First assessment of the Russian intervention in Syria ?
At a time when the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, has just announced the beginning of the withdrawal of Russian troops stationed in Syria: the time has come to draw an initial assessment - provisional - of this military intervention.
It can not be ignored that Syria has been torn apart by a terrible civil war since March 2011, and the current government led by Bashar al-Assad has lost a large part of the national territory to the detriment of a mosaic of opposition groups and groups. some of them being of radical Islamic obedience (EI) others being moderate, etc. The aim of this article is not to speak politics; we refer you to specialized websites.
Summary of the most important facts
Faced with the staggering losses (military and territorial) known by the government and following a formal request for military aid issued by Bashar al-Assad, the Russian president announced the intervention of Russia in support of the Syrian government in September 2015 .
There is no need to go around the bush: Russia is not interested in the plight of the Syrian population. However, Damascus is historically a faithful ally first of the USSR and then of Russia. In addition, Russia still has permanent access to the Mediterranean Sea through the port of Tartus made available to the Russian Navy and the base of Khmeimim (near Latakia) which have become integral property of Russia since January 2017 for a period of 49 years that can be extended by 25 years.
The announcement of the Russian intervention will be very quickly followed by effects since the first strikes carried out by the Russian air forces will already take place on September 30, 2015. The deployed devices being based on the base of Khmeimim, the latter having known a discount a fast and complete level of its fixed equipment as well as the installation of anti-aircraft protection installations.
The Russian military intervention will be the ideal opportunity for the military to test all the new equipment acquired since 2010 and put into service within the front-line units. The last external interventions of the Russian army were hardly brilliant (Chechnya and Georgia) and brought to light the big gaps in several fields (intelligence, training, logistics, joint arms cooperation, etc ...). The shortcomings observed led the Russian state to launch a major program of reforms that would lead to a "defatted" army but modernized thanks to the commissioning of modernized or new Equipment.
The Russian military will quickly deploy to the base of Khmeimim a set of aircraft including mainly tactical bombers and close support aircraft.
The first aerial allocation consists of:
12 Sukhoi Su-24M
4 Sukhoi Su-34
12 Sukhoi Su-25SM
4 Sukhoi Su-30SM
17 Mi-8AMTSh / Mi-24P
The Sukhoï Su-30SM were sent on the spot to provide tactical bombers with aerial protection against possible air threats. Knowing that rebel troops have almost no airpower at all; the presence of hunters is a way to prevent other countries involved in Syria from attacking Russian aircraft. In addition, the anti-aircraft coverage of the Khmeimim base was ensured by the deployment of an S-300 missile battery supplemented by several Pantsir-S1 systems for close coverage.
The speed of deployment by Russian troops was made possible by the presence for several months of Russian observers and specialists on the ground, responsible for informing and observing troop movements in Syria. Thanks to a good prior knowledge of the combat zones, the Russian military could estimate the need for equipment on the spot. In addition to air support, the Russian army also provided armored vehicles (MBT T-90), artillery, anti-tank systems and infantry troops.
In addition to the Air Forces, the Navy will also be involved; on October 7, 2015, no less than four ships (a Gepard class frigate and three Buyan-M-class corvettes) belonging to the Caspian Sea flotilla will fire 26 missiles 3M-14T Kalibr-NK on 11 targets located in Syrian territory. It was also the first use of this type of missile in offensive operations.
The month of November 2015, and more precisely dated the 17th, was an important date in the history of the Russian army. Indeed, on this date took place the first offensive raids carried out by Tupolev Tu-160M and Tu-95MSM followed closely by Tu-22M3. The raid consisted of launching Kh-101 missiles (Tu-95MS / Tu-160) and smooth bombs (Tu-22M3) on targets at the hands of the IS. It was therefore for Tu-95MS and Tu-160M the first offensive use of these devices, the Tu-22M3 had already been engaged in Georgia in particular. The Tu-95MS and Tu-160 (M) were deployed from their Engels base and escorted by Su-30SM once close to Syrian airspace. All the missiles fired did not hit their targets, but the Russian air force seems to have been satisfied with this commitment.
The Russian military will quickly deploy to the base of Khmeimim a set of aircraft including mainly tactical bombers and close support aircraft.
The first aerial allocation consists of:
12 Sukhoi Su-24M
4 Sukhoi Su-34
12 Sukhoi Su-25SM
4 Sukhoi Su-30SM
17 Mi-8AMTSh / -24P
The Sukhoï Su-30SM were sent on the spot to provide tactical bombers with aerial protection against possible air threats. Knowing that rebel troops have almost no airpower at all; the presence of hunters is a way to prevent other countries involved in Syria from attacking Russian aircraft. In addition, the anti-aircraft coverage of the Khmeimim base was ensured by the deployment of an S-300 missile battery supplemented by several Pantsir-S1 systems for close coverage.
In addition, a SAM S-400 missile battery was deployed at Khmeimim airport to replace the S-300 battery and was supplemented by a S-300F battery from the Moskva cruiser (Izd 1164 Slava). in the Mediterranean Sea near the border between Syria and Turkey; the goal being to create a bubble of protection A2 / AD over Syria and overflowing on the bordering countries. In addition, Tu-22M3 were repositioned from their Shaykovka base (Kaluga Oblast) to the Mozdok base in North Ossetia.
Also during the month of November and early December, the Russian Navy fired 18 missiles 3M-14T Kalibr-NK from the Caspian Sea flotilla (on 20/11) and 3M missiles. 14K Kalibr-PL from submarine B-237 Rostov on Don (Izd 636.3) belonging to the Black Sea Fleet but deployed in the Mediterranean Sea.
Russia's engagement with Loyalist troops has allowed them to stop losing ground before starting to reconquer the country; the Russians even worked hand in hand with the loyalist air force ... often by delegating to the latter the accomplishment of the least glorious and the least "elegant" tasks (to say it diplomatically) ...
At the beginning of 2016, two events are to be noted: the arrival of the first 4 Sukhoï Su-35S (from Dzemgi) and equipped with Khibiny countermeasures pods located at the ends of the wings as well as the replacement of the cruiser Moskva by the cruiser Varyag. The first quarter of 2016 was "slightly" calmer in Syria, especially following the cease-fire that was followed by the announcement on March 14, 2016 that the objectives set for the Russian army were were reached and a large part of the troops were to be withdrawn.
Finally, it was not so since the fighting continued and the aeronautical endowment of Khmeimim remained stable overall. The following notable loss was recorded on July 8, 2016 with the fall of a Mi-24 Syrian (other sources speak of a Russian Mi-35) shot down by a BGM-71 missile that dragged the two Russian pilots into death (which tends to confirm the hypothesis of Mi-35 Russian ...).
It will not be long before the next crash since it is the 1st of August 2016 that the Russian army lost a Mi-8AMTSh after firing from the ground: three crew members and two humanitarians lost their lives in this crash.
Air missions regained momentum from September 2016 as part of the offensive to retake the city of Aleppo. This northern Syrian city is of strategic importance to the loyalist forces and its reconquest is going to be a long, complex and destructive process. The Russian air force was relentlessly called upon to dislodge IS fighters infesting the city.
But the most interesting news is undoubtedly the deployment from October 15, 2016 of aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov (Izd 1143.5) and his group including the battle cruiser Piotr Velikiy (Izd 1144.2 class Kirov), two Udaloy class destroyers (Izd.1155) as well as other auxiliary vessels, including an ocean tug.
This deployment for the least heavily publicized was also revealing several problems with the aircraft carrier. In addition, the deployment was marked by the loss of two aircraft (a Su-33 on December 3 and a MiG-29KR on November 14) due to technical problems related to the stopping strands. Finally, the aircraft were temporarily "disembarked" and based at Khmeimim for the technicians to carry out the necessary repairs on the ship. The deployment of Admiral Kuznetsov will also end prematurely with an announcement of its withdrawal in early January 2017. On 9 February, Admiral Kuznetsov was back at his home base Severomorsk, with a first report indicating that 420 out of the aircraft devices about 1,500 targets were reached.
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The year 2017 will not see any fundamental changes compared to 2016 in terms of Russian intervention and deployed aircraft; at the level of the interesting elements, one can announce in particular the arrival of additional Su-25SM as well as the arrival of Su-27SM3 and unexpected thing of several MiG-29SMT.
Despite the presence of an S-400 battery at the Khmeimim base covering almost the entire Syrian territory, the penetration of Israeli aircraft and the destruction of an S-200 battery of the Syrian army will push Russia to deploy a second S-400 battery at a former S-200VE site of the Syrian Army near Masyaf, south of Latakia: the aim being to have more extensive radar coverage of Syrian territory and neighboring countries.
On June 18, 2017, a Sukhoi Su-22 of the Syrian Army was shot down by an F / A-18E Super Hornet near Raqqa, resulting in a sharp rise in tension between Russia and the US-led coalition forces. Russia took the opportunity to say that any aircraft targeting a Russian aircraft would be considered a target and treated as such. Common sense prevailed quickly and a de-escalation will be announced soon (June 27) after talks between the US and Russia.
At least September and early October 2017, several rounds of Kalibr missile firing at IS targets will also be carried out from the Admiral Essen and Admiral Grigorovich frigates (Izd 11356) as well as from marine B-268 Veliky Novgorod and B-271 Kolpino (Izd 636.3).
In particular, the Mi-35M attack helicopters, better equipped than the Mi-24Ps they replaced, were deployed, working in tandem with Mi-24Ps. The Mi-35M's electronic protection equipment provides the Mi-24P's "relative" protection, though it's all relative. A similar situation will be encountered with the Tu-22M3: in order to obtain a greater bombardment accuracy, the raids will be carried out with at least one device equipped with the Gefest-24 system. The latter serving as a "guide" to the other devices, the time of the dropping of the bombs by the first device indicating the moment of the dropping for the others. We saw more effective method ...
In the end, based on the article by Tass and other specialized sources, we obtain the following figures for all the units deployed in the context of the intervention in Syria. the maximum number (therefore over the entire duration of operations) of devices present in Syria:
30 Sukhoi Su-24M
12 Sukhoi Su-25SM
4 Sukhoi Su-27SM3
Between 12 and 16 Sukhoï Su-30SM
12 Sukhoi Su-34
Sukhoi Su-35S
4 MiG-29SMT
6 Kamov Ka-52
15 Mil Mi-8
15 Thu Mi-24 / -35
6 Mil Mi-28N
In addition, no less than 6 Tu-160 (M), 6 Tu-95MS and between 12 and 14 Tu-22M3 (M / Gefest-24) were mobilized to ensure strikes from the Russian territory on targets localized in Syria. In addition, at least two A-50Us were deployed (not at the same time), an IL-20M, a Tu-214R and finally at the end of the conflict at least one IL-22PP was seen over Syria and on the basis of Khmeimim.
with the gradual recovery of Alepp, Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa; the conflict was nearing its end in October 2017: Loyalist forces had recovered about 85% of the territories lost in the first months of the conflict. Russia could therefore consider withdrawing from Syria.
The announcement on December 11 during a surprise visit by the Russian president will be - this time - followed quickly by effects since the MiG-29SMT, A-50U, Su-34, Tu-22M3 have returned to their home. base just hours after the announcement of the troop withdrawal.
All is not completed yet, Russia will deploy police in Syria to "stabilize" the situation and there is still no information on what will be maintained on the spot for how much time and in what quantity. We must be aware that this type of operation does not end overnight, otherwise it will end up in situations such as Afghanistan experienced at the time of the Soviet withdrawal ...
What lessons can be learned from this deployment ?
Several interesting elements stem from the Russian intervention in Syria.
The first relevant element is the observation that Russia has achieved two major strategic gains in the region: the Tartous naval base where the Russians can park up to 11 ships simultaneously (even those with nuclear propulsion) as well as the Khmeimim airbase which are at the exclusive disposal of Russia and where Syrian law does not apply. And this for a period of 49 years extensible 25 years unless a country makes a request in the opposite direction before the deadline.
The second element is that Russia now has a clear picture of the state and capabilities of its forces. While the commissioning of modern aircraft has accelerated since the beginning of this decade, the military had not yet had the opportunity to test the combat effectiveness of the latter.
If the Western media and marketing gurus like the phrase "fight proven", we can now say that the MiG-29KR / KUBR, MiG-29SMT, Su-27SM3, Su-30SM, Su-33, Su-34 and Su-35S also received the precious (?) Sesame. This being so, it is much more interesting to see that the Russians have learned from these commitments and in particular the need to improve and modify some modern devices.
It is in this context that it has appeared in particular necessary to:
integrate the Kh-35 missile into the Su-35S weapon system,
installation of the Gefest 24 system on the Su-33 and Tu-22M3
systematic installation of Khibiny pods on Su-34
more widespread use of Khibiny pods on Su-35s
use of the L370S President-S countermeasures system on attack helicopters
increased use of drones and intelligence capabilities (Tu-214R, IL-20M, A-50U)
obligation to have modern targeting pods
build and use a stock of guided ammunition
And that's where the third element comes from: the Russian military has come to realize the importance of using modern targeting and guided munitions. Admittedly, the use of "carpet bombing" is an inexpensive way to treat a target (and all that is close to it ...) but in the end, it is perfectly absurd to fly modern devices to launch smooth bombs of 250 Kg on fixed targets. The lack of targeting pod is felt on modern aircraft and prevents the efficient use of ammunition details. In addition, stocks of such ammunition being limited: it seems that the army soon found itself in a situation of shortage. This implies a massive use of conventional unguided ammunition.
It is therefore confirmed that for cost and technical reasons Russia has fallen behind in this area and the operations in Syria have highlighted this state of affairs. The situation is not new in itself since the same observation was made after the intervention in Georgia.
Fourth interesting element, the joint cooperation: it seems that the execution of coordinated strikes between the air force, the navy and the strategic bombing aviation was carried out impeccably and this mainly in order to maximize the impact of the strikes while minimizing the reaction capacity opposite. It was also a great way to train and test the crews' abilities on long-term missions.
Fifth relevant element; awareness of the critical need for intelligence capabilities, electronic warfare and information gathering. While the deployment of Beriev A-50U was primarily to provide the role of air traffic controller in restricted and congested airspace, the use of IL-20M and Tu-214R was primarily aimed at tracking the channels of communication and information of the rebel forces. While the Tu-214R program seemed to have been dormant for several months in its testing program, it took Russia only a short time to order a third copy shortly after the aircraft was hovering over the plane. Syria.
Sixth and last significant element: the actual state of a part of the Russian Navy. The deployment of Admiral Kuznetsov and his carrier group, if it was widely publicized, did not deceive many people. The ship was clearly not ready to ensure such a speedy and hastily deployed deployment, and the loss of two aircraft in the space of a few weeks certainly did not help to restore the reputation of the Russian Navy. Having an aircraft carrier is one thing, having the means to use it is another. The use of Su-33 with only limited air-to-ground capabilities and the limited number of MiG-29KR / -KUBRs (as well as validated drivers on this aircraft) onboard did not provide anything from an operational point of view compared to devices already deployed in Khmeimim.
The media profit hoped for by this deployment was also annihilated by the images that we all saw of a ship dragging at low speed while releasing an imposing plume of smoke. The technical problems of the Kuznetsov boilers are known and instead of deploying the ship, it would have been more relevant to grant him the fairing that he has more than need instead of deploying it in the Mediterranean with the results that we know. The only conclusion to this deployment being that the immobilization followed by the necessary refit of Kuznetsov was decided after its deployment.
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In conclusion
As we have seen above, Russia has not been doing mass tourism in the region for the good eyes of the Syrian people. Sometimes nicknamed with a lot of cynicism as the "Syrian Airshow", it is undeniable that this intervention teaches us a lot about both the capabilities of the Russian Air Force as well as the points on which the progress of this one are deficient.
On the other hand, it is indisputable that the government of Bashar al-Assad owes a great deal to his Russian ally; From a situation generally considered hopeless, in a few weeks we have gone through a complete reversal of the situation in which the loyalist army has returned to conquer the country with the successes we have seen.
However, it is useless to hide the truth: the abuses were numerous in each camp in presence. The loyalist army has become almost specialized in dirty and criminal actions such as the gassing of certain populations ... our goal here is not to make the trial of this war and its belligerents. Others will do it better than us but we can not decently speak of this intervention without raising the pile of dust hidden under the carpet and that we do not want (?) Or can not (?) Not see. And even though we have learned a great deal about the Russian army in recent months, we must not forget that Syria is a huge ruin where almost everything is to be rebuilt and with a scattered population that wants to flee at all costs.
The Russian force in this conflict was not only military, the ability of the Russian leaders to communicate all over their achievements and victories while continuing to perform (or help) the dirty work allowed them to draw a picture from the Russian population of military size found again. And even when losses took place with the political tensions that followed (with Turkey in particular), it did not take long for the tension to come down and everyone's interests to converge in the same direction. . Moreover, it is a royal road for the Russian government to justify important investments in the military sector and this in the context of a recessionary economy and where cuts in public spending have to be performed.
Finally, Russia is also trying to establish itself as a major player in the Middle East and surrounding areas by positioning itself as an ally capable of going to put his hands in the grease to disentangle a situation a priori inextricable. At a time when the US has entered a phase of retreating into itself (temporarily?) Abandoning its traditional role of regional leadership, the Putin administration is trying to take over - in part - this role, the recent declaration of the Russian President regarding the victory of Russia in Syria, going in this direction. No observer of the conflict can decently think that the Russians have arrived alone, other countries are also there to defend their interests and allies but it seems quite obvious that Russia is the one that has invested the most massively to all levels to put an end - definitive? - to this conflict.
The Syrian people will be the only one able to judge the well founded (or not) for him of this intervention ...
Russian missile division received new Yars intercontinental ballistic missile
On December 13, 2017, Russia’s Ministry of Defence announced that yet another missile division received the new Yars intercontinental ballistic missile system.
According to the Russian MoD. the new Yars intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) recently was put on combat duty with the Kozelsk missile division in Kaluga region.
These days the Kozelsk missile division is being rearmed with Yars modern silo-based missile complex. The RS-24 Yars (NATO reporting name SS-27 Mod 2) is an upgraded version of the Topol-M ballistic missile that can be fired both from a mobile launcher and silo. It carries ICBMs with multiple independently targetable nuclear warheads and has a range of 10,900 km.
The first test launch was carried out on May 29, 2007, from the Plesetsk Range over the Kura Range (Kamchatka). Russia started to deploy RS-24 Yars in December 2009.
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=Nov 17, 2017
today they launched the second up there, the Typhoon:
EDIT I guess there'll be plenty of pictures available soon, now noticed this view: