Russian Military News, Reports, Data, etc.

Jura said:

recently the model of the loader for

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missiles into

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was presented; the thing is to be built close to

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according to the source:

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Jura said:

hey FORBIN, you favorite source
How Russia and China Could Strike the US Air Force’s 'Achilles Heel'

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or not anymore, if it's not lambasting the Russians?

EDIT
for me the Russian translation

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is interesting because of the current terminology

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FORBIN said:

...

" NI " i like much but sometimes nah

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Jura said:

Amigo what is your source here? I mean do you realize it would mean exporting the Kalibrs? (see the VLS in the superstructure, pretty much in the middle of the ship?)

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Gloire_bb said:

Club series are for sale since 2000s.

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Jura said:

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Jura said:

... I'm even more at loss about "Version 3": Thales radar etc.; OTO 3" gun; apparently Western engine ...

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Russian fleet: the way to continentalization

While the full realization of the naval component of the 2011-2020 armament plane seems a long time compromised, many questions already surrounding the challenges of the next arming plan. What should expect the Russian fleet?

New determinants

Plans weapons being developed every 5 years and over a period of ten years, the new weapons of the plan would be implemented from 2016 for a period of up to 2025 (the last for the period 2011-2020). However, no plans have been announced, and this should not be the case before 2018, election year in Russia (presidential election), for a period extending to 2025 or beyond. This shift would be of a struggle between the one hand power structures, and the central bankers of the Russian state, on the other hand, which has forced the Kremlin to "kick for touch", and push the plug making.

The conditions prevailing at the time of the development of the 2011-2020 armament plan (the late 2000s) no longer exist: the price of a barrel of crude now stands painfully around $ 50, and economic growth would be at best 1% or 2% in the coming years. The budget of the Russian defense, continuously expanding (in absolute value) throughout the 2000s, had its first budget cuts in 2015, and it should be the same until 2019: the Russian Ministry of Finance has already proposed to reduce defense spending by 6% over the period 2017-2019 compared to the 2016 budget (itself already reduced by 5%). Relations with the West are permanently damaged from the Ukrainian crisis, ruling out any military-technical cooperation in the medium-term high-technologies. In addition, the Ukrainian military-industrial complex has terminated its cooperation with the Russian defense industry, depriving Russia of a number of key technologies for the implementation of the 2011-2020 program, including field of shipbuilding. These are conditions that should determine the development of the next armament plan, even if the markers should be applied to the economic aspects. The heyday of the 2000s is over, and the economic pressure causes power struggles within the political and military elite and industrial ..

The mirage goals

The appointment of the former commander of the fleet, Admiral Viktor Chirkov, the Chief Advisor position near President OSK - Russian consortium for shipbuilding - means that the Kremlin wants to limit the damage vis- a-vis the implementation of the 2011-2020 naval component, and especially today give "good habits" to OSK for the realization of the next arming plan. The Russian president also said - about annunciator - that 2020 will correspond to a peak for deliveries of new equipment in the weapons program. The Russian Navy will not, at maturity of the plan, eight new Borei SSBNs of the project, much less 7 SSGN of Yasen project, let alone the frigates of Project 22350. Some units are already admitted to active service, d more will be, but the objectives will not be met. Unlike OAK - Russian consortium for the aircraft industry - the success of OSK remains very mixed, as evidenced by the number of resignations and replacements in the leadership of this structure in recent years. However, if the industry share some responsibility in the repeated delays in some programs, they are not responsible for everything, and according to experts, it would still fifteen years the Russian naval industrial base to recover the period black 1990s and irregular funding naval programs that still characterized part of the 2000s Today, R & D remains the poor relation of the budget of the Russian defense: it accounted for 3.5% of the 2013 budget, and since she was reduced to a trickle.

Boiling projects related to the project of building a blue water fleet also explains the will power to OSK as effective tool than is OAK for air. If the chances of the next arming plane integrate the construction of an aircraft carrier are thin (which could be the case the next shot), it is however possible to see the laying of the keel of the future of new destroyer generation (the Lider) as well as large amphibious ships (or Priboi Lavina). Beyond the triple economic, industrial and technological challenge that would represent the start of construction of these offshore vessels for Russia, the question is whether they would respond to a need expressed by the Russian Navy.

...

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Russian fleet: the way to continentalization

The temptation of a fleet of state-continent

The Russian navy is now a Fleet enough largely coastal, however with limited offshore capabilities to ensure a continued presence but relatively less intense in some parts of the world ocean (especially during exercise, especially in the area Asia Pacific). new offshore platforms surface of the projects mentioned so far point to a long-term shift of the current format of the Russian navy to that of carrier battle group centered around carrier (Anglo-Saxon and French scheme). This oceanic tipping is it justified, however, even as a debate about the relevance of the "aircraft carrier" tool animates the community of experts and practitioners from the United States Naval? The tasks assigned / to be borne by the Russian Navy they require; even aircraft carriers? As for the cruiser Lider, do not you risk it being already obsolete when it comes out of the holds of the shipyard, after multiple delays, in the 2030s, or even 2040? The ultra-marine interests of Russia justify they invest in these expensive platforms?

Among the strategic guidance documents published by the Russian administration in recent years, the Russian maritime doctrine exists, but there is clearly no naval doctrine. In addition, Russian fleets and fleets are integrated into military districts, which avoids, or at least complicates any purely naval strategic planning. The Russian General Staff would also preparing any strategic operation in the world ocean (except patrol SSBN), these functions have been delegated to the commanders of military districts (which are unified operational strategic commands). The mutation of the flowchart of the Russian chain of command does not explain alone the aridity of the Russian naval vision. Gorchkovienne the vision of the Soviet Navy continues, by default, to prevail on a naval tool that has more vocation to fulfill global missions. Financial logic (where the Russian navy will lose out compared to other weapons) and industrial (safeguard and develop the naval VPK) tend to be substituted by competing in a naval strategic thought barely audible.

The Syrian crisis could tip the balance in favor of those in the Russian military-political and industrial elite, wants continentaliser of the Russian Navy. The fleet plays since the beginning of the Syrian crisis a logistics support role (amphibious units in 1171 and 775 projects), prohibition (Varyag cruiser Moskva) and intelligence, to which was added in September 2015 a mission fighting for some units (missile corvettes, SSK) who fired Kalibr cruise missiles. The Project 21631 corvettes are buildings designed to operate in the brown waters (корабля ближней морской зоны) while the SSK of Project 0636.3 are "more comfortable" in the seas like the Black Sea or the Baltic Sea, and n 'were in any case not intended to evolve in the world ocean. Added to that the difficulties encountered in integrating new units on some anti-aircraft systems (Polyment-Redut), and it is understood that the second and third units are never as effective as they evolve under the protection of air defense systems (S-300 or S-400) and anti-surface (Bastion) land-based. In addition, the nature of the crisis has put the Navy in a subordinate role to the air force, and tends to give ammunition to those in Russia who believe that projects of aircraft carriers and destroyers are more about politics and presence of the issues, as operational considerations. In other words, the Syrian campaign would not have been better if Moscow had disposed of an aircraft carrier or destroyer (it would not be bad either more range).

Given the new realities (economic, technological barriers, lack of naval vision), and saw naval teachings of the Syrian crisis, logic would dictate that the next arming plan emphasizes the start of construction of second surface units and third that Russian shipyards know how to produce. At the same time, an essential upgrade of the sites affected by the construction of offshore units surface at the next program (up to 2050) must be undertaken if the Russian naval industry wants to avoid a definitive drop in this sector . That's what she hopes to avoid with Lider.

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Jura said:

anyway, Project 22800 ...

I'll keep looking for more info now ...

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Jura said:

... recently I found out about another nice feature of the Turkish OPV: they can be assembled/outfitted at the customer's site like here:

it's in Turkmenistan

(I think the location is:

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and shows two of the Tuzla-class modified for Turkmenistan (I've read they'll be able to shoot the Otomat AShMs, and I guess they were not interested in the sonar

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Turkmenistan order mentioned by Dearsan:

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