There's really way too many variables to make a decent analysis of how would a potential conflict go. We would have to ask ourselves some of
the following questions (answers to which no one knows):
What sort of event would trigger 'US taking on china'?
Would the taiwanese declare independence hastily or slowly?
Would the US and Taiwan goverment's and militaries work
together before the declaration of independence, preparing
for months in advance, if needed.
Would China attack before any formal declaration of independence,
right after the declaration or perhaps years after it, waiting for the best
moment? (lets assume there would be an attack, for the sake of this thread)
Depending on answers to some of those questions, and the changed balance of power (not the same if USN has just one carrier in the vicinity or is on some sort of cold war setting and has three carriers near china at all times. (one in japan, one in guam surge ready plus one deployed close to them)
Likewise, USN could have little or no ships nearby taiwan and/or okinawa, or they could permanently be rotating several fleets, providing SAM and antiballistic coverage for those islands.
Politics and economics can hugely influence those issues and it's equally possible that either extremes (no permanent protection or a lot of protection) be applicable in some future scenario.
Who would strike first? While perhaps a silly question, i don't believe it'd be out of the realm of possibility that US strikes minutes before PLA does, in order to negate PLA's initiative, IF there would be enough intelligence gathered to warrant such a premptive strike. Then again, such intelligence would be next to impossible to prove, plus the political and with it economic aftermath of the first strike would be masssive and perhaps not worth it.
If we try to avoid so many questions and settle on some usual conflict scenario, there's still a lot of variables in the play. It is impossible to know just how much preparation taiwan's, china's or US's military would need to perform certain kind of operations. It is impossible to know how much of the mentioned preparations could be held in secrecy. We can't know if china would strike with 10% of its power in X amount of time or 50% in 2X amount of time or any other combination. And all that can be very important in conflicts like these.
We can't possibly know how effective would antiballistic defenses be, we can't know if a single interceptor missile would be enough for a single ballistic missile, or 3, or 5. We can't know how precise chinese missiles would be, and there is a big difference between a CEP of 100 m, 50 m or 20 m, as each of those open up a whole new range of possible targets. We don't know how good the intelligence and counter intelligence is on both sides. How many missiles would be wasted on bogus targets or how many missiles would hit just where they'd hurt the opponent the most.
It is usually said china has over a thousand ballistic missiles aimed at taiwan. What about Okinawa? Are there 10 missiles ready to be fired at that direction? or 100? or 1000?
Most analysis of the taiwan conflict correctly focus on the air war. It would definitely be the most important aspect. Without a successful supression of taiwanese and/or US airpower over the broad area of taiwan, no other phase of conflict would be able to continue.
But we can't know how much damage could chinese take and still operate their air force, even if they're preemptively attacked. The rule of thumb would be more than taiwanese. Then again, more damage is a sure thing, if US has a chance to plan its attack well. But a well planned attack needs careful positioning of forces and that takes time. Who would have more time
to deploy its forces? And what sort of forces would those be?
The issues I see with taiwan's self defense are these: On one hand, they're
perfectly positoned to react swiftly and maintain a strong CAP with a relatively smaller number of planes, as opposed to US CAP over taiwan
which would require several times more planes to do the same thing, due
to the distances involved.
In a perfect situation, ROCAF could keep dozen of planes on rotation, in the air, at any given time. Plus dozens more on the ground for quick reaction.
US fighters can't really be used in CAP over taiwan, nor be ready to be scrambled, as they're too far away. Kadena AFB is some 750 kms away from Taiwan, which means 20-30 minutes before they could answer. Everything else, save for USN's planes from the carriers, would be way too far away. If one wants to keep the planes in the air, on patrol, that'd lower the effectiveness by quite a bit, compared to taiwanese planes stationed in taiwan.
Lets use Kadena AFB for an example. Flying to taiwan and back at some fuel conserving speed would take some two hours and more than half a tank. So such a plane could be on station for perhaps one or so hour. Remedy to that would be in air refuelling but at what cost? One can't have a fighter pilot in the air, in combat surroundings, for 6 or 8 hours and expect him to be fresh and focused as he was during the first two hours of the mission. Not to mention that one kc135 can fully refuel some 4-5 f15s. Every tanker stationed in kadena means less other aircraft. And less fighters make it harder to keep a large CAP fleet on station.
Sure, tankers could be stationed in guam but that'd basically mean that each tanker would have to have its own tanker or two to support it, as that's 2750 kms away from taiwan. Again, that lowers overall efficiency. Misawa in Japan would be slightly better, but again not a great solution. It's important to understand the size of logistics requirements ofundertaking a permanent fleet on CAP over taiwan. If one wants to keep 12 F15s over Taiwan or close to taiwan (lets say 500 km away from kadena) 24/7, that'd mean 3 kc135 would have to make a sortie each two hours or so. That's 36 tanker sorties. Every plane requires maintenance and those tankers are among the worst in the USAF fleet, being old as they are. We're looking at 12-15 planes for a short period (a week) or upwards of 20 if such CAPs are to be performed for longer periods.
Same thing with the fighters themselves. They need to be inspected after each flight and maintained properly. One can't expect to do more than 3 or 4 sorties per day, for a short time period. That's with short flights. With in air refuelling and missions lasting for 5-6 or more hours sortie generation falls further still. Over a week or more additional maintenance is needed and sortie rates fall further still. Basically, to keep 12 F15s in the air for a week, 500 km away from Kadena, at least three times as many would be needed in the base. And that base needs to host 30-40 tankers, various awacs and elint planes... it'd be crowded. Doubling that number, to 24 planes on cap would pretty much be impossible for Kadena.
And that is the best base available to the US. Everything else, on mainland Japan, South Korea (though that's unlikely to happen under any sort of circumstances short of a cold war gone hot scenario) would be even worse, as those are some 1500 kms away or more from Taiwan.
Carriers are nice but they can't sustain high sortie rates for long periods of time. They need time to be sent to the theater, which can take up to weeks longer than it'd take USAF to reinforce Guam, Kadena, etc. Plus it may prove risky to position the carriers very close to China's mainland. Distance provides safety, even though it lowers sortie rates. Of course, the more carriers there are, they are safer, as a group, and could operate closer. But at the same time, the more carriers are needed, the more time it takes to assemble such a fleet.
So, in light of all that, i don't believe we would see a lot of US combat air patrols over the strait. What is much more realistic is a period of relatively low involvement from the US side in the already ongoing conflict. (save for submarine hunts and keeping the China's fleet confined to a relatively small area of sea around taiwan) US would, in my opinion, wait until it assembles a strong enough force, then start striking.
But then again there's politics. There would certainly be cries for swift action. It is unknown how resistant the US DoD would be to such outcries.
It is important to note that sortie generation works both ways. PLAAF and PLANAF would suffer from it as well, though less so, due to smaller distances involved. Airbases right across the strait, 200-300 km away from Taiwan, would probably offer good sortie rates. Those farther away would fare no better than USAF from Okinawa. So in a sense, taiwan's 400 fighters would be worth more than Chinese 400 fighters of same quality, due to the fact that taiwanese sortie rates would be by far the best, as they basically wouldn't even need to have constant CAPs. (as long as their or US awacs live)
But counting on fighter interceptors might not be so smart. As we said, there's no way of knowing just how much damage chinese ballistic and cruise missiles could do. Even disabling the runways at one airbase for half an hour would lower the overall taiwan's defense capabilities by quite a bit. Naturally, any missile attack must be followed by a proper air attack and bombardment, otherwise the initial shock would mostly be wasted. We can't know if the initial barrage would result in no disruption to taiwan's sortie generation rates or would it lower them by 20% or 50% or more. Same goes for any possible missile strike against Kadena. While definitely harder to pull off due to bigger distance, Kadena is clearly the very best (by a wide margin) platform US has to conduct air war from. Therefore, a lot of resources might be sacrificed in order to attack it.
In my opinion, unless both sides are caught off guard and are not expecting a war, China today does not have enough power to simultaneously strike both Kadena and Taiwan with sufficient force to be successful. It is more realistic that taiwan would be attacked with Kadena being left alone or at best, harrassed, in the initial stages of the conflict. Only if the air war over taiwan goes fairy well would Kadena be properly attacked. The alternative of first striking Kadena, then Taiwan would be, in my opinion, politically far too dangerous and thus unrealistic.
Ultimately, the reason why none of this is likely to happen is the fact US would be in no rush to answer. Even if by some miracle the entire island of taiwan is successfully invaded and its defenders are turned into a guerilla force, (which by in itself would require at very best weeks if not months), the said invading force would be rendered useless once cut of from the mainland. And cut off they would be, as if the US does choose to prepare a good counterattack plan, there'd hardly be a chinese plane or a ship left to keep that logistics line open. It is quite possible US wouldn't even attack much of mainland china, save for the harbors and nearby airfields as the mission could be accomplished without it and the increased risks that deep strikes into China's mainland would require.
Stealth helps but going deep into China (russia, US, Australia, whoever) increases risks of detection and successful interception by quite a considerable margin. In my opinion, even the likes of B2 and such would keep away, lobbing various jdams etc at close by targets. While being accompanied by fighter cover. A lone b2 over china would be far too risky.
Basically, US would do to china what china did to taiwan. That's not to say that losses on all of the involved sides wouldn't be great. We'd be looking at close to total annihilation of Taiwanese AF and Navy, as well as Chinese Navy. Also, a good deal, if not a majority of PLAAF would be taken out, depending on various factors, some of which would be in chinese control. In the end, a good deal of USN's air power in the theatre would be taken out (not so much USN's ships themselves) and probably not an insignificant number of USAF planes as well. I'm being vague here on purpose as its impossible to project if the losses would be 5% or 30% or more.
If anyone is going to quote this - please don't. It's far too long. If you must, quote only a paragraph or two.
