I came across the following Rand study, while surfing the web:
Entering the Dragon's Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States
I don't know if anyone else has had a chance to review the document. It came out this past March, although I didn't hear anything about it in the press at the time. The following items from the report, in particular, drew my attention:
All told, the Rand report is worth a read.
Entering the Dragon's Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States
I don't know if anyone else has had a chance to review the document. It came out this past March, although I didn't hear anything about it in the press at the time. The following items from the report, in particular, drew my attention:
"PLA writings have identified several perceived strategic U.S. vulnerabilities. First is the possibility that U.S. forces could be involved in two major contingency operations simultaneously. PLA writers have observed that even a relatively limited engagement, like the 1999 conflict with Serbia over Kosovo, requires significant U.S. forces and that timing a military operation for when the United States was already engaged could mean that the United States would not have enough forces available to respond to China’s actions. In addition, some Chinese strategists calculate that the perceived U.S. aversion to casualties might be exploited by delivering a sudden blow aimed at causing a large number of U.S. military casualties, sowing doubt and discontent among the U.S. population, and potentially forcing the withdrawal of U.S. forces." (p. xv)
"Noting the great distances that U.S. forces would need to travel in a conflict with China, attacks against logistic systems are also discussed. The goals of these attacks would be to delay the deployment of additional U.S. forces to the region and to render existing forces in the region less effective or more vulnerable by preventing timely supplies of the materiel needed for warfighting." (p. xvi)
"Chinese strategists appear to understand that success against the U.S. military depends on China’s ability to avoid a direct confrontation with U.S. forces in a traditional, force-on-force battle. In an interview with the newspaper China Youth Daily, a PLA senior colonel compared any attempt by China to contend directly with the United States in a hightechnology conflict to 'throwing an egg against a rock'." (p.28)
"The possibility of a Chinese antiaccess strategy is more than hypothetical. . . .
"As a consequence of all this, it is possible that the United States could actually be defeated in a conflict with China—not in the sense that the U.S. military would be destroyed but in the sense that China would accomplish its military-political objectives while preventing the United States from accomplishing some or all of its own political and military objectives. A weakened initial U.S. response to a Chinese assault on Taiwan, for example, could result in the collapse of Taiwan’s military resistance. The island might therefore capitulate before the United States could bring all its combat power to bear." (pp.111-112)
"Noting the great distances that U.S. forces would need to travel in a conflict with China, attacks against logistic systems are also discussed. The goals of these attacks would be to delay the deployment of additional U.S. forces to the region and to render existing forces in the region less effective or more vulnerable by preventing timely supplies of the materiel needed for warfighting." (p. xvi)
"Chinese strategists appear to understand that success against the U.S. military depends on China’s ability to avoid a direct confrontation with U.S. forces in a traditional, force-on-force battle. In an interview with the newspaper China Youth Daily, a PLA senior colonel compared any attempt by China to contend directly with the United States in a hightechnology conflict to 'throwing an egg against a rock'." (p.28)
"The possibility of a Chinese antiaccess strategy is more than hypothetical. . . .
"As a consequence of all this, it is possible that the United States could actually be defeated in a conflict with China—not in the sense that the U.S. military would be destroyed but in the sense that China would accomplish its military-political objectives while preventing the United States from accomplishing some or all of its own political and military objectives. A weakened initial U.S. response to a Chinese assault on Taiwan, for example, could result in the collapse of Taiwan’s military resistance. The island might therefore capitulate before the United States could bring all its combat power to bear." (pp.111-112)
All told, the Rand report is worth a read.
