This is an excellent article that provides a peek behind the Chinese front and exposes certain vulnerabilities China must overcome if they are to become a true powerhouse in the 21th century
Political and Military Analysis on China
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This is an excellent article that provides a peek behind the Chinese front and exposes certain vulnerabilities China must overcome if they are to become a true powerhouse in the 21th century
escobar
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Beijing must recognize the consequences of its engagement in countries where peace is fragile and act accordingly. But the West also has a mixed record.
The recent capture of 29 Chinese road constructors by rebels in Sudan has made clear rising powers like China are increasingly involved in countries where peace is fragile. China’s willingness to match financial assistance to host government requests, largely without political conditions, has made it a popular partner. Even in neighboring South Sudan, where infrastructure needs are immense, an official admits that “if a man is thirsty, he needs to drink, no matter where the water comes from. China is ready to do things straightaway…When the West gives some small money, they want to manage it very carefully. While they are thinking what to do, China will come in.”
Beijing’s approach to conflict-affected countries has tended to prioritize healthy diplomatic relations with host governments, often with an eye to deepening commercial ties. The policy of non-interference in other states’ internal affairs has been one way to support these ties. The principle often implies implicit support for the incumbent regime and a state-orientated vision of stability. In practice, while the principle of non-interference remains important, Chinese policy has been implemented with a degree of pragmatism. For example, when it has judged its interests to be at stake, Beijing has exerted pressure on host governments to pursue peaceful options and hedged against political change by building relationships with alternative guarantors of stability.
China’s business-like approach to supporting economic development in some post-war contexts – typified by cheap loans from state-owned banks that pay Chinese companies to deliver infrastructure projects – can yield quicker results than Western aid and provide a tangible peace dividend. However, when the benefits are seen to favor certain groups or consolidating the power of elites, China’s economic role may inadvertently exacerbate instability. This reality of engagement in conflict-affected states is placing new pressures on Chinese policy.
China’s growing role is also creating a new reality for Western donors and policymakers. Sri Lanka is a case in point. In recent years, China has become the largest development financer and arms supplier to the Government of Sri Lanka. After they had long backed a peace agreement, Western states openly questioned the conduct of Sri Lanka’s 2009 military campaign that defeated the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, leading to cuts in aid, restricted arms sales and calls for an international investigation into alleged war crimes. If such concerns existed in Beijing, they were muted: Sri Lanka’s conflict was an internal matter. Loans, arms and diplomatic backing continued.
But blaming China for the collapse of the peace in Sri Lanka overlooks not only the importance of domestic political dynamics that were beyond the international community’s control, but also the West’s own failings. Western states are by no means always a benign counterweight to China’s presence. Their record in promoting peace overseas is mixed at best, and they are no strangers to prioritizing healthy relations with host governments and top-down approaches to stability.
However, it’s hard not to conclude that with a more diverse market for development assistance, diplomatic support and arms, governments in conflict-affected states are less responsive to Western conditionalities and pressure. “It’s hard to imagine that the 2009 end to the conflict would have played out the same way 15 years ago”, notes one Western diplomat based in Colombo. “Today’s context is different.” Furthermore, calls for the protection of human rights, democratic reforms and good governance, never that loudly or consistently applied to start with, are at some risk of becoming even quieter as Western states compete with Beijing for the favor of host governments.
Nonetheless, although different values and principles exist, a shared interest in stability represents a concrete foundation for co-operation. As Beijing’s approach towards conflict-affected countries evolves to protect deepening interests, there’s an unprecedented opportunity for China and the West to develop more complementary approaches in support of peace. This could, for example, focus on jointly developing policies and principles to make development assistance more conflict-sensitive. The current situation isn’t encouraging. In the contexts where Saferworld conducted research, there was little or no regular dialogue, let alone co-ordination or co-operation, between Chinese and Western representatives. As one Western official admitted, “It’s like we operate in parallel universes: they do what they do, we do what we do.”
To address this, Chinese and Western policymakers need to create avenues for dialogue at multiple levels. This must include not only officials, but also think tanks, academics and NGOs. Discussions on what is understood by stability, and how it’s best promoted overseas, need to take place with the participation of civil society voices from countries where peace is fragile. Small, practical, on-the-ground development projects could be jointly supported in conflict-affected countries, serving as entry-points to deeper co-operation. Western states should make greater efforts to engage China in discussions on important multilateral agreements – such as that on aid effectiveness recently agreed in South Korea, and the upcoming negotiations on an international arms trade treaty. China needs to ensure its representatives participate constructively.
Peace and stability in conflict-affected countries will largely be determined by the decisions of their governments, politicians and leaders. However, complicity in violent conflict and responsibility for peace is multi-layered. Western actors must work together more closely and redouble efforts to promote democracy, human rights and healthy state-society relations. These are the foundations on which inclusive peace and long-term stability are built. Aid to governments in conflict-affected countries needs to be linked more strategically to diplomacy and complemented by support that gives non-state actors a stronger voice in the development process.
For its part, China wants its rise to be perceived as peaceful. Its image as a global power will be greatly determined by its role in parts of the world that are troubled by conflict. Beijing needs to recognize the consequences of its engagement in countries where peace is fragile and act accordingly. This may mean re-assessing how to interpret non-interference, deliver development finance, and ensure Chinese weapons do not end up fuelling further human suffering. As Chinese policymakers grapple with how to square new-found influence, greater responsibility and deepening interests, they may well find that the solution ultimately lies in working with others.
escobar
Brigadier
Near Seas “Anti-Navy” Capabilities, not Nascent Blue Water Fleet, Constitute China’s Core Challenge to U.S. and Regional Militaries
The U.S.-China relationship is central to international relations in the twenty-first century, as the two great Asia-Pacific powers compete, coexist, and cooperate across the full spectrum of national capabilities. While they share many important interests and are increasingly interdependent, particularly in the economic realm, Beijing and Washington regrettably face substantial differences regarding important security issues. This friction can likely be managed, albeit at the cost of tremendous effort and patience on both sides, but occasional crises are likely (akin to the 2001 EP-3 incident), and conflict cannot be ruled out completely if wisdom and diligence prove insufficient. The best way to avoid conflict is to understand its potential nature and cost. To that end, this four-part series will examine four major, under-researched issues:
–China’s Near Seas military focus and capabilities
–China’s fiscal environment and implications for military development
–Chinese energy and resource imports and their potential to drive naval expansion
–China’s conflict triggers and mitigating factors, particularly economic interdependence
The U.S.-China relationship is central to international relations in the twenty-first century, as the two great Asia-Pacific powers compete, coexist, and cooperate across the full spectrum of national capabilities. While they share many important interests and are increasingly interdependent, particularly in the economic realm, Beijing and Washington regrettably face substantial differences regarding important security issues. This friction can likely be managed, albeit at the cost of tremendous effort and patience on both sides, but occasional crises are likely (akin to the 2001 EP-3 incident), and conflict cannot be ruled out completely if wisdom and diligence prove insufficient. The best way to avoid conflict is to understand its potential nature and cost. To that end, this four-part series will examine four major, under-researched issues:
–China’s Near Seas military focus and capabilities
–China’s fiscal environment and implications for military development
–Chinese energy and resource imports and their potential to drive naval expansion
–China’s conflict triggers and mitigating factors, particularly economic interdependence
escobar
Brigadier
LNG carriers to aircraft carriers? Assessing the potential for crossover between civilian and military shipbuilding in China
* China’s growing proficiency in building massive ore carriers and oil tankers suggests that Chinese yards can physically fabricate ship hulls of up to supercarrier size.
* However, the ability to fashion a carrier’s hull has little bearing on the ability to build the ship’s internals and turn it into a floating airbase with planes, fuel, munitions, catapults, and at least several hundred personnel aboard.
* Building the internal components of the ship and then learning to operate this immensely complex vessel as part of a battle group will likely require many years of trial and error unrelated to China’s growing shipyard capacity.
* China’s growing proficiency in building massive ore carriers and oil tankers suggests that Chinese yards can physically fabricate ship hulls of up to supercarrier size.
* However, the ability to fashion a carrier’s hull has little bearing on the ability to build the ship’s internals and turn it into a floating airbase with planes, fuel, munitions, catapults, and at least several hundred personnel aboard.
* Building the internal components of the ship and then learning to operate this immensely complex vessel as part of a battle group will likely require many years of trial and error unrelated to China’s growing shipyard capacity.
escobar
Brigadier
A Smoking Cursor? New Window Opens on China’s Potential Cyberwarfare Development CCTV 7 program raises new questions about Beijing’s support for hacking
Amid growing U.S. concerns of ongoing Chinese cyberattacks, attribution remains the most complex issue. At the open source level at least, it has been hard to find a “smoking cursor.” That is, until the broadcast of a recent cyberwarfare program on the military channel of China’s state television network. It appeared to show dated computer screenshots of a Chinese military institute conducting a rudimentary type of cyberattack against a United States-based dissident entity. However modest, ambiguous—and, from China’s perspective, defensive—this is possibly the first direct piece of visual evidence from an official Chinese government source to undermine Beijing’s official claims never to engage in overseas hacking of any kind for government purposes. Clearly, Washington and Beijing have much to discuss candidly here if they are to avoid dangerous strategic tension.
Amid growing U.S. concerns of ongoing Chinese cyberattacks, attribution remains the most complex issue. At the open source level at least, it has been hard to find a “smoking cursor.” That is, until the broadcast of a recent cyberwarfare program on the military channel of China’s state television network. It appeared to show dated computer screenshots of a Chinese military institute conducting a rudimentary type of cyberattack against a United States-based dissident entity. However modest, ambiguous—and, from China’s perspective, defensive—this is possibly the first direct piece of visual evidence from an official Chinese government source to undermine Beijing’s official claims never to engage in overseas hacking of any kind for government purposes. Clearly, Washington and Beijing have much to discuss candidly here if they are to avoid dangerous strategic tension.
escobar
Brigadier
REPORT: Chinese Capabilities for Computer Network Operations and Cyber Espionage
The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission released a report entitled:
“Occupying the Information High Ground: Chinese Capabilities for Computer Network
Operations and Cyber Espionage.” The report details how China is advancing its capabilities in
computer network attack, defense, and exploitation and examines issues related to
cybersecurity, China, and potential risks to U.S. national security and economic interests.
"The United States suffers from continual cyber operations sanctioned or tolerated by the
Chinese government" said Commission Chairman Dennis Shea. "Our nation's national and
economic security are threatened, and as the Chinese government funds research to improve
its advanced cyber capabilities these threats will continue to grow. This report is timely as the
United States Congress is currently considering cybersecurity legislation, and the Commission
hopes that this work will be useful to the Congress as it deliberates on how to best protect our
networks."
"The report highlights China's extensive development of cyber tools to advance the leadership's
objectives” said Commissioner Michael Wessel. “It's getting harder and harder for China's
leaders to claim ignorance and innocence as to the massive electronic reconnaissance and cyber
intrusions activities directed by Chinese interests at the U.S. government and our private sector.
The report identifies specific doctrinal intent as well as financial support for government-
sponsored cyber espionage capabilities. There's clear and present danger that is increasing
every day."
This report was prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission by
Northrop Grumman Corp, and is a follow-up to a 2009 report prepared for the Commission by
Northrop Grumman on the “Capability of the People’s Republic of China to Conduct Cyber
Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation.”
The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission released a report entitled:
“Occupying the Information High Ground: Chinese Capabilities for Computer Network
Operations and Cyber Espionage.” The report details how China is advancing its capabilities in
computer network attack, defense, and exploitation and examines issues related to
cybersecurity, China, and potential risks to U.S. national security and economic interests.
"The United States suffers from continual cyber operations sanctioned or tolerated by the
Chinese government" said Commission Chairman Dennis Shea. "Our nation's national and
economic security are threatened, and as the Chinese government funds research to improve
its advanced cyber capabilities these threats will continue to grow. This report is timely as the
United States Congress is currently considering cybersecurity legislation, and the Commission
hopes that this work will be useful to the Congress as it deliberates on how to best protect our
networks."
"The report highlights China's extensive development of cyber tools to advance the leadership's
objectives” said Commissioner Michael Wessel. “It's getting harder and harder for China's
leaders to claim ignorance and innocence as to the massive electronic reconnaissance and cyber
intrusions activities directed by Chinese interests at the U.S. government and our private sector.
The report identifies specific doctrinal intent as well as financial support for government-
sponsored cyber espionage capabilities. There's clear and present danger that is increasing
every day."
This report was prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission by
Northrop Grumman Corp, and is a follow-up to a 2009 report prepared for the Commission by
Northrop Grumman on the “Capability of the People’s Republic of China to Conduct Cyber
Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation.”
escobar
Brigadier
A Chinese oil pipeline being built through Myanmar has not been affected by fighting between Myanmar forces and rebels, a Chinese security official said on Saturday, adding that China had been trying to help find a solution to the conflict.
A 17-year-old ceasefire with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), one of the Myanmar's most powerful rebel groups, broke down last June sending Kachins fleeing across the long border with China into tent settlements.
Northern Myanmar's Kachin State is of strategic importance to China and sustained conflict could have an impact on its plans to use the region as a conduit for energy to its southwest provinces.
Construction of twin oil and gas pipeline from the Bay of Bengal, through Kachin State, to China's Yunnan province is underway and the region is home to several hydropower projects exporting electricity to China.
"Lots of Chinese companies have invested a great deal in Myanmar, especially in the oil pipeline which passes through the Kachin State area," Yunnan's security chief Meng Sutie said on the sidelines of China's annual meeting of parliament.
"As far as I know, Myanmar's central government and the Kachin regional government have a positive, supportive attitude towards the building of this pipeline," he added.
"At present, construction is proceeding smoothly and there have been no outstanding problems. The Kachin government, and the central government, have been cooperating well and effectively with us on its building."
The KIA, seeking autonomy in Myanmar, sent a delegation to meet Myanmar negotiators in the Yunnan border town of Ruili this week to try to agree on terms to end the fighting that has displaced an estimated 50,000 people.
"The Yunnan government, in accordance with a request from the central government, is proactively pushing for both sides to find a peaceful resolve their problems, and is proactively engaged in mediation," Meng said.
"We are happy to see that both sides have been in contact with each other. We are providing whatever services we can," he added. "What we have seen is that there has been progress. But the Kachin problem is a long-standing one."
China told Myanmar last month to better secure the border but it denies the existence of the refugees, who are an embarrassment to a government which enjoys close ties with Myanmar and has stood by it for years in the face of Western sanctions.
But Meng said the Yunnan government had been providing humanitarian aid to the displaced.
"We believe that on the basis of consensus reached by the Chinese and Myanmar governments, and between our regional government and the Kachin organisation, we will appropriately deal with the issue of refugees coming in," he added.
Meng said at most there were 3,000 Kachins seeking refuge in China, though Kachin groups have put the number at about 10,000.
The European Union and the United States have made peace deals with ethnic minority rebels a pre-requisite for lifting sanctions on the former Burma, put in place after a bloody crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations in 1988.
Some rebel groups have fought the government since shortly after independence from Britain in 1948.
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