PLAN Amphibious assault capability

As much as invasion across the strait is discussed, what if China was able to establish air superiority on day 0, and naval superiority out to 300nm on day 1. Would China under any circumstances choose to land on the eastern side?

The reason I pose the question is because the vast majority of major amphibious assault assets in the PLAN are based in Zhanjiang, which is nowhere near Taiwan. If the amphibious ships approached from Zhanjiang, the difference between landing in the southeast and southwest is about 3 hours at sea tops, which is not much time at all if the difference in defenders numbers is a brigade, nevermind a division.

China doesnot need to invade Taiwan, they just have to use psychological war against them. In the end they will capitulate and become unified with the PRC. There's no need for war.

When the Taiwanese will see how powerful China has become economically and military they will know it will be useless to fight.

Brain is better than Brawn

PLA will never carry out Amphibious assault if they do not gain air superiority. Using D-Day as a guide line for PRC Amphibious assault on Taiwan is also flaw. With always ever improving technology,less and less manpower are required to transport over. PLus we have not factor in airborne abilities of PLAAF. Helo capabilites is absent in D-Day scenario. While is a luxurious in Taiwan scenario. Cos I expect each helo of PLAAF to conduct at least 3 sorties with pinpoint accuracy unlike air transport plane. (3 in fact is a ultra low estimation)

Galrahn said:

As much as invasion across the strait is discussed, what if China was able to establish air superiority on day 0, and naval superiority out to 300nm on day 1. Would China under any circumstances choose to land on the eastern side?

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Hello Galrahn,

Please look at this map of Taiwan:


The eastern 2/3rds of the island is mostly covered with mountains. The bulk of Taiwan's population and cities are located to the western lowlands.

I suppose it's possible to land to the west, but from military point of view it doesn't make sense to make your troops climb over mountains like Hannibal -- assume the defending ROC forces would've blown up roads and bridges.

I recently did a paper on the ability of the Chinese to successfully invade Taiwan. I noted that due to the distances involved, it will take a ship 12 hours traveling at around 4 knots or 8km/h (which is somewhat unrealistic, as most Chinese amphibious assets are able to travel at least twice that speed) to travel between Taiwan and the mainland.

If the Chinese had prepositioned their equipment wisely so that when a ship returns, it can be quickly loaded, I say and agree with the earlier statement that the Chinese have the ability to deliver 1 heavy (armoured) division plus 3 airborne (light brigade) each day. That excludes of course, the Chinese using their civilian ship assets, of which I placed the number of over 2,500 merchantmen with a total of 37 million deadweight tonnage in 2000, with an average of each ship being around 14,800 deadweight tonnes each (this is from a document from the Chinese Ministry of Communication). The Chinese will most likely supplement their amphibious assault capabilities with Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT).

adeptitus said:

The eastern 2/3rds of the island is mostly covered with mountains. The bulk of Taiwan's population and cities are located to the western lowlands.

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I understand that, I have been to Taiwan a couple times. However the mtns make it just as difficult to counter attack, make it easier to fortify positions after landing, and it isn't quite what it seems because there are still plenty of beaches on the western side that could be used for a beach landing of heavy equipment.

The western side isn't where you would want to land Armor in large numbers, however it is perfect for landing engineers to set up a forward air field for helicopter operations on the island.

This is all theoretical, because to be honest I don't think the Chinese would even make it to the beach in useful numbers if they tried to come across the strait. If that battle ever occurs, the weapon that decides the conflict will be the sea mine. There are reasons why large areas of the western Taiwan coast are off limits to fishing.

They may not have enough capability but they have enough for power projection into N Korea, I am hearing reports that the 39GA has moved into the border region near the DPRK. Seems the PRC is not very happy with Mr Funny Hair's destabalizing the region. If the PLA gets tasked to effect a regime change to stabalize the region or pre-empt a pro-western coup the landing assets they do have would be ideal, since msot of the N. Korean army is oreinted south.

bd popeye said:

This is intresting. It shows how this forum has matured in since it's inception.

Probally a year ago this type of thread would have started a small brush war among the forum members ending in a nuclear disaster.. But now a year latter we have intelligent discussion. Excellent.

Since it now appears that the PLAN will have probally two LPD's in a few years time what sort of air-cushioned, if any, landing craft will the 071 type ship have? I know we had a thread on this subject but I think no concrete information was produced. Any updates?...

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There is the Type 724. According to Sinodefence the PLAN has 20 to 30.



I was under the impression that the PLAN has several Zubrs from Russia, but that might not be true because I didn't see it on Sinodefence.

Finn McCool said:

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I was under the impression that the PLAN has several Zubrs from Russia, but that might not be true because I didn't see it on Sinodefence.

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look at this

The whole D-day scenario is completely obsolete regarding an analysis of the current situation existing between the straits.

Crude military power used like in WW 2 would be simply dysfunctional and totally counterproductive and China is well advised to desist from such a selfdefeating strategy. The campaign eventually achieving the reintegration of Taiwan into some kind of ´Greater China´will rely heavily on economic, social, cultural and (probably pivotal) on psychological factors which will enable China to neutralize Taiwan´s ´anti-China forces´. Indeed the strength of the PLAAF and PLAN will be of secondary importance compared with China´s ability to absorb and redirect Taiwan´s economic and social potential.

Today the PLA primary objective regarding Taiwan is achieving the credible capability of destroying taiwanese military forces and effectively deterring US intervention if splittist forces on Taiwan should cross the ´red line´. The resulting strategic credibilty will be an instrument of utmost importance in the upcoming process of negotiations on ´normalization´with taiwanese leaders. (Beijing understands very well Teddy Roosevelt´s dictum: ´Talk softly but carry a big stick!´)