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PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC
- Thread starter SEAD
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The US, in its long position of geostrategic privilege, will not see it that way.
When you are accustomed to privilege, equality feels like oppression.
Bingo!
I posit that victory required for the PRC is nothing less than securing the international environment for China to flourish, not just survive.
If U.S. + NATO is able to trade the first (or even the second) island chain for a permanent blockade of the PRC then it would be at best a pyrrhic victory, and perhaps even long term defeat, for the PRC.
I don't think so. If regime change occurred in Taiwan, it is at least a political win, which is what actually matters for Taiwan. Otherwise if material conditions were all that mattered, then the rational choice is to just let Taiwan go if they declare independence and the PLA isn't ready, then just build up until they are. But it's not rational, it's political.
Even if the end result is PLAN gets sunk and China is under total sanctions, it doesn't matter. The ships can be rebuilt, supply chains reconfigured. What people historically will remember is that China liberated Taiwan from the clutches of the US and humiliated it. This really boils down to a US ego issue - can they handle being 'humiliated' by a regime change in Taiwan?
The West can’t build like the Chinese do. As long as China retain her industrial capabilities, she will outbuild the West and come out on top. The land portion of the Belt & Road will provide all the materials PRC needs to rebuild her military.
Thanks for the answer.
Well, to be honest I disagree with your assessment somewhat in terms of what "victory conditions" mean for China.
In fact, I think lzmfVw put it most succinctly in his post above -- "I posit that victory required for the PRC is nothing less than securing the international environment for China to flourish, not just survive".
That is to say, I think the victory conditions of such a conflict would require not only China to be able to exact regime change on Taiwan, but also for the aftermath of any conflict to be one where the PRC is militarily ahead of most other global powers, and still possesses significant power projection capabilities and retaining a large part of its pre-war conventional military capabilities (as well as its civilian industries and the majority of its trade relationships and still possessing sufficient energy routes to power a competitive, post-conflict economy).
Putting it another way, assessing the outcomes of a conflict over Taiwan, from the Chinese pov, is not only about the political status of Taiwan, but also about China's ability to navigate and compete and defend its interests after the conflict is finished.
What you describe, IMO would be much more like draws, or pyrrhic victories at best.
I disagree. As long as the US can’t destroy China’s industrial capabilities, China will switch to a war time economy, outbuild the entire West and goes for round two,
This is self-contradicting though. If China can expel the US from the second or even just the first chain of islands, how will the US then be able to create the "permanent blockade of the PRC"?
I would say that's called a draw and going for "round two".
That's not called "victory," unless one calls victory as "still having a chance to live and fight another day".
well, I am just looking at the minimum acceptable scenario for PRC leadership. it would be nice if PRC 'secured the international environment required to flourish' but that's a bigger goal. The immediate goal is, if Taiwan declares independence, they get regime changed. anything more is a bonus. anything less is partial defeat.