I can understand yours as well. However, Ukraine and China are *very* different matters.
The US has little to no reason to get involved in Ukraine - we're perfectly content drawing blood by proxy. Taiwan on the other hand is considered symbolic of US hegemony in the WESTPAC, and the political discourse is (currently at least) very much in the direction of intervention. Nuclear power or not doesn't matter that much. China is not going to nuke the US for intervening, and we are not going to nuke China for invading. If the US were to invade the PRC and somehow succeed, then sure - yeah, maybe the nukes come into play. However, in all non-existential scenarios, they're a tool for deterrence and deterrence only.
A Chinese economic collapse caused by a war in the Western Pacific is an existential issue for China. But for the US, the Western Pacific is not existential.
Once China has parity in terms of its nuclear arsenal, what would be the US response if China was losing and launched a small tactical nuke at a military target on Japanese or Australian soil, and which resulted in fewer casualties than a US carrier being sunk? Remember that China now has nuclear parity and can continue escalating because the Western Pacific matters far more to China than the US.
I agree that Taiwan is symbolic of US hegemony in the Western Pacific.
But for the past 2 millenia, China has been the natural hegemon from a economic, political and military perspective in the Western Pacific. From the Chinese point of view, the past 100 years or so have been a historical aberration.
Frankly, I was more referring to the ability of US Bombers from Diego Garcia and AU to generate salvos targeting SCS military installations, and the ability of the US to achieve local force parity south and west of the SCS. COMSUBPAC has everything within a couple hundred nm of the second island chain fairly comprehensively locked down for the time being, so until the PLA expands its expeditionary ASW capability by a significant margin, I don't view surface force sorties out much farther than a bit beyond the 1IC to be prudent.
The SCS military installations are definitely a secondary target.
What does attacking these actually accomplish given the primary PLA target is Taiwan?
And unless an amphibious operation wrests away control of the SCS islands, the Chinese can regenerate the facilities as they are relatively close to China.
And if US bombers launch JASSMs at the SCS or Malacca Straits, these have to cross Indonesian or Malaysian territory.
Do you see Indonesia or Malaysia being very happy with a situation which turns their internal waters into a warzone?
They would be obliged to shoot down these US bombers/JASSMs and deny the US access to their airspace.
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