Interceptors don’t change the trajectory, air do. A reentry vehicle do almost Brownian motion once aerodynamic profile is broken.
PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC
- Thread starter SEAD
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But a DF-26 reentry vehicle is largely on a ballistic trajectory to its target, albeit with some manoeuvring.
The reentry vehicle payload has the same trajectory, and comprises (tens? of thousands) of small tungsten ball bearings, each with the kinetic energy equivalent to a cluster bomblet or gun round.
And each of these round tungsten ball bearings is designed to disperse independently in the air on their current trajectory.
Plus you still haven't address the huge cost disadvantage of trying to use THAAD to defend against incoming DF-26.
The estimate is that the Chinese military currently have 80 DF-26 launchers and Guam only has 1 THAAD battery with 48 interceptors.
Couple of comments.
1. You need IRBMs to reach Guam from mainland China, not smaller MRBMs
2. H-20s launching 250kg JDAM equivalents (at a range of 20km) at the beginning is pushing it in my opinion. Instead you could launch a larger number of SDB-type weapons from 100km away, still at an acceptable cost. SDBs are perfectly adequate against soft targets like any aircraft.
The B-2 payload has a payload of 108 SDBs or 80 JDAMs for example.
Costings are around $25K for a JDAM, $40K for a SDB-1, $200K for SDB-2
3. China has hardened mountain airbases where SDBs and JDAMs don't really work.
Sure, ballistic missiles long enough to reach Guam.
When I mention pgms, I am referring to ones that can glide, so that h20 can launch them from 150km out. The Ukraine conflict shows that they clearly need investment in this area. If each h20 can carry 60 pgms and you can have 10 sorties a day, that would take out any military base. And then you would also add ucav payload to that and maybe you will be willing to have ucavs carry 100kg pgms.
Most of the US/Chinese glide bombs look like they are in the 100-125kg class, rather than 250kg.
I suspect that you get a lot less range with a 250kg glide bomb, more space occupied in the internal bomb bays and the smaller warhead doesn't really matter for soft targets like aircraft or vehicles.
China's gonna have to sink those carriers, instead of simply distracting them.
USN Carriers will be one of the highest value targets on China's list.
The efficacy of carriers will also be tested in the 21st century.
They have yet to prove their survivability against current systems.
All land and naval radar systems can be trivially bypassed by sea skimming. Indeed this is one of Chinese bomber’s asymmetric advantage relative to US bombers—sea skimming over the uninhabited Pacific ocean is a viable strategy whereas doing the same over densely populated Eastern China is not.
Airborne radars are limited by size. Typical US AWAC operate over UHF (E-2) or L band (E-3, E-7), whereas the preferred terrestrial early warning anti-stealth radars operate in the VHF band a.k.a metric wave radars. Even VHF band may not be low enough for large strategic bombers so radars of even lower frequency (HF) may be necessary to detect stealth bombers.
If we assume -20dBsm for the H-20 in UHF band (which would be quite bad), and E-2 has a range of 400km against 1 m^2 target, then the detection range against H-20 would be reduced to only 100km. I will overlay a 100km detection bubble over the Pacific.
Notice how small it is and how impossible it is to create a continuous line of these bubbles from Japan to Indonesia and maintain it 24/7.
Further consider the -20dBsm would be a very conservative RCS and the criterion for VLO is typically set at -30dBsm, which would further half the detection range down to 50km. Moreover, H-20 would have sophisticated EW systems, which would warn of incoming radar emissions at beyond detection range so that the pilots adjust route to avoid detection.
An attack on Guam should transit the First Island Chain through the Luzon Strait, between Taiwan and the Philippines. The distance from US strongholds on Okinawa means AWACs, even if they do venture this far, will not have much fighter cover. J-20s have more than enough range to escort H-20s if necessary.
We can add route planning to bypass additional pop up threats, like US CBGs. Again, it cannot be underscored enough that due to square vs 4th-power difference between radar warning receiver vs radar equations, radar warning receivers should always detect radar first.
Therefore, assuming H-20 achieves -20dBsm RCS against UHF to X band and 10,000km range, I would argue the US cannot detect H-20 and prevent it from launching stand-off missiles against Guam.
Airborne radars are limited by size. Typical US AWAC operate over UHF (E-2) or L band (E-3, E-7), whereas the preferred terrestrial early warning anti-stealth radars operate in the VHF band a.k.a metric wave radars. Even VHF band may not be low enough for large strategic bombers so radars of even lower frequency (HF) may be necessary to detect stealth bombers.
If we assume -20dBsm for the H-20 in UHF band (which would be quite bad), and E-2 has a range of 400km against 1 m^2 target, then the detection range against H-20 would be reduced to only 100km. I will overlay a 100km detection bubble over the Pacific.
Notice how small it is and how impossible it is to create a continuous line of these bubbles from Japan to Indonesia and maintain it 24/7.
Further consider the -20dBsm would be a very conservative RCS and the criterion for VLO is typically set at -30dBsm, which would further half the detection range down to 50km. Moreover, H-20 would have sophisticated EW systems, which would warn of incoming radar emissions at beyond detection range so that the pilots adjust route to avoid detection.
An attack on Guam should transit the First Island Chain through the Luzon Strait, between Taiwan and the Philippines. The distance from US strongholds on Okinawa means AWACs, even if they do venture this far, will not have much fighter cover. J-20s have more than enough range to escort H-20s if necessary.
We can add route planning to bypass additional pop up threats, like US CBGs. Again, it cannot be underscored enough that due to square vs 4th-power difference between radar warning receiver vs radar equations, radar warning receivers should always detect radar first.
Therefore, assuming H-20 achieves -20dBsm RCS against UHF to X band and 10,000km range, I would argue the US cannot detect H-20 and prevent it from launching stand-off missiles against Guam.
Exactly. That’s what I mean by “try to simulate in CMO and the map speaks”
indeed the continuous line should be from Alaska to Vietnam.
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I think that e2 is likely to offer pretty close to l band if it can guide missiles to target. Kj2000 is supposedly at 1.4 GHz. I would imagine kj500 is between 1 and 1.4 GHz. Chinese counter stealth radar are likely closer to 300 MHz. They are also humongous. My point is that not all uhf range are created equal. I think -20dbsm against h20 is reasonable. With h20 ew pressure, it's probably hard for e2 to track h20 out to 100 km. As such, there will be plenty of room for h20 to fly around e2 presence. Since Chinese satellites are likely to be able to track us carrier movement in the region, I think h20 will be able to fly route to avoid it. The bigger question is how close it can get to Guam without being detected.
For glide bombs, you have seen those ls6 kits back in the days. I am sure that something launched from really high at mach 0.6 to 0.75 can fly 150 km to the target. China really just needs to step up it's game and build that large arsenal of glide pgms. Don't be cheap.
As for attacking carriers, tht belongs to the anti ship missiles thread.
I think this is a continuous game between the two sides. Usaf will look to keep improving it's bmd and ability to operate off short take off. China will look to keep improving and add the number of ballistic and cruise missiles it has.
But imo, the addition of h20 and a quiet 095 are huge game changers to the equations. Even if us adds b21 and a new generation of nuclear subs, it would only make their existing strategic force a little more potent. On the other hand, china adding h20 and 095 will give them massive capabilities they didn't have before. It would also give them additional capabilities to deter usn in south china sea that they didn't have before.
I think h6 platform still has quite a lot of important in launching long range lacm and hypersonic anti ship missiles. You probably want to use them for that purpose rather than venturing further out to drop pgms on usaf bases.
For glide bombs, you have seen those ls6 kits back in the days. I am sure that something launched from really high at mach 0.6 to 0.75 can fly 150 km to the target. China really just needs to step up it's game and build that large arsenal of glide pgms. Don't be cheap.
As for attacking carriers, tht belongs to the anti ship missiles thread.
I think this is a continuous game between the two sides. Usaf will look to keep improving it's bmd and ability to operate off short take off. China will look to keep improving and add the number of ballistic and cruise missiles it has.
But imo, the addition of h20 and a quiet 095 are huge game changers to the equations. Even if us adds b21 and a new generation of nuclear subs, it would only make their existing strategic force a little more potent. On the other hand, china adding h20 and 095 will give them massive capabilities they didn't have before. It would also give them additional capabilities to deter usn in south china sea that they didn't have before.
I think h6 platform still has quite a lot of important in launching long range lacm and hypersonic anti ship missiles. You probably want to use them for that purpose rather than venturing further out to drop pgms on usaf bases.