PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

• In 1967, Israel faced an Egyptian force that was, on paper, the equal to their own in Sinai. After a successful sneak attack on Egypt's airbases, terror, confusion, and panic struck even the highest echelons of Egypt's command, leading to a disorderly rout to the Suez. A theoretically superior force was then smashed by the pursuing Israelis with few losses of their own.
• In 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, Pakistani POWs outnumbered killed and wounded by almost three to one.
• In 1982, after defeating an Iranian tank force the previous year, the Iraqi army in Iran was routed completely by an offensive supported by a human wave attack that likely would have failed if they had just stood their ground.
• In 1988 Iraqi offensives to drive Iran from its territory, IRGC troops, for all their supposed love for martyrdom, were taken prisoner by the thousands. The remainder of the army - some hundreds of thousands - fled in an disorganized rout, leaving behind the majority of all the heavy equipment left in Iran's inventory.
• In the Persian Gulf War, Iraqi pilots mid-way into the coalition air campaign refused to take off. Contra popular belief, they were doing some damage to the coalition air forces, especially with their faster jets like the MiG-25.
• Also in that war, numerous experts predicted tens of thousands of coalition casualties in the face of an Iraqi military that was, on paper, strong. Instead, "Shock and Awe" ran its course. After the destruction of the Iraqi IADS and a whithering air campaign, coalition forces did not meet hardened resistance from a veteran army, but scattered clashes and groups eager to surrender.
• An extreme repeat of this happened in 2003, where an almost absurdly small American force managed to occupy all the major cities of Iraq. Saddam's forces, including his "elite" Republican Guard, scattered like the wind when they realized things were going poorly.
• In 2001, the Taliban in Afghanistan collapsed far, far quicker than the Americans expected. The city of Mazar i Sharif was expected to hold out for months, but, in the face of a modern air campaign, its defense dispersed in a single day.
• Even ISIL fighters, for all their boasting of self-sacrifice, were overcome with a self-preservation instinct in the face of the US-led air campaign. SOHR estimated that, at its peak, ISIS had 80-100,000 fighters. The death or capture of less than half of these are accounted for.

• Paradigms for studying war are still largely stuck in WW2. In some cases this is explicit - the Soviet GenStab in the 1980s was still extrapolating many of its predictions from WW2.
• Morale in war is far less predictable than material. There is no good way to integrate it into a computer simulation. This leads to a case of the McNamara Paradox: what can't be measured is disregarded.
• Maneuvers are drilled in an environment of safety, taking the morale factor entirely out of warfare. As a result, armies tend towards doctrines that assume fear doesn't exist.
• People are always bravest the farther they are from danger. No great power has fought another since Korea, save for minor skirmishes, and senior officers today (unavoidably) do not command from the front.
• No senior officer wants to acknowledge that their forces might be overcome with panic, or not want to do what they've trained to do. "Confidence in safety" above often turns to bravado in safety, and anyone who criticizes the best plan on paper on the basis that it won't be followed will be accused of cowardice, defeatism, or insulting the honor of the men. This has happened countless times, from the doctrinal debates before the Franco-Prussian War, to those before World War 1, to those before World War 2, etc.

zlixOS said:

(Part 2)

• In 1967, Israel faced an Egyptian force that was, on paper, the equal to their own in Sinai. After a successful sneak attack on Egypt's airbases, terror, confusion, and panic struck even the highest echelons of Egypt's command, leading to a disorderly rout to the Suez. A theoretically superior force was then smashed by the pursuing Israelis with few losses of their own.
• In 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, Pakistani POWs outnumbered killed and wounded by almost three to one.
• In 1982, after defeating an Iranian tank force the previous year, the Iraqi army in Iran was routed completely by an offensive supported by a human wave attack that likely would have failed if they had just stood their ground.
• In 1988 Iraqi offensives to drive Iran from its territory, IRGC troops, for all their supposed love for martyrdom, were taken prisoner by the thousands. The remainder of the army - some hundreds of thousands - fled in an disorganized rout, leaving behind the majority of all the heavy equipment left in Iran's inventory.
• In the Persian Gulf War, Iraqi pilots mid-way into the coalition air campaign refused to take off. Contra popular belief, they were doing some damage to the coalition air forces, especially with their faster jets like the MiG-25.
• Also in that war, numerous experts predicted tens of thousands of coalition casualties in the face of an Iraqi military that was, on paper, strong. Instead, "Shock and Awe" ran its course. After the destruction of the Iraqi IADS and a whithering air campaign, coalition forces did not meet hardened resistance from a veteran army, but scattered clashes and groups eager to surrender.
• An extreme repeat of this happened in 2003, where an almost absurdly small American force managed to occupy all the major cities of Iraq. Saddam's forces, including his "elite" Republican Guard, scattered like the wind when they realized things were going poorly.
• In 2001, the Taliban in Afghanistan collapsed far, far quicker than the Americans expected. The city of Mazar i Sharif was expected to hold out for months, but, in the face of a modern air campaign, its defense dispersed in a single day.
• Even ISIL fighters, for all their boasting of self-sacrifice, were overcome with a self-preservation instinct in the face of the US-led air campaign. SOHR estimated that, at its peak, ISIS had 80-100,000 fighters. The death or capture of less than half of these are accounted for.

You could make the argument that in all these wars, one side was decisively superior to the other. This is inevitable because of how few examples of high intensity wars in the 60s and beyond exist, but misses the point. In each of the above cases, the combat damage the winning force did to the losing force paled in comparison to the damage done by panic and collapse. In at least two of these cases - 1967 and 1982 - the winner wasn't materially superior to the loser, and won simply because the loser lost his nerve and ran.
In the face of modern artillery and air support, there are no indecisive battles. In every operation since 1960 where one or both sides have access to significant firepower, someone has won big because the other side broke.
Russia and China, of course, are more capable than Saddam's Iraq, but that just means the resources dedicated to the war by the US, and therefore the damage on both sides, will be greater. This could not possibly result in a better morale situation for either side than the Gulf War. In any peer or near peer conflict, one of the two sides (and not necessarily the materially weaker one, as seen in the Six Day War) will collapse in the first weeks, and the rest of the war will be mopup in comparison.
The reasons military wargames consistently forecast these horrendous losses despite much historical evidence that losses will not be as extreme are many:

• Paradigms for studying war are still largely stuck in WW2. In some cases this is explicit - the Soviet GenStab in the 1980s was still extrapolating many of its predictions from WW2.
• Morale in war is far less predictable than material. There is no good way to integrate it into a computer simulation. This leads to a case of the McNamara Paradox: what can't be measured is disregarded.
• Maneuvers are drilled in an environment of safety, taking the morale factor entirely out of warfare. As a result, armies tend towards doctrines that assume fear doesn't exist.
• People are always bravest the farther they are from danger. No great power has fought another since Korea, save for minor skirmishes, and senior officers today (unavoidably) do not command from the front.
• No senior officer wants to acknowledge that their forces might be overcome with panic, or not want to do what they've trained to do. "Confidence in safety" above often turns to bravado in safety, and anyone who criticizes the best plan on paper on the basis that it won't be followed will be accused of cowardice, defeatism, or insulting the honor of the men. This has happened countless times, from the doctrinal debates before the Franco-Prussian War, to those before World War 1, to those before World War 2, etc.

My commentary:

So who will be the last to chicken out in this continuation of the People's War --- one centered around Taiwan? I think not it will be the Taiwanese civilian, who either a) cares not whose leadership they fall under (read KMT/GMD), or b) are too weak-willed to fight (read DPP/MJD). I also think not it will be the Taiwanese soldier, who either a) is already spying for the CCP and has signed surrender documents in advance, or b) is too weak-willed to fight, trusting not his comrades-in-arms. The only man who will stand up for his island pseudonation is that of one who believes that if he holds out long enough, Uncle Sam will bail him out. Unfortunately for them, most of the ROC's conscript army has not the fortitude.

Compare this to the PRC. Every soldier in the PLA is a volunteer patriot, and every man who supports the annexation effort believes in his heart that Taiwan is an island territory of China. That alone will drive morale, fighting spirit, confidence, espirit de corps, and thus performance on the beaches of Kaohsiung/Gaoxiong.

If we are comparing will and bravery to determine battlefield outcomes, I think the PLA will come out securely on top.

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Bellum_Romanum said:

I don’t understand the logic of the arguments put forward by these two numbskulls. There’s no amount of “will and bravery” that can withstand a determined juggernaut backed by history, culture, politics, and the entire society’s goal of reunifying what is essentially a wayward island. The number of fighting forces, the industrial capacity, and the ability to both inflict and endure pain are heavily lopsided in favor of the PRC, making what these two clowns are asking for not only improbable but impossible.

Consider Ukraine, an almost landlocked country—Crimea was taken over and recaptured by the Russians—that is also connected to the larger European continent. It has a fighting force with a history of bravery and commitment to the defense of their motherland, not to mention an industrial capacity that dwarfs that of Taiwan. Yet, even Ukraine struggled against Russia. So, what chance do the Taiwanese people and society as a whole have against the behemoth that is China?

If the suggestion here is that America can join in the fray, is this a serious proposal? Or is it just something that’s often debated in defense circles and think tanks but not implemented as a national strategy backed by actual laws passed in Congress? Such a strategy would necessitate American blood and treasure to defend Taiwan in the event of forced reunification or if the DPP is foolish enough to declare independence.

Most importantly, no matter how the Americans and their Western cohorts bend and twist the truth, the fact of the matter is that Taiwan is part of China based on international law, U.N. recognition, the Potsdam Declaration, and the Shanghai Communiqué. Everything else is just perfunctory noise and deliberate obfuscation of the truth to fit the U.S. and Western narrative.

A fact often overlooked by these misguided individuals is that in both Afghanistan and Iraq—countries that have seen more than their fair share of bloodshed, combat, and human deprivation—the local forces could not be effectively taught the ways of modern combat, even after the supposed “excellent training” and gargantuan amounts of money spent by the U.S. and its allies. Take the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan as the most recent example: a decade or more of training the Afghan soldiers and military melted away rather quickly, in less than a week after the American withdrawal. That’s from a society known for its warrior culture. Yet, these American enthusiasts and this Taiwanese commentator imagine that Taiwanese society and its general population, which have forgotten combat, hardship, and the horrors of war, can somehow be magically hardened in both spirit and will.

The guise of using “freedom and democracy” as its raison d’être to summon courage and fight from the people totally disregards history, culture, and a serious study of war.

What these two clowns argue is nothing but wishful fantasy, similar to the wishes and fantasies concocted by neocon stalwarts like Mr. Wolfowitz, who arrogantly declared in Congress during the hearing on the impending Iraq War that American troops would be greeted as liberators and that the war costs would pay for themselves. Clearly, history has proven him wrong, and the American people seem unwilling to learn their lesson. To choose to fight against a peer enemy whose intellectual capacity ranks among the very top, combined with its industrial capacity, know-how, the support of the whole society, and the political will to see their mission (reunification with Taiwan) completed, will, in my view, result in the U.S. suffering a catastrophic loss that can only be salvaged via the use of nuclear weapons—something they considered using against China when China was largely a peasant agricultural country. Unfortunately for America, doing so now would invite mutual destruction.

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tamsen_ikard said:

The only reason US and Taiwanese can think they can fight China and somehow win is because China's extremely low military spending of just 1.2% of GDP officially and1.5% SIPRI estimate. If this was double of what it is now, imagine if China had 4000 fighters instead of 2000 now. 800 J-20 instead of 3-400 now. 6 carriers already operational. This was possible if China spent more money in the last 10-15 years.

I think if that was the case then Taiwanese would forget about fighting china at all. Taiwanese voters would have voted KMT to power instead to sue for peace or status quo. Hard power matters. Numbers also matter. China's low military spending has allowed its adversaries to be so aggressive.

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manqiangrexue said:

Yes, but it's a balance. If China did this 15 years ago, it would have less money to spend on research so maybe the 2 6th gens would not be flying yet. Maybe WS-15 would not be ready yet. Same applies to our navy and more importantly, our missile forces, which are arguable the most important.

Also, China's economy and technological absorption grew in leaps and bounds throughout the last 2 decades. If we armed up too early and the West became alarmed, we may have had to fight the trade and tech wars 15 years earlier when we were much weaker, and that outcome may not favor us.

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FairAndUnbiased said:

I must point out there are 2 wars after WW2 where the participants did, in fact, fight to the death and were willing+capable to both inflict and suffer horrible casualties:

1. Korea
2. Vietnam

See something in common?

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zlixOS said:

Korea still fell under the umbrella of WWII, and Vietnam was a guerilla revolutionary war.

But both were limited wars, and according to the same deleted Reddit account, "[d]isintegration [was] still possible but less likely simply because both sides have reserves never engaged."
And even then, at every tactical and brigade-level fight was decisively won or lost.

When Taiwan commits every soldier and tank and New Taiwan Dollar to resisting full annexation, it will most certainly be all or nothing die or flee.

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Luke Warmwar said:

As a counterpoint, the examples of cowardice given are all instances where men can see the whites of their enemies’ eyes. In a Taiwan scenario, the primary battlefield will fought in the air and on the sea, or via missiles or drones kilometres away.

In those conflicts, there’s no opportunity for last minute defection. You’re in a vessel with your comrades, or you’re in an air conditioned room. If we’re seeing large scale land engagements, then the battle is likely already decided.

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