PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

A

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
Matheus S said:
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Are helicopters actually the best way to cross the Taiwan Straits?

An Mi-17 helicopter costs $18 Million and has a payload of 30 troops or 5 tonnes.

In comparison, a Type-072A LST likely costs about $14M and has a payload of approx 18 medium vehicles or 500+ tonnes.
That is based on the cost of the Indonesian Teluk Bintuni LSTs which are roughly the same length (120m) and displacement (4800tonnes) which cost $13.5 Million each.

Yes, LSTs are slower, but over the course of a day, the LST would be able to land far more troops and equipment than a helicopter.
Plus the LSTs would be a lot cheaper to operate and less vulnerable than a helicopter.

If the helicopters already exist, then yes, they might as well be used.
But for resupply and landing larger numbers of troops, more landing ships are the way to go.
The larger Type-071 LPDs look too big (25000tonnes) and expensive ($200 Million for the Thai export variant).
But the Type-072s are big enough to fit a single Mechanised Combined Arms Company.

---

Looking at the existing amphibious fleet, it looks like there is enough sealift for the combat vehicles of 2 Amphibious Mechanised Brigades in the Chinese Army.

But there are actually 6 Army Amphibious Mechanised Brigades in total. Given the 2027 target to build the capability to successfully invade and conquer Taiwan, if China wanted to land the combat elements of all these Brigades on Taiwan in the single wave with LSTs, I get a figure of an extra 104 Type-072A LST for these 4 Brigades. The resupply elements would follow 12+ hours later once the LSTs sail back to Chinese ports to load up.

---

In terms of Light Infantry Brigades, small landing craft like the Type-067 LCU (135tonnes) would work. My guestimate is that they might only cost $2-4 Million each. But each craft could carry a company of infantry troops along with their Unmanned Ground Vehicles. So my guess is that 24 of these LCUs would be enough to transport the combat elements of an Infantry Brigade. I see 4 Infantry Brigades assigned to the 3 Army Corps on the Coast which also have Amphibious Brigades. Plus there are many more Infantry Brigades assigned to other Army Corps.

Taiwan would primarily be an infantry/drone/recon battle because the terrain is mostly mountainous or urban.

---

These LSTs and LCUs are well within the capabilities of Chinese shipyards to build quickly and cheaply.
104 Type-072A LST would have an acquisition cost of $1.5 Billion. Another 96 Type-067 LCU might cost $0.4 Billion

So by 2027, we could be looking at the combat elements for 6 Army Amphibious Brigades and 4+ Army Infantry Brigades via landing craft in a single wave onto beaches in Taiwan. You'd be looking at over 300 landing craft in the area, covered by at least 30 Air Defence Destroyers and Frigates. That's a minimum of 2000 SAMs plus overhead AWACs and fighter cover.

And then there would also be Airborne Brigades via plane and helicopter, along with Marine Amphibious Brigades via the Type-071 LPDs and the Type-075 LHDs.
 
Suetham

Suetham

Senior Member
Registered Member
AndrewS said:
Are helicopters actually the best way to cross the Taiwan Straits?

An Mi-17 helicopter costs $18 Million and has a payload of 30 troops or 5 tonnes.

In comparison, a Type-072A LST likely costs about $14M and has a payload of approx 18 medium vehicles or 500+ tonnes.
That is based on the cost of the Indonesian Teluk Bintuni LSTs which are roughly the same length (120m) and displacement (4800tonnes) which cost $13.5 Million each.

Yes, LSTs are slower, but over the course of a day, the LST would be able to land far more troops and equipment than a helicopter.
Plus the LSTs would be a lot cheaper to operate and less vulnerable than a helicopter.

If the helicopters already exist, then yes, they might as well be used.
But for resupply and landing larger numbers of troops, more landing ships are the way to go.
The larger Type-071 LPDs look too big (25000tonnes) and expensive ($200 Million for the Thai export variant).
But the Type-072s are big enough to fit a single Mechanised Combined Arms Company.

---

Looking at the existing amphibious fleet, it looks like there is enough sealift for the combat vehicles of 2 Amphibious Mechanised Brigades in the Chinese Army.

But there are actually 6 Army Amphibious Mechanised Brigades in total. Given the 2027 target to build the capability to successfully invade and conquer Taiwan, if China wanted to land the combat elements of all these Brigades on Taiwan in the single wave with LSTs, I get a figure of an extra 104 Type-072A LST for these 4 Brigades. The resupply elements would follow 12+ hours later once the LSTs sail back to Chinese ports to load up.

---

In terms of Light Infantry Brigades, small landing craft like the Type-067 LCU (135tonnes) would work. My guestimate is that they might only cost $2-4 Million each. But each craft could carry a company of infantry troops along with their Unmanned Ground Vehicles. So my guess is that 24 of these LCUs would be enough to transport the combat elements of an Infantry Brigade. I see 4 Infantry Brigades assigned to the 3 Army Corps on the Coast which also have Amphibious Brigades. Plus there are many more Infantry Brigades assigned to other Army Corps.

Taiwan would primarily be an infantry/drone/recon battle because the terrain is mostly mountainous or urban.

---

These LSTs and LCUs are well within the capabilities of Chinese shipyards to build quickly and cheaply.
104 Type-072A LST would have an acquisition cost of $1.5 Billion. Another 96 Type-067 LCU might cost $0.4 Billion

So by 2027, we could be looking at the combat elements for 6 Army Amphibious Brigades and 4+ Army Infantry Brigades via landing craft in a single wave onto beaches in Taiwan. You'd be looking at over 300 landing craft in the area, covered by at least 30 Air Defence Destroyers and Frigates. That's a minimum of 2000 SAMs plus overhead AWACs and fighter cover.

And then there would also be Airborne Brigades via plane and helicopter, along with Marine Amphibious Brigades via the Type-071 LPDs and the Type-075 LHDs.
Click to expand...
The analysis was not directed towards the replacement of amphibious landing ships by helicopters, the title was very sensational, but the text mentions that a part of the invasion has to be complemented by helicopters.

Some public analyzes warn that the PLA has to transport around 25,000 troops at the beginning of the invasion as a first-tier army that will have the function of holding the beachhead to proceed with the capture of the island. Today, the PLA's amphibious landing capability should likely be able to carry 80% of the total troops that analyzes suggest, i.e. around 20,000 troops, divided into mechanized battalions consisting of hundreds of IFVs and tanks.

The PLAAF could contribute to this first-scale invasion, an air campaign could fulfill a force of a light infantry brigade, which includes around 5000 troops with lightly armored vehicles and artillery. The PLAGF can also contribute to this top-tier force, currently with two air assault brigades capable of deploying around 3,000 troops per helicopter.

PLAN/PLANMC:
The Type 075 is one of the central components in air support in a future amphibious operation (Amp Op) against Taiwan, its ability to carry 30 Z-8, Z-9 and Z-18 helicopters is something that must be addressed. Each Type 075 can carry a mechanized battalion of around 900-1200 soldiers which also includes landing craft. If any Op Amps took place now and all three Type 075s were in service at full combat capability, we would already have an amphibious force of 90 helicopters that could support 2700-3600 troops in a contingency. If we are going to analyze the long term according to the PLAN's planning to have 8 Type 075s, this would give an amphibious force composed of 240 helicopters and 7200-9600 soldiers in an Op Amp, which makes a total of 8 mechanized battalions.

The Z-9, as a light tactical troop transport helicopter, has a capacity to support 10 fully armed soldiers, its internal transport capacity is limited to 1.9 tons.

The Z-8, as a medium troop transport helicopter, has a capacity to transport up to 27 equipped troops, and its internal transport capacity is 3 tons of cargo.

The Z-18, as a medium-heavy troop transport helicopter, can carry up to 4 tons internally. It accommodates around 27 armed passengers.

As the Type 075 air wing will consist of majority of troop transport helicopters, the troop transport capacity of Type 075 helicopters will be between 400-600 troops depending on the air wing configuration and the weight being in the range of 54 -72 tons transported. 3 Type 075 means the airlift capacity is between 1200-1800 soldiers and a total weight of 162-216 tons, if it is 8 Type 075 as per the PLAN planning, the capacity is around 3200-4800 soldiers and a weight 432-576 tonnes transported.

Just for note, I'm disregarding the sea transport capability of the Type 075 as the focus here is on the airlifted capacity in a future contingency against Taiwan, definitely the sea capability is the highest quality of the amphibious vessel capable of transporting multiple vehicles amphibious vehicles, including ZTD-05 amphibious light tanks and ZBD 2000 amphibious infantry fighting vehicles, with a total of 45 amphibious vehicles and at least 2 Type 726A LCACs.

The Type 071 is another key landing ship in an Amp Op against Taiwan. With 8 units currently built and all in service, the PLAN's total amphibious capacity can be said to be sufficient to employ 32 Z-18s, as well as 32 LCAC Type 726A's. Therefore, the total helicopter troop transport capacity of all Type 071 class ships is 864 soldiers and 128 tons transported, which amounts to a battalion of Marines. In total terms, including landing vehicles, the 8 Type 071 ships can supply 2 fully armed Amphibious Brigades.
 
Suetham

Suetham

Senior Member
Registered Member
AndrewS said:
Are helicopters actually the best way to cross the Taiwan Straits?

An Mi-17 helicopter costs $18 Million and has a payload of 30 troops or 5 tonnes.

In comparison, a Type-072A LST likely costs about $14M and has a payload of approx 18 medium vehicles or 500+ tonnes.
That is based on the cost of the Indonesian Teluk Bintuni LSTs which are roughly the same length (120m) and displacement (4800tonnes) which cost $13.5 Million each.

Yes, LSTs are slower, but over the course of a day, the LST would be able to land far more troops and equipment than a helicopter.
Plus the LSTs would be a lot cheaper to operate and less vulnerable than a helicopter.

If the helicopters already exist, then yes, they might as well be used.
But for resupply and landing larger numbers of troops, more landing ships are the way to go.
The larger Type-071 LPDs look too big (25000tonnes) and expensive ($200 Million for the Thai export variant).
But the Type-072s are big enough to fit a single Mechanised Combined Arms Company.

---

Looking at the existing amphibious fleet, it looks like there is enough sealift for the combat vehicles of 2 Amphibious Mechanised Brigades in the Chinese Army.

But there are actually 6 Army Amphibious Mechanised Brigades in total. Given the 2027 target to build the capability to successfully invade and conquer Taiwan, if China wanted to land the combat elements of all these Brigades on Taiwan in the single wave with LSTs, I get a figure of an extra 104 Type-072A LST for these 4 Brigades. The resupply elements would follow 12+ hours later once the LSTs sail back to Chinese ports to load up.

---

In terms of Light Infantry Brigades, small landing craft like the Type-067 LCU (135tonnes) would work. My guestimate is that they might only cost $2-4 Million each. But each craft could carry a company of infantry troops along with their Unmanned Ground Vehicles. So my guess is that 24 of these LCUs would be enough to transport the combat elements of an Infantry Brigade. I see 4 Infantry Brigades assigned to the 3 Army Corps on the Coast which also have Amphibious Brigades. Plus there are many more Infantry Brigades assigned to other Army Corps.

Taiwan would primarily be an infantry/drone/recon battle because the terrain is mostly mountainous or urban.

---

These LSTs and LCUs are well within the capabilities of Chinese shipyards to build quickly and cheaply.
104 Type-072A LST would have an acquisition cost of $1.5 Billion. Another 96 Type-067 LCU might cost $0.4 Billion

So by 2027, we could be looking at the combat elements for 6 Army Amphibious Brigades and 4+ Army Infantry Brigades via landing craft in a single wave onto beaches in Taiwan. You'd be looking at over 300 landing craft in the area, covered by at least 30 Air Defence Destroyers and Frigates. That's a minimum of 2000 SAMs plus overhead AWACs and fighter cover.

And then there would also be Airborne Brigades via plane and helicopter, along with Marine Amphibious Brigades via the Type-071 LPDs and the Type-075 LHDs.
Click to expand...
Part 2:

Now, Taiwan is close enough to mainland China that in an Amp Op, the PLA could carry out airborne invasion helicopter transport out of the mainland and landing on Taiwan's beaches, as both territories are separated by a narrow, wider side. the strait is at a distance of 220 km and the closer side of the strait is at a distance of 130 km, this is close enough for helicopters to make 1-3 round trips before needing to refuel to proceed with the operation depending on the distance travelled. The Z-8 has a range of 700km, the Z-18 with 900km of range and the Z-9 probably around 560km of range.

The Z-8, based on its range, manages to make 2.6 trips before needing to refuel considering the closer side of the strait, and 1.75 trips considering the far side of the strait. The Z-18 can make 3.4 trips before needing to refuel, and can make 2 full trips on the far side of the strait. The Z-9 manages to make 2.1 trips considering the side closer to the strait and 1.2 trips considering the far side of the strait.

Considering the average speed of the Z-8, Z-9 and Z-18 helicopters at 260 km/h at cruising speed, if the distance traveled is 260 km, considering the narrowest side of the crossing, performing the calculation of the time of a trip dividing the average speed/hour by the distance traveled, the travel time is one hour, 30 minutes to arrive and 30 minutes to return, obviously I am disregarding the boarding and disembarkation of the troops that can take some time, this would make my job difficult , but in general terms, a helicopter can make a one-hour round trip from Taiwan, so much faster than amphibious ships, the agility of a helicopter and the proximity of the territories makes an invasion of Taiwan impossible if not When helicopters are used, it is actually a requirement to use them, but not necessarily the most important thing. Almost double the travel time on the far side of the strait.

In a simplistic approach, a helicopter could perform the crossing 4-5 times if the range between the naval air base was 130 km considering the side closer to the strait and 2-3 times considering the side farther from the strait.

In an Op Amp, just a single Z-9 could carry around 7.6-9.5 tons daily and 40-50 troops to Taiwan considering the distance of 130 km. If we consider the distance of 220 km, it could transport 3.8-5.7 tons and 20-30 soldiers to Taiwan daily.

A single Z-8 could carry around 12-15 tons daily and 108-135 troops to Taiwan considering a distance of 130 km. If we consider the distance of 220 km, it could transport 6-9 tons and 54-81 soldiers to Taiwan daily.

A single Z-18 could carry around 16-20 tons daily and 108-135 troops to Taiwan considering a distance of 130 km. If we consider the distance of 220 km, it could transport 8-12 tons and 54-81 soldiers to Taiwan daily.

Just a single Z-8, Z-9 and Z-18 could carry 35.6-44.5 tons and 256-320 soldiers daily considering a distance of 130 km. Considering the far side of the strait, a single Z-8, Z-9 and Z-18 could carry 17.8-26.7 tons and 128-192 soldiers daily.

Now do the math. Let's say a rotational force composed by 10 helicopters Z-8, Z-9 and Z-18, it would be enough to multiply by 10. Now, a force composed by 100 units of each helicopter, which is a reasonably small number compared to the capacity of the PLAN and the Chinese aeronautical industry.

10 Z-8, Z-9 and Z-18: 30

130 km: 356-445 tons and 2560-3200 soldiers.
220 km: 178-267 tons and 1280-1290 soldiers.

50 Z-8, Z-9 and Z-18: 150

130 km: 1780-2225 tons and 12800-16000 soldiers.
220 km: 890-1335 tons and 6400-9600 soldiers.

100 Z-8, Z-9 and Z-18: 300

130 km: 3560-4450 tons and 25600-32000 soldiers.
220 km: 1780-2670 tons and 12800-19200 soldiers.

Simply, the small distance makes things much easier for the PLA for an airborne operation, the above analysis is just a brief mention that rotational capacity in a future contingency in Taiwan cannot be overlooked, it will become a key requirement in addition to of the vessels. Some things in this review may change, for example replacing the Z-8 with the Z-18 will make a carrying capacity even greater, add 10 more Z-18s, 50 Z-18s or 100 Z-18s in place of the Z-8s , those Z-18 carrying all-terrain vehicle (ATV) means 4-5(or 2-3) of these vehicles can be delivered for each Z-18, now put 10 Z-18 carrying ATVs, that means 40- 50(or 20-30) ATVs could be delivered daily, 100 Z-18 transporting ATVs translates to 400-500(or 200-300) delivered daily.

Simply distance makes it possible.

And if I'm not mistaken, of the 6 PLAGF amphibious brigades since the 2017 reform, 4 were transferred to the PLANMC in order to complete the two existing brigades at the time, which increased the size of the PLAMC from around 13,000 to around 13,000. 36,000 people.

Don't despise the airborne capability of an Op Amp against Taiwan.
 
clockwork

clockwork

Junior Member
Registered Member
I don't understand why the LST count in the PLAN is actually dwindling. While large ships/vertical landing (LHDs/LPDs) are obviously important and more should be built, they are vulnerable to Taiwanese AShMs, and how do they expect to land enough armour on Taiwan with such a small and declining number of LSTs? Shouldn't massive numbers of LSTs be built? Unless they think civilian boats can be used for it, but I don't see how when they don't have ports at the front like LSTs to load/offload tanks.

Unless LCACs can just drive all the way across the strait from the mainland? But there aren't that many of those either AFAIK.
 
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S

supersnoop

Major
Registered Member
clockwork said:
I don't understand why the LST count in the PLAN is actually dwindling. While large ships/vertical landing (LHDs/LPDs) are obviously important and more should be built, they are vulnerable to Taiwanese AShMs, and how do they expect to land enough armour on Taiwan with such a small and declining number of LSTs? Shouldn't massive numbers of LSTs be built? Unless they think civilian boats can be used for it, but I don't see how when they don't have ports at the front like LSTs to load/offload tanks.

Unless LCACs can just drive all the way across the strait from the mainland? But there aren't that many of those either AFAIK.
Click to expand...
Congratulations, you have just pointed out one of the big reasons why most rational people do not believe a "Taiwan Invasion" is imminent.
 
A

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
Matheus S said:
Part 2:

Now, Taiwan is close enough to mainland China that in an Amp Op, the PLA could carry out airborne invasion helicopter transport out of the mainland and landing on Taiwan's beaches, as both territories are separated by a narrow, wider side. the strait is at a distance of 220 km and the closer side of the strait is at a distance of 130 km, this is close enough for helicopters to make 1-3 round trips before needing to refuel to proceed with the operation depending on the distance travelled. The Z-8 has a range of 700km, the Z-18 with 900km of range and the Z-9 probably around 560km of range.

The Z-8, based on its range, manages to make 2.6 trips before needing to refuel considering the closer side of the strait, and 1.75 trips considering the far side of the strait. The Z-18 can make 3.4 trips before needing to refuel, and can make 2 full trips on the far side of the strait. The Z-9 manages to make 2.1 trips considering the side closer to the strait and 1.2 trips considering the far side of the strait.

Considering the average speed of the Z-8, Z-9 and Z-18 helicopters at 260 km/h at cruising speed, if the distance traveled is 260 km, considering the narrowest side of the crossing, performing the calculation of the time of a trip dividing the average speed/hour by the distance traveled, the travel time is one hour, 30 minutes to arrive and 30 minutes to return, obviously I am disregarding the boarding and disembarkation of the troops that can take some time, this would make my job difficult , but in general terms, a helicopter can make a one-hour round trip from Taiwan, so much faster than amphibious ships, the agility of a helicopter and the proximity of the territories makes an invasion of Taiwan impossible if not When helicopters are used, it is actually a requirement to use them, but not necessarily the most important thing. Almost double the travel time on the far side of the strait.

In a simplistic approach, a helicopter could perform the crossing 4-5 times if the range between the naval air base was 130 km considering the side closer to the strait and 2-3 times considering the side farther from the strait.

In an Op Amp, just a single Z-9 could carry around 7.6-9.5 tons daily and 40-50 troops to Taiwan considering the distance of 130 km. If we consider the distance of 220 km, it could transport 3.8-5.7 tons and 20-30 soldiers to Taiwan daily.

A single Z-8 could carry around 12-15 tons daily and 108-135 troops to Taiwan considering a distance of 130 km. If we consider the distance of 220 km, it could transport 6-9 tons and 54-81 soldiers to Taiwan daily.

A single Z-18 could carry around 16-20 tons daily and 108-135 troops to Taiwan considering a distance of 130 km. If we consider the distance of 220 km, it could transport 8-12 tons and 54-81 soldiers to Taiwan daily.

Just a single Z-8, Z-9 and Z-18 could carry 35.6-44.5 tons and 256-320 soldiers daily considering a distance of 130 km. Considering the far side of the strait, a single Z-8, Z-9 and Z-18 could carry 17.8-26.7 tons and 128-192 soldiers daily.

Now do the math. Let's say a rotational force composed by 10 helicopters Z-8, Z-9 and Z-18, it would be enough to multiply by 10. Now, a force composed by 100 units of each helicopter, which is a reasonably small number compared to the capacity of the PLAN and the Chinese aeronautical industry.

10 Z-8, Z-9 and Z-18: 30

130 km: 356-445 tons and 2560-3200 soldiers.
220 km: 178-267 tons and 1280-1290 soldiers.

50 Z-8, Z-9 and Z-18: 150

130 km: 1780-2225 tons and 12800-16000 soldiers.
220 km: 890-1335 tons and 6400-9600 soldiers.

100 Z-8, Z-9 and Z-18: 300

130 km: 3560-4450 tons and 25600-32000 soldiers.
220 km: 1780-2670 tons and 12800-19200 soldiers.

Simply, the small distance makes things much easier for the PLA for an airborne operation, the above analysis is just a brief mention that rotational capacity in a future contingency in Taiwan cannot be overlooked, it will become a key requirement in addition to of the vessels. Some things in this review may change, for example replacing the Z-8 with the Z-18 will make a carrying capacity even greater, add 10 more Z-18s, 50 Z-18s or 100 Z-18s in place of the Z-8s , those Z-18 carrying all-terrain vehicle (ATV) means 4-5(or 2-3) of these vehicles can be delivered for each Z-18, now put 10 Z-18 carrying ATVs, that means 40- 50(or 20-30) ATVs could be delivered daily, 100 Z-18 transporting ATVs translates to 400-500(or 200-300) delivered daily.

Simply distance makes it possible.

And if I'm not mistaken, of the 6 PLAGF amphibious brigades since the 2017 reform, 4 were transferred to the PLANMC in order to complete the two existing brigades at the time, which increased the size of the PLAMC from around 13,000 to around 13,000. 36,000 people.

Don't despise the airborne capability of an Op Amp against Taiwan.
Click to expand...

I don't despise airborne or helicopter transport across the Taiwan Straits.
If you already have the helicopters for other reasons, then there's no reason they can't be used.

But helicopters are very limited in the amount of weight they can transport
A single Type-073A LST can transport over 500 tonnes and make almost 2 round trips per day.
That is far more payload than any helicopter.
Plus a single Type-073A LST has a lower overall cost than a helicopter.

A US Army Stryker Brigade requires 20000tonnes of lift and an Infantry Brigade is 12000tonnes.
Trying to airlift large loads by helicopter is far more difficult that using LSTs

I'm looking at the locations of the Army Amphibious Brigades and the Marine Corps Brigades, and I've got different locations for them all.
 
A

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
clockwork said:
I don't understand why the LST count in the PLAN is actually dwindling. While large ships/vertical landing (LHDs/LPDs) are obviously important and more should be built, they are vulnerable to Taiwanese AShMs, and how do they expect to land enough armour on Taiwan with such a small and declining number of LSTs? Shouldn't massive numbers of LSTs be built? Unless they think civilian boats can be used for it, but I don't see how when they don't have ports at the front like LSTs to load/offload tanks.

Unless LCACs can just drive all the way across the strait from the mainland? But there aren't that many of those either AFAIK.
Click to expand...

Taiwan is more an infantry battle rather than one for armoured vehicles.

But those infantry do still have to be supplied and that requires a lot of trucks.
Plus there would still be a large number of armoured vehicles in support of the infantry.

And yes, I see a much larger number of LSTs being required to guarantee success in a Taiwan invasion scenario.

10 years ago, the Chinese Air Force would have struggled to obtain air superiority over Taiwan, so there wasn't any point in building and maintaining a large number of LSTs. But I think this will change in the next 5 years.

LCACs are actually really expensive considering how little payload they carry.
 
Suetham

Suetham

Senior Member
Registered Member
clockwork said:
I don't understand why the LST count in the PLAN is actually dwindling. While large ships/vertical landing (LHDs/LPDs) are obviously important and more should be built, they are vulnerable to Taiwanese AShMs, and how do they expect to land enough armour on Taiwan with such a small and declining number of LSTs?
Click to expand...
Both the Type 071 and Type 075 have anti-aircraft defenses on board, in terms of Taiwan AShM survivability, they are in a superior position to LSTs that don't even have CIWS, despite having anti-aircraft guns. The Type 071, in addition to having a 76 mm AK-176 anti-aircraft gun, has 4 AK-630 30 mm CIWS and has passive decoy/chaff defenses. The Type 075 has 2 30mm H/PJ-11 CIWS and 2 sets of HQ-10 SAM.

Now the PLAN has 29 Type 072 LSTs (in 2020 it had 37 units) that have made great achievements from the 1990s to the first decade of this century. Time has changed and to complete the great cause of reunification of the Chinese homeland is underway, the PLAN needs more landing ships of the Type 071 series (12-16 ships) and also the Type 075 series, an analysis by Janes suggests China the PLAN to operate 12 Type 075s in 2030, which adds 8100 mechanized troops. The add-on will also come in the form of the Type 938 which already has 6 units in service. If it needs to increase landing capacity, the PLAN can produce more Type 072A in order to compensate for the withdrawal of other LSTs.

clockwork said:
Shouldn't massive numbers of LSTs be built? Unless they think civilian boats can be used for it, but I don't see how when they don't have ports at the front like LSTs to load/offload tanks.
Click to expand...
Let's analyze.

Type 067 landing craft/utility: Retired.
Type 072: Retired.
Type 074: Retired.
Type 271IIIA: Retired.

In service in early 2022

LST:
Type 072II: 3 units. Capacity of 200 troops/10 tanks (ZTZ-96). One was withdrawn from service, prefixed with 930 in July 2021.
Type 072-III YUTING I: 11 units. Capacity of 250 troops/10 tanks and 2 helicopters.
Type 072A: 15 units. Capacity of 250 troops/10 tanks and 2 helicopters or 2 LCAC Type 724s and 1 helicopter.
Type 073A: 10 units. Transports 75 people/6 tanks.
Type 073I: 1 unit. Capacity of 500 troops or 5 tanks. This one will be retired soon.
Type 074A: 11 units. Capacity of 250 troops or 3 Type 096 tanks or a platoon of Type 059 tanks (3 vehicles) and an infantry platoon (70 soldiers) or 6 ZTD-05 amphibious vehicles or towed medium-caliber trucks.

What capacity? 11,100 troops with armored vehicles/tanks and 52 helicopters. Basically a landing force capable of supporting 4 amphibious brigades.
clockwork said:
Unless LCACs can just drive all the way across the strait from the mainland? But there aren't that many of those either AFAIK.
Click to expand...
LCAC:
Type 958(Zubr): 6 units. Capacity of 360 troops or 3 ZTZ-96 tanks (total weight 150 tons) or 8 ZBD-05 tanks (total weight 150 tons) or 10 armored vehicles + 140 soldiers (total weight 131 tons) or 8 armored vehicles + 140 soldiers ( total weight 115 tons) or 500 armed soldiers (360 of them in the cabin).
Type 726: 38 units. Capacity of 80 people or 1 tank or 2 IFVs.

What capacity? 5200 troops with armored vehicles/tanks.
_________________________________________________

LPD:
Type 071: 8 units. Capacity of 800 troops/60 vehicles and 4 helicopters.

What capacity? 6400 troops/480 amphibious vehicles and 32 helicopters.

LHD:
Type 075: 3 units(2+1). Capacity of 1200 troops/40 vehicles, 2 LCAC Type 726s and 30 helicopters.

What capacity? 3600 troops/120 vehicles, 6 LCAC Type 726s and 90 helicopters.

Totaling a landing capacity of 26300 mechanized troops supported by hundreds of amphibious vehicles/tanks and 204 helicopters.
 
Suetham

Suetham

Senior Member
Registered Member
AndrewS said:
I'm looking at the locations of the Army Amphibious Brigades and the Marine Corps Brigades, and I've got different locations for them all.
Click to expand...
Check and let me know later. Got the number of LSTs in service, have a look at the comment above. This weekend I will update the PLAN fleet including LSTs and other ships that I haven't covered yet.
 
clockwork

clockwork

Junior Member
Registered Member
AndrewS said:
Taiwan is more an infantry battle rather than one for armoured vehicles.

But those infantry do still have to be supplied and that requires a lot of trucks.
Plus there would still be a large number of armoured vehicles in support of the infantry.

And yes, I see a much larger number of LSTs being required to guarantee success in a Taiwan invasion scenario.

10 years ago, the Chinese Air Force would have struggled to obtain air superiority over Taiwan, so there wasn't any point in building and maintaining a large number of LSTs. But I think this will change in the next 5 years.

LCACs are actually really expensive considering how little payload they carry.
Click to expand...
Amphibious vehicles like the ZBD-05 can't cross the entire strait on their own can they? I see wikipedia listing a 500km range but idk if that's on land or what.

If they actually can that would negate a huge need for ships.
 
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