2. You assumed that the US interceptors developed in a time where there are no HGVs would be as effective in defending against HGVs as China's HGVs are at reaching their ship targets. This is why you put everything as, "You don't know; I don't know; nobody knows," effectively cancelling them out. But China's hypersonic ASBMs were developed specifically to strike US ships while American interceptors were not designed to target HGVs, though they may have some carry-over effect that would basically be a numbers game. So that puts the advantage to China's missiles. Then, the nature of it gives China further advantages because it is inherently much more difficult to hit a missile-sized object travelling at hypersonic speeds than to hit a ship-sized target travelling at like 35mph.
I’m not defending him, but there’s some truth to that argument.
I can joke with the Americans here, but there’s one thing that can’t be denied: they are indeed gaining some experience with their air defense systems. They’ve dealt with Iran’s Operation True Promise, which launched over 300 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) against Israel in total, and they’re also dealing with the Houthi threat in the Red Sea. Of course, in both cases, this is not comparable to what China might employ in a potential conflict, but it does demonstrate a remarkable degree of experience outside the controlled testing environment where these air defense systems are evaluated. A recent example is the use of THAAD to intercept Houthi missiles a few days ago.
Defenses against hypersonic ballistic threats are ideally implemented in layers, with overlap between them, starting in space. Defense against maneuverable hypersonic threats is currently only viable in the “terminal” phase, when the missile is diving toward the target, is no longer maneuvering, and slows down due to atmospheric friction. It is not possible to use exoatmospheric interceptors against so-called “hypersonics,” since they do not reach space (and when they do, it is only in the initial, post-burn phase).
In a few years, the GPI (Glide Phase Interceptor) interceptor will be operational and is expected to have the capacity to intercept hypersonic missiles (HCM and PBW) in the pre-terminal phase, that is, when the missile is still flying level at high altitude. When the GPI becomes operational, layered defense for hypersonic missiles will also be inaugurated.
The layered defense can be summarized as follows:
ICBMs:
Exoatmospheric capability: GBI, SM-3 Block IIA, THAAD-ER
IRBMs:
Exoatmospheric capability: SM-3 Block IIA, SM-3 Block IB, THAAD
MRBMs:
Exoatmospheric capability: SM-3 Block IIA, SM-3 Block IB, SM-3 Block IA, THAAD
Endoatmospheric capability: THAAD, SM-6, PAC-3 MSE
SRBMs:
Exoatmospheric capability: SM-3 Block IIA, IB, IA, THAAD
Endoatmospheric capability: THAAD, SM-6, PAC-3 MSE, PAC-3
TBMs:
Exoatmospheric capability: THAAD
Endoatmospheric capability: THAAD, SM-6, PAC-3 MSE, PAC-3, PAC-2
The American exoatmospheric interceptors are: GBI, SM-3 Block IA, IB and IIA. They cannot intercept hypersonic missiles, for obvious reasons (hypersonic missiles cannot reach space). The American high-performance endoatmospheric interceptors include: SM-6, SM-2, PAC-2, PAC-3 and PAC-3 MSE. These, in theory, are capable of intercepting hypersonic missiles in the terminal phase. THAAD has a mixed capability (endoatmospheric and exoatmospheric) and, in theory, can neutralize hypersonic threats. The GPI, under development, will have the capability of intercepting hypersonic missiles in the intermediate glide phase. The SM-6 Block IB, also under development, should have its endoatmospheric interception capability improved in relation to the current version.
With the exception of a few systems mentioned, most have already been tested in combat in the last three years. The Houthis are an example: although they do not have an impressive arsenal of weapons and missiles, they have presented a valuable opportunity for the US Navy. Now, the US Navy can include, in the certification phase of the CVNs, new tactics refined based on the combat experience of previous units. The USS Gerald Ford, for example, is in training to replace the USS Harry Truman, benefiting from these lessons.
It is possible to consider that China has a much larger and more diverse arsenal, including HGV capabilities that others do not have. However, in terms of practical experience, the Americans are not standing still and have been certifying their air defense systems to face new threats.
It is important to note that these new offensive weapons (hypersonics) have not yet been fully proven in real combat. The impact of the so-called hypersonic missiles, presented as revolutionary in a conflict, has so far been zero. Whether in the case of Iran (Fattah-2) or Russia (Zircon), neither of these hypersonics has demonstrated true hypersonic speed in the terminal phase, which is the most vulnerable. Thus, it is likely that they have been routinely intercepted by endoatmospheric systems. Anti-ship ballistic missiles have also not shown their potential so far – the Houthis are a proven example of this. Still, these scenarios allow the US Navy to gain experience and pass on lessons learned to improve its air defense systems.
