PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

Bltizo said:

There have been some methods investigated that might allow Ro-ro ships to deploy amphibious assault vehicles directly into the water and thus participate in the first wave(s) assault, but at present it isn't considered to be an operational or mature capability.

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That is exactly what I am thinking. According to Blasko an amphibious brigade have some 400 vehicles. Until PLA has acquired more landing ship capacity, the most efficient way to deploy a brigade would be to put the amphibious vehicles on RORO ships and put other vehicles on landing crafts on 071 and 075, perhaps with some amphibious vehicles as part of the first wave. Special ops can conduct air assault of type 75 with a mix of transport and attack helicopters. While this ability might still be experimental, it is at least within the realm of feasibility for PLA in the short term.

Based on assessment, if a small RORO can transport a battalion, then 4 RORO, one for each combined arms battalion would make sense.

I don’t think amphibious operation is still attracting so much attention in 2022.

In 1996 it may be important because any minor intervention from US will be a disaster for PLA so they need to creat an accomplished fact asap. But for now they are going beyond the threshold of building consistent air superiority against US over the 1st island chain, so they can isolate and bomb Taiwan FOREVER until they surrender.

At the same time, amphibious fleet is still vulnerable. US has a lot of bombers and SSNs for stand-off weapons salvo, it’s still a difficult task for China to interrupt all of them. In addition,, so the total scale of the salvo will be HUGE.

In the long term, US is developing its own HGV/HCM. It will be a difficult task for both side to interrupt them even 10 years later so I guess the whole seafield will be ‘empty’ since no one can use the field because both sides have the capability to prevent the other side to use it.

Don't look like Taiwan is getting any new howitzers from the US any time soon due to the Ukraine crisis.

Volpler11 said:

That is exactly what I am thinking. According to Blasko an amphibious brigade have some 400 vehicles. Until PLA has acquired more landing ship capacity, the most efficient way to deploy a brigade would be to put the amphibious vehicles on RORO ships and put other vehicles on landing crafts on 071 and 075, perhaps with some amphibious vehicles as part of the first wave. Special ops can conduct air assault of type 75 with a mix of transport and attack helicopters. While this ability might still be experimental, it is at least within the realm of feasibility for PLA in the short term.

Based on

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assessment, if a small RORO can transport a battalion, then 4 RORO, one for each combined arms battalion would make sense.

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Let's assume the ratios for LHD, LPD and LST are 1:2:4, the goal is to have 8, 16, 64 of them respectively in medium term. They're roughly at 50% of that goal.

RORO ships are dual use. The largest fleets are Bohai Ferry (11) and Hainan ferries (12) (between mainland China and Hainan Island) as well as others. All told, there are at least over 30 large RORO ships that can be used in a Taiwan landing contingency. Each RORO ship can carry up to 200 vehicles and 2,000 personnels at maximum capacity.

PLAN Marine Corps has six brigades (it appears that there is also another brigade on Hainan, to be confirmed) and one air assault brigade. Total number is approximately 40,000.

PLAGF has total six amphibious combined arms brigades, belonging to 72nd, 73rd, and 74th Army Groups respectively. Total number is approximately 30,000.

These PLAN Marines brigades and PLAGF Amphibious Combined Arms brigades will be used in the first waves, transported by LHD/LPD/LST.

These first-wave landing forces will be supported and reinforced by PLAGF, primarily from the 72nd, 73rd and 74th Army Groups, but possibly from other army groups too. These will land via RORO ships.

PLAAF Airborne Corps, which consists of total nine brigades including six airborne brigades (the other three are special force, support and transport brigades), may also join the landing. Their total number is about 40,000. They will land via Y-20/IL-76/Y-9/Y-8. They may have close to 100 Y-20/IL-76's soon.

weig2000 said:

Let's assume the ratios for LHD, LPD and LST are 1:2:4, the goal is to have 8, 16, 64 of them respectively in medium term. They're roughly at 50% of that goal.

RORO ships are dual use. The largest fleets are Bohai Ferry (11) and Hainan ferries (12) (between mainland China and Hainan Island) as well as others. All told, there are at least over 30 large RORO ships that can be used in a Taiwan landing contingency. Each RORO ship can carry up to 200 vehicles and 2,000 personnels at maximum capacity.

PLAN Marine Corps has six brigades (it appears that there is also another brigade on Hainan, to be confirmed) and one air assault brigade. Total number is approximately 40,000.

PLAGF has total six amphibious combined arms brigades, belonging to 72nd, 73rd, and 74th Army Groups respectively. Total number is approximately 30,000.

These PLAN Marines brigades and PLAGF Amphibious Combined Arms brigades will be used in the first waves, transported by LHD/LPD/LST.

These first-wave landing forces will be supported and reinforced by PLAGF, primarily from the 72nd, 73rd and 74th Army Groups, but possibly from other army groups too. These will land via RORO ships.

PLAAF Airborne Corps, which consists of total nine brigades including six airborne brigades (the other three are special force, support and transport brigades), may also join the landing. Their total number is about 40,000. They will land via Y-20/IL-76/Y-9/Y-8. They may have close to 100 Y-20/IL-76's soon.

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The one thing I somewhat (actually, strongly) disagree with, is the viability and relevance of airborne drops in a Taiwan contingency.

The ability of transport aircraft to survive over hostile airspace -- especially in the early stages of a campaign -- is slim to none. I think tactical and strategic transport aircraft would be far better used in supporting and reinforcing logistics and supply on Chinese soil instead, helping to transport high priority materiel and personnel across the country, and also to help facilitate dispersed/agile aerial forces.

On a related note, the threat of MANPADS (also shown vividly in the recent events in Ukraine), makes me believe that large scale heliborne assaults against anything resembling a modern enemy, is very difficult to pull off, unless you have massive, laughably lopsided advantages in ISR and precision fires to support your landed force. Smaller scale insertions with helicopters may be somewhat more viable.


I agree with the LHD and LPD and LST ratio, though I think you meant 1: 2: 8, rather than 1: 2: 4 (if it was 4, then there would be 32 LSTs rather than 64).
I would also add, that when 076 enters the mix, I think a 1: 1: 2: 4 ratio of 8 076s, 8 075s, 16 071s, and 64 LSTs, could be a neat way of rounding the numbers.
Of course, in a Taiwan contingency, 076s may not be quite as important as the rest of them.

But as peacetime, blue water equivalent ESG equivalents, one 076, one 075, and two 071s would make a formidable package, and likely able to transport a good part of an army amphibious capable or marine brigade. In event of a Taiwan contingency, all they would have to do to reinforce it would add eight LSTs and they'd probably be able to carry a full army amphibious or marine brigade, perhaps even slightly reinforced.

I think the Penghu strategy put forth by previous writers @drowingfish @Rettam Stacf deserves some consideration. Taking Penghu as an intermediate objective in a major operation is relatively easy and most importantly, puts much of Taiwan within range of lighter rockets and gun artillery. It also cuts off north-south Taiwan, isolating them into 2 non-mutually reinforcing regions unless they launch an amphibious counterattack.

Sustained firepower like gun artillery, light rockets, helicopters and drones are important for keeping the enemy down after fixed wings and missiles kick in the door.

Bltizo said:

The one thing I somewhat (actually, strongly) disagree with, is the viability and relevance of airborne drops in a Taiwan contingency.

The ability of transport aircraft to survive over hostile airspace -- especially in the early stages of a campaign -- is slim to none. I think tactical and strategic transport aircraft would be far better used in supporting and reinforcing logistics and supply on Chinese soil instead, helping to transport high priority materiel and personnel across the country, and also to help facilitate dispersed/agile aerial forces.

On a related note, the threat of MANPADS (also shown vividly in the recent events in Ukraine), makes me believe that large scale heliborne assaults against anything resembling a modern enemy, is very difficult to pull off, unless you have massive, laughably lopsided advantages in ISR and precision fires to support your landed force. Smaller scale insertions with helicopters may be somewhat more viable.

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I don't disagree with you. In fact, I agree with your arguments.

Notice I didn't specify the tactics in deploying these airborne troops. I merely point out these are the forces that will be or may well be deployed as well as their platforms in such a contingency.

I believe how the airborne troop will be deployed probably depends on how the war will unfold. They may be used opportunistically. I think their main advantage is the speed and availability. One thing I do agree is that they will not be in the first waves and they will only be deployed when the risks from MANPADS and other threats are minimal or minimized.

Bltizo said:

I agree with the LHD and LPD and LST ratio, though I think you meant 1: 2: 8, rather than 1: 2: 4 (if it was 4, then there would be 32 LSTs rather than 64).
I would also add, that when 076 enters the mix, I think a 1: 1: 2: 4 ratio of 8 076s, 8 075s, 16 071s, and 64 LSTs, could be a neat way of rounding the numbers.
Of course, in a Taiwan contingency, 076s may not be quite as important as the rest of them.

But as peacetime, blue water equivalent ESG equivalents, one 076, one 075, and two 071s would make a formidable package, and likely able to transport a good part of an army amphibious capable or marine brigade. In event of a Taiwan contingency, all they would have to do to reinforce it would add eight LSTs and they'd probably be able to carry a full army amphibious or marine brigade, perhaps even slightly reinforced.

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Yeah, you're right. It's 1:2:8 - they already have like 30+ LSTs now. 1 x 075, 2 x 071, 8 x LSTs can transport a good part of a marine brigade or an amphibious brigade.

I did not include 076 because it probably a bit further in the future and also we don't know how many of them will be eventually produced. It does seem though they may be built earlier than were assumed before judging by the leaked info lately.

weig2000 said:

I don't disagree with you. In fact, I agree with your arguments.

Notice I didn't specify the tactics in deploying these airborne troops. I merely point out these are the forces that will be or may well be deployed as well as their platforms in such a contingency.

I believe how the airborne troop will be deployed probably depends on how the war will unfold. They may be used opportunistically. I think their main advantage is the speed and availability. One thing I do agree is that they will not be in the first waves and they will only be deployed when the risks from MANPADS and other threats are minimal or minimized.

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Fair enough.

I thought the mention of transport aircraft and airborne was in context during the first waves or during active hostilities.

That said, I would actually be a bit more cautious than you and say that the use of transport aircraft in a Taiwan contingency would probably only be relevant after virtually all conventional warfighting capability of the ROC military is neutralized, and even then they would only likely perform in an aerial resupply role

weig2000 said:

Yeah, you're right. It's 1:2:8 - they already have like 30+ LSTs now. 1 x 075, 2 x 071, 8 x LSTs can transport a good part of a marine brigade or an amphibious brigade.

I did not include 076 because it probably a bit further in the future and also we don't know how many of them will be eventually produced. It does seem though they may be built earlier than were assumed before judging by the leaked info lately.

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Yes, and 076s are arguably less important to a Taiwan contingency than 075s, 071s and especially LSTs are.

Personally I wonder when we will see the next wave of 075s (075As?) and 071s be built, and how long it would take to reach the 8/16 fleet described.
Especially with the move of HDZH. That said, they've demonstrated the ability to build 075s and 071s fairly quickly, so who knows.

FairAndUnbiased said:

I think the Penghu strategy put forth by previous writers @drowingfish @Rettam Stacf deserves some consideration. Taking Penghu as an intermediate objective in a major operation is relatively easy and most importantly, puts much of Taiwan within range of lighter rockets and gun artillery. It also cuts off north-south Taiwan, isolating them into 2 non-mutually reinforcing regions unless they launch an amphibious counterattack.

Sustained firepower like gun artillery, light rockets, helicopters and drones are important for keeping the enemy down after fixed wings and missiles kick in the door.

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I think the idea of taking Penghu as part of an overall Taiwan contingency and amphibious invasion makes sense, if done rapidly. In fact, as part of an overall Taiwan contingency, taking as many of the islands that would be useful to the operation at large, would be a natural part of the process.
(Less useful islands could have their warfighting capabilities neutralized, and then subsequently either bypassed or demand their surrender).

But it is important to specify that the idea of taking only Penghu (and/or other small, outlying islands) without waging an operation against Taiwan island proper, is unacceptable.
This is important to specify, because there are often western analysts and commentators who entertain the idea of China only seeking to take a few outlying islands like Kinmen and/or Penghu, as a "warning shot" or a "limited operation" without immediate follow up as part of a generalized Taiwan invasion. However given the geopolitical and strategic consequences of such a limited action (namely, it would greatly galvanize the US and their allies/vassals and cause the PLA to lose valuable time), I cannot see why the CMC would consider such a move in isolation, as it would be quite foolish.

Bltizo said:

The one thing I somewhat (actually, strongly) disagree with, is the viability and relevance of airborne drops in a Taiwan contingency.

The ability of transport aircraft to survive over hostile airspace -- especially in the early stages of a campaign -- is slim to none. I think tactical and strategic transport aircraft would be far better used in supporting and reinforcing logistics and supply on Chinese soil instead, helping to transport high priority materiel and personnel across the country, and also to help facilitate dispersed/agile aerial forces.

On a related note, the threat of MANPADS (also shown vividly in the recent events in Ukraine), makes me believe that large scale heliborne assaults against anything resembling a modern enemy, is very difficult to pull off, unless you have massive, laughably lopsided advantages in ISR and precision fires to support your landed force. Smaller scale insertions with helicopters may be somewhat more viable.

Click to expand...

On the contrary, I think the war in Ukraine has proven the viability of helicopters in a MANPAD rich environment, where attack helicopters are a primary source of Russian ground attack air power (I know that’s more down to how bad their fixed wing fleet is proving to be in strike, but the point is they are able to continue to viably use them despite Ukraine probably being the most densely MANPAD defended airspace in the world right now).

While they are taking looses, it’s hardly crippling and the losses are overwhelmingly falling on their attack helicopters rather than transports.

Their Ka52s do have an advantage in speed which is really useful, but I think the key to successful large scale air assault on the modern battlefield is scale.

The biggest weakness with MANPADs are short range and man-mobile.

That means you need to spread them out, which means spreading them thin; and it means they are limited to the speed of the man carrying them, which means you cannot realistically expect to be able to surge them to meet a fast approaching threat. That is why large scale air assault works while individual lone ship runs tend to get shot down.

The key is to have attack helicopters work as line breakers and escorts where the first thing enemy MANPAD operators see are waves of attack helicopters for them to expend their munitions against while the transports follow shortly after and runs like hell to their objectives.

If you throw in potentially operational future weapons like swarm drones deployed by munitions dispensers flying in ahead of the helicopter fleet and spamming the ingress and egress routes with loitering suicide swarm drones that can automatically navigate complex terrain like forests and ID and track humans in said terrain and the balance shifts overwhelmingly in favour of the attacker.