Geographer
Junior Member
delft, thanks for the corrections regarding MacArthur and Eisenhower.
Social science does not operate in laboratory conditions in which a single variable can be changed and the experiment run again endlessly. In some areas we use statistics from large data sets that even then are tough to draw inferences from. In other areas, we use case studies (aka history), human psychology, and organizational psychology. Organizational psychology is just an extension of individual psychology. No two humans are perfectly alike, but in similar conditions human groups tend to behave the same way.
The firefighter example is a way to show how bureaucracies have two reasons to aggressively expand their operations: the young guys want to prove their mettle and have fun, and the commanders need to justify their large budget to the civilian leadership.
I see three arguments against my argument that the PLA will increasingly advocate pro-force policies within the Chinese government, and that the CCP should be aware of the self-serving nature of the military's future advice. There is a nuance here that keeps getting ignored. Solarz and others seem to see the military in dualistic terms: either the military is peace-loving and totally obedient to civilian control, or they are war-mongering fascists. They see my argument as painting the PLA in the latter terms when I am doing no such thing.
I have to keep stating my argument because it keeps getting distorted. I'm not picking on the military, all bureaucracies have agendas that do not necessarily align with the national interest. Frankly I am surprised it engenders such a reaction because it seems intuitive to me. The counter-arguments I see are:
One, that military leaders (the implication being all military leaders, not just China's) are mature enough to give stark, cold analysis and advice that aligns with the civilian leadership. Two, that whatever the experiences of Western governments, China is different because of its history as a victim of imperialism. Three, that even if the military leadership is gung-ho and similar to Western countries, war games are sufficient excitement to keep them from going stir-crazy. I'll examine each counter-argument in turn.
Regarding the first counter-argument that the top generals are mature enough to give stark, cold analysis and advice that aligns with the civilian leadership. This is what we want to believe about military leaderships around the world. But what we want to be true and what is likely to be true are separate things. How many ministers and secretaries--who are not political appointees but rose up through the ranks--actively call for budget cuts to their agencies? How many call their organizations bloated and in need of reform? How many call their agency's job overrated? Virtually NONE! It's not because career civil servants are dishonest or unintelligent, it is because 1) the kind of people who make it to the top do it by not rocking the boat, and 2) their whole mindset is that what they and their agency does it important. Think of generals are career civil servants.
Here's another example that will resonate with conservatives: teachers' unions. Teachers unions claim to know what's best for students so they deserve tenure, limited hours, barriers to entry of the teaching profession, and other perks. Do the teachers unions ever call for less pay? A smaller budget? Fewer schools? A longer school year? More accountability? Of course not. Neither do police unions, or firefighter unions or the American Legion (an American veterans' NGO).
The point is that the top generals are shaped by their experiences getting to the top, and have their own agendas to further their careers. It won't be huge differences of opinion with the civilian leadership, just a more militaristic outlook on international affairs, a belief that the military option would be beneficial. In the back of the generals' minds are the possibility of a promotion and budget security. The exception to all this is when the military gets involved in money-making like in Egypt and Pakistan, where they actively avoid war in order to keep the corrupt times rollin' and the money flowin'. A war would hurt Egyptian and Pakistani top officers' military careers by exposing their incompetence and unpreparedness.
The second counter-argument, that even if my case-studies from Western bureaucracies are valid, China's history as a victim of imperialism render them incapable of war for anything but self-defense. This is another belief rooted in idealism. Wouldn't be nice if the bullied turned into pacifists? But that's usually not the case. First of all, every war is presented in terms of self-defense. Even the 2003 Iraq War was sold as a self-defense measure against an unpredictable dictator with NBC weapons we could not take a chance on after 9/11. If Taiwan declared independence and China attacked them, both the PRC and ROC would see their actions as self-defense.
One thing that stands out in recent Chinese history is their complete inability to wage an imperial war even if they wanted to. They were too weak and divided. They were constantly fending off Western or Japanese imperial troops. After the CCP won the civil war, they engaged in a policy of autarky, trying to be economically self-sufficient. Trade dropped off a cliff. They could move a lot of troops around the country but with no navy or air force worth a damn they could not project power. Only within in the last five years has China had the means to project power beyond its immediate borders. Therefore recent history is a poor guide to China's military intentions.
Second, the PLA has benefited from rapid modernization of tactics and weapons and a large, sustained budget increase for the last twenty years. Many weapons are indigenous and innovative. Officers and research engineers both want to see the fruits of their labor in action, to push them into new challenges, to show them off. This leads me to the third counter-argument...
The third counter-argument, that even if the military leadership is gung-ho and similar to Western countries, war games are sufficient excitement to keep them from going stir-crazy. War games, even with other countries, is no substitute for the real thing. Does anyone here believe war games in which no one gets hurt, and therefore no threat of getting hurt, are equivalent to a shooting war? Of course not! Exercises are carefully planned to test certain capabilities. There is an old saying that "no battle plan ever survives first contact with the enemy."
The question then becomes, if war games aren't as useful as the real thing in showing off weapon systems, are the useful enough ? War games are an important part of military readiness and do provide a release valve for pent up energy. But I think that ultimately everyone from the foot soldier to the weapon's chief engineer to the generals want to test their mettle in real combat. You don't get medals or national fame for doing well in an exercise. War is a whole other beast in which people who do well in safe war games may not succeed.
War games also do not help the generals justify their budget. Suppose President Hu has been a big backer of the PLA and gives them big budget increases. In a few years a new administration will take over, probably led by President Xi. Maybe Xi is not as militaristic as Hu. So President Xi asks the Central Military Commission to review its budget and justify the ~$100 billion spent on them. Can the generals point to all the great exercises they've engaged in? No, because that has not helped China. When it comes to budget battles, it's a "what have you done for me lately" attitude. Note again I'm not saying this is how it should be but how it often is.
After the Cold War ended, the U.S. cut the military budget significantly. It was called the Peace Dividend. Protest as they did, the U.S. defense establishment could hardly justify the enormous defense budget in the absence of a major enemy. But after September 11th the U.S. invaded Afghanistan and Iraq and engaged in other smaller actions around the globe in the War on Terror. For the last 10 years, the U.S. military has benefited from rapid growth in its budget despite two recessions. Nearly anything the military wanted, it got. Wars are a great way to increase and protect the military budget, hence the reluctance to wind down those wars.
Invoking the scientific method is a strange move on a military enthusiast's message board in which speculation and theory are rampant. SDF isn't a chemistry lab. We're not trying for Nobel Prizes or industrial patents but rather a greater understanding of the Chinese military and to a lesser extent the Chinese political system.
Social science does not operate in laboratory conditions in which a single variable can be changed and the experiment run again endlessly. In some areas we use statistics from large data sets that even then are tough to draw inferences from. In other areas, we use case studies (aka history), human psychology, and organizational psychology. Organizational psychology is just an extension of individual psychology. No two humans are perfectly alike, but in similar conditions human groups tend to behave the same way.
Note how solarz restates my arguments in a way that was not said. In the firefighting analogy, I did not say the firefighters would start fires. My exact words were, "They're going to get stir crazy and find excuses to go out and show their skills." The "foot soldier" level firefighters are going to try to respond to everything that could possibly use some firefighters. At more senior levels, the firefighter commanders are going to have to start justifying the expense of their new fire engine. Otherwise in a few years, new city council members may start to ask why they are paying for the upkeep of such an expensive fire engine when there hasn't been a fire in years. Knowing this, the senior firefighter commanders will seek to execute as many missions as possible, possibly doubling up on other departments such as EMS, in order to preserve their own budget. This leads to turf wars and wasted money, well-known problems in any large organization.
The firefighter example is a way to show how bureaucracies have two reasons to aggressively expand their operations: the young guys want to prove their mettle and have fun, and the commanders need to justify their large budget to the civilian leadership.
I see three arguments against my argument that the PLA will increasingly advocate pro-force policies within the Chinese government, and that the CCP should be aware of the self-serving nature of the military's future advice. There is a nuance here that keeps getting ignored. Solarz and others seem to see the military in dualistic terms: either the military is peace-loving and totally obedient to civilian control, or they are war-mongering fascists. They see my argument as painting the PLA in the latter terms when I am doing no such thing.
I have to keep stating my argument because it keeps getting distorted. I'm not picking on the military, all bureaucracies have agendas that do not necessarily align with the national interest. Frankly I am surprised it engenders such a reaction because it seems intuitive to me. The counter-arguments I see are:
One, that military leaders (the implication being all military leaders, not just China's) are mature enough to give stark, cold analysis and advice that aligns with the civilian leadership. Two, that whatever the experiences of Western governments, China is different because of its history as a victim of imperialism. Three, that even if the military leadership is gung-ho and similar to Western countries, war games are sufficient excitement to keep them from going stir-crazy. I'll examine each counter-argument in turn.
Regarding the first counter-argument that the top generals are mature enough to give stark, cold analysis and advice that aligns with the civilian leadership. This is what we want to believe about military leaderships around the world. But what we want to be true and what is likely to be true are separate things. How many ministers and secretaries--who are not political appointees but rose up through the ranks--actively call for budget cuts to their agencies? How many call their organizations bloated and in need of reform? How many call their agency's job overrated? Virtually NONE! It's not because career civil servants are dishonest or unintelligent, it is because 1) the kind of people who make it to the top do it by not rocking the boat, and 2) their whole mindset is that what they and their agency does it important. Think of generals are career civil servants.
Here's another example that will resonate with conservatives: teachers' unions. Teachers unions claim to know what's best for students so they deserve tenure, limited hours, barriers to entry of the teaching profession, and other perks. Do the teachers unions ever call for less pay? A smaller budget? Fewer schools? A longer school year? More accountability? Of course not. Neither do police unions, or firefighter unions or the American Legion (an American veterans' NGO).
The point is that the top generals are shaped by their experiences getting to the top, and have their own agendas to further their careers. It won't be huge differences of opinion with the civilian leadership, just a more militaristic outlook on international affairs, a belief that the military option would be beneficial. In the back of the generals' minds are the possibility of a promotion and budget security. The exception to all this is when the military gets involved in money-making like in Egypt and Pakistan, where they actively avoid war in order to keep the corrupt times rollin' and the money flowin'. A war would hurt Egyptian and Pakistani top officers' military careers by exposing their incompetence and unpreparedness.
The second counter-argument, that even if my case-studies from Western bureaucracies are valid, China's history as a victim of imperialism render them incapable of war for anything but self-defense. This is another belief rooted in idealism. Wouldn't be nice if the bullied turned into pacifists? But that's usually not the case. First of all, every war is presented in terms of self-defense. Even the 2003 Iraq War was sold as a self-defense measure against an unpredictable dictator with NBC weapons we could not take a chance on after 9/11. If Taiwan declared independence and China attacked them, both the PRC and ROC would see their actions as self-defense.
One thing that stands out in recent Chinese history is their complete inability to wage an imperial war even if they wanted to. They were too weak and divided. They were constantly fending off Western or Japanese imperial troops. After the CCP won the civil war, they engaged in a policy of autarky, trying to be economically self-sufficient. Trade dropped off a cliff. They could move a lot of troops around the country but with no navy or air force worth a damn they could not project power. Only within in the last five years has China had the means to project power beyond its immediate borders. Therefore recent history is a poor guide to China's military intentions.
Second, the PLA has benefited from rapid modernization of tactics and weapons and a large, sustained budget increase for the last twenty years. Many weapons are indigenous and innovative. Officers and research engineers both want to see the fruits of their labor in action, to push them into new challenges, to show them off. This leads me to the third counter-argument...
The third counter-argument, that even if the military leadership is gung-ho and similar to Western countries, war games are sufficient excitement to keep them from going stir-crazy. War games, even with other countries, is no substitute for the real thing. Does anyone here believe war games in which no one gets hurt, and therefore no threat of getting hurt, are equivalent to a shooting war? Of course not! Exercises are carefully planned to test certain capabilities. There is an old saying that "no battle plan ever survives first contact with the enemy."
The question then becomes, if war games aren't as useful as the real thing in showing off weapon systems, are the useful enough ? War games are an important part of military readiness and do provide a release valve for pent up energy. But I think that ultimately everyone from the foot soldier to the weapon's chief engineer to the generals want to test their mettle in real combat. You don't get medals or national fame for doing well in an exercise. War is a whole other beast in which people who do well in safe war games may not succeed.
War games also do not help the generals justify their budget. Suppose President Hu has been a big backer of the PLA and gives them big budget increases. In a few years a new administration will take over, probably led by President Xi. Maybe Xi is not as militaristic as Hu. So President Xi asks the Central Military Commission to review its budget and justify the ~$100 billion spent on them. Can the generals point to all the great exercises they've engaged in? No, because that has not helped China. When it comes to budget battles, it's a "what have you done for me lately" attitude. Note again I'm not saying this is how it should be but how it often is.
After the Cold War ended, the U.S. cut the military budget significantly. It was called the Peace Dividend. Protest as they did, the U.S. defense establishment could hardly justify the enormous defense budget in the absence of a major enemy. But after September 11th the U.S. invaded Afghanistan and Iraq and engaged in other smaller actions around the globe in the War on Terror. For the last 10 years, the U.S. military has benefited from rapid growth in its budget despite two recessions. Nearly anything the military wanted, it got. Wars are a great way to increase and protect the military budget, hence the reluctance to wind down those wars.
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! But in fact, I think it is true that CPC's policies, and especially its attitude towards war, and towards foreign affairs, are discussed daily, and inside the PLA, loyalty to China means loyalty to the CPC's policies.
