Opinions on the Stryker

Finn McCool said:

@ Norfolk and Adeptius:

I think you are both correct on the issue of heavy IFVs/APCs. We have seen time and again that lighter IFVs fail. The First Chechen War is an excellent example, as is the Afghan-Soviet War, and to a lesser extent the Iraq War and the recent Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The modern threat enviroment is simply too full of weapons that can destroy light infantry vehicles. RPGs, ATGMS, large IEDs and mines are simply far too easy to come by for these vehicles to be very practical in most modern war enviroments.

Of course the other side of this coin is that heavy vehicles have a lot of problems too. I'm sure that you completely understand what those are but I'll just say that fuel and logistics is the biggest one.

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I personally think that losses of light wheeled IFVs are blown completely out of proportion. Losses in conflicts you mentioned have more to do with almost criminal negligence and stupidity in tactical usage of those vehicles rather then with shortcomings of those vehicles…

The first Chechen war is great example of that; both tracked BMPs and wheeled BTRs were used as mobile bunkers with infantry detachments that were afraid to leave false safety of those vehicles making the job for Chechen fighters even more easy...

On other hand IDF's little fiasco in Lebanon was perfect example what happens when you train your troops to serve as security detachments in Palestinian areas, use tactics developed for CT operations and choose to forget all experience you accumulated last time you were fighting against that particular enemy... Not to mention stupid belief that air force can win war by itself...

Heavy IFV are product of Israeli needs to protect troops as much as possible (since potential enemy's have much larger manpower available) and Israeli experience in urban CT operations in Palestinian areas. They are tailored to fit Israeli tactics in this areas and while they are great products that doesn't make them a perfect choice for every army that conducts similar operations...
They are slower, noisier and less mobile and while they are able to survive heavier punches they will still be destroyed by IED with enough explosives..

Besides threats you mentioned are not new and can be countered by use of proper tactics... Currant reports by the US troops seams to show that they are more then happy with Stryker and it seams that tactics developed for Stryker actually work really well...

The troops seem reasonably happy with the LAV, but so far they've only been fighting guerrillas; the LAVs were intended to handle a wide range of situations from such as internal security and rapid intervention in low-intensity warfare, to armoured reconnaissance and main-force battles in medium-, even higher-intensity warfare.

The Canadian Army ran a comprehensive series of tests of the LAV III (Stryker with 25mm autocannon with Thermal Imagining) in the latter functions, placing the Stryker alongside the Leopard 1 (called C2 here) in combined arms offensive and defensive operations against forces equipped with T-72s and BMP-2s. The tests were performed using laser engagement systems. The MAIS Trials results are described here:



A summary of the trials results found:

1. An infantry company equipped with LAVs does not survive a fight against enemy tanks without tanks of its own, and a LAV company cannot engage in offensive operations against heavy armour; the report states that as LAV III Stryker lacks a medium- or long-range ATGM, it does not provide a tactical change from the M-113 tracked APC.

2. The LAVs, concentrating on enemy BMPs achieved 95% of all BMP kills at an average engagment range of 1,476m - a kill ratio of 37:1 at company level, and 7:4 at combat team (infantry company paired with tank squadron) level, in favour of LAV; while the Leopard 1 tanks concentrated on enemy T-72s - a kill ratio of 23:1 in favour of Leopard 1.

3. LAV should engage BMP at ranges between 800m to 1,200m; 30mm cannon of BMP-2 can penetrate LAV below 800m, and LAV can evade AT-5 ATGM of BMP-2 best at ranges over 1,200m.

4. LAV can detect enemy at ranges of 4,000m or so; but usual ranges are between 1,500m to 1,900m.

5. 18 of 23 LAVs destroyed were by T-72s, 5 by BMPs - tank is main enemy of LAV, even when supported by friendly tanks in lead; 1 Leopard 1 was destroyed by BMP, while 26 BMPs were destroyed by Leopard 1.

6. During day operations, LAV III detected enemy 44% of time using binoculars, 22% by naked eye, and 11% each by turret optical sights and by thermal imaging sights; 2,474m average detection range.

7. During night operations, LAV III detected enemy 90% of time using thermal imaging; 2,150m average detection range without illumination, 2,272m with illumination.

8. Leopard 1 detected enemy 83% of the time first (Leopard 1 tanks normally lead), 17% by LAV III.

For lower intensity operations, such as those underway in Iraq and Afghanistan, the vulnerability of the LAV III Stryker to main battle tanks is not particularly critical, but in medium and higher-intensity operations, the LAV's main opponent is not the IFV, but the MBT; of 23 Strykers (all armed with 25mm autocannon with thermal imaging) destroyed during operations against enemy heavy forces, 18 were destroyed by T-72s, only 5 by BMP-2s with 30mm autocannons and AT-5 medium ATGMs, even though LAV IIIs were typically supported, and in offensive operations led, by Leopard 1 MBTs. Thus, an APC/IFV requires MBT-level protection and a medium- or long-range ATGM to protect itself against enemy MBTs while still carrying and providing covering fire to its infantry squad/section. The LAV III Stryker cannot do this, and is effectively limited to low-intensity warfare.