A general rule of thumb is that that more extreme/obscure/ridiculous assumptions you need to make explain a theory, the more likely that that theory is wrong.
So far, we have had:
- Does not know much about things outside North Korea, yet seem to know enough to try and plan his flight path to fly over urban population centers?
- Pilot has no idea how much fuel he has or how far that will get him. Ever drive a car? Did anyone explain to you the fuel consumption rate? Ever run out of gas trying to get somewhere? Even if you were not given the exact fuel consumption rates, even a teenager can figure out a rough estimate of how far a given level of fuel will get you even with only a few hours behind the wheel.
-The pilot did not plan the 'defection'. Really? Are you serious? This was not an impulse purchase. This is literally a life and death decision, and it will take a lot to convince people someone would make this kind of a decision without at least doing a logic check to see if it was possible with the most basic research.
All that makes me doubt the theory very much. Just far too many extreme assumptions are needed to make this work.
There are some interesting facts that so far no one has picked up on or considered.
For example, he was flying alone, where was his wingman? May understanding is that it is common practice patrols to go out in pairs as a minimum, partly to dissuade attempted defections. Perhaps, his wingman/lead suffered technical problems and had to head home during a patrol, that might have suddenly presented him with a golden opportunity to make his move.
Why the pilot didn't eject when his plane ran out of fuel. To assume the ejection seats don't work or that North Korea pilots are not trained to use them are completely baseless and pretty silly tbh. Now, it could have been that the pilot didn't want his plane nosediving into a school or something and then be facing homicide charges, or it could be that he was too low to eject when he did run out of fuel.
The mechanical failure cover story, and that was a cover story as it came out only a few days after the crash. There's no chance that they were able to do the tests needed to establish the cause of the crash that quickly. Was this just to spare the North Koreans embarrassment, or was there something else at play?
As for the failure to intercept, well the homebase of this Mig was very close to the boarder. That means its very common for North Korean fighters to be operating extremely close to the boarder and Chinese air traffic control would not have known anything was different until the Mig crossed the boarder.
He got 250km into China. Sounds like a lot, but at cruising speed, that would have only taken 17 minutes, and maybe was little as 6 minutes if he was pushing the plane to its max speed.
This is better friendly neighbours, who do not typically see each other as a threat. If they wanted to, I'm pretty sure a Canadian fighter pilot can penetrate at least a similar distance into US airspace before he was intercepted. Same for any country in mainland Europe in the EU.
For island countries, you have open water all around so there is no where for planes to hide from ground based radar, and anything flying towards you from the sea looks suspicious, so you have a lot more warning about possible intruders. For land-locked neighbours, especially those on good terms with each other, you have no early warning as your neighbour can fly anything he likes anywhere in his airspace. And because you are on good terms, you won't have standby fighters near the boarder on quick launch alert. Even during the height of the cold war, alert fighters' response time would have been considered excellent if they got into the air within 5 minutes of an alert going up.
As my simple calculations showed, even by that benchmark, the PLAAF fighters would have only been in the air maybe as little as a minute before the Mig crashed. No time at all to intercept.
If the Mig had been flying low to try and avoid ground radar, that alert time would have been cut shorter still.