North Korea Military News, Reports, Data, etc.
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If it gets as big as Delta then surfaced weight at minimum would be 8000 ton and at most 14000 ton.
Same weight or much heavier than frigates they are making and perhaps if latter weight then maybe even as heavy as two frigates.
Same weight or much heavier than frigates they are making and perhaps if latter weight then maybe even as heavy as two frigates.
A ship that large is simply uneconomical to keep inshore. Does it seem that Kim is really ambitious enough to want to seize control of the Sea of Japan?!?
An ambition so large that it seems to be insanely unimaginable, when the Japan-South Korea-US alliance has simply enjoyed naval dominance for a long time. Hopefully Kim learns the lesson of the Kaiserliche Marine and Kriegsmarine.
An ambition so large that it seems to be insanely unimaginable, when the Japan-South Korea-US alliance has simply enjoyed naval dominance for a long time. Hopefully Kim learns the lesson of the Kaiserliche Marine and Kriegsmarine.
As the sub must be almost certainly a SSBN, it makes sense from the point of view of the bastion concept, adding another leg to DPRK's nuclear deterrent. It's role is to ensure a reliable second strike capability. Would be deployed relatively close to DPRK shores under the cover of friendly air, missile and naval forces. Perhaps this is why the new frigates are being built, to protect said bastion with among others their long range SAMs. Although they could probably launch nuclear tipped Hwasals themselves.
I don't think it's truly possible for DPRK to make a bastion. They're not strong and technologically advanced enough, and realistically, being sandwiched between ROK and Japan is not exactly the best environment.
Finally, SSBNs are really not a best way to provide littoral deterrent. This is a big boat, unlikely to be all that suitable for littoral ops. Big, and, crucially, damn tall.
What I think is in fact possible is to provide them escorted deployment, where later boats themselves patrol somewhere away from ROK.
For example, up through Tarar strait into sea Okhotsk.
Primary benefit of SSBN is endurance along far less fuel and batteries are needed besides enough for backup systems in case there is need to shutdown the nuclear reactor or to be stationary somewhere and be as silent as possible, only limitation would be amount of food on board and usually nuclear powered submarines have longer endurance because they carry more food as SSN layout is far more efficient.
They aren't sandwiching DPRK tbh, they are east of her. DPRK at the right circumstances can obtain strategic depth through China or Russia. Also keep in mind that scientific socialism is way better from capitalism on resources allocation and productivity. Nothing goes to speculation or big pockets. A socialist system with modern cybernetics and automation can do miracles. This can be proven by the fact that DPRK packs quiet a greater punch than Iran, a 80 million capitalist state with less strict embargoes and way more natural resources.
The thing a SSBN with a surface Navy to support it is to divert fires and resources that would otherwise be given to attacks on the DPRK landmass. It can serve as a distraction especially because of its second strike capability and make the primary DPRK strength more survivable.
In theory, North Korea has a number of natural features that could be used as Bastions. The west coast is rugged with numerous offshore islands forming numerous straits, channels and inlets between them and the coast, perfect for Romeo-class submarines to hide among (yes, there are three on the west). The east coast has a flatter coastline with very few natural obstacles, except for Wonsan Bay where the Tapchon Joint Naval Base is being built nearby - a relatively deep and enclosed bay with a number of small islands and peninsulas that act as natural barriers. North Korea could rely on those natural terrains, along with its growing arsenal of shore-based anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles, as well as its formidable and battle-tested coastal mine warfare and submarine capabilities, to protect them.
However, the "Bastion" concept would probably be more appropriate for the modified Romeos, as their technical characteristics imply that they would probably stick to protected waters - the propulsion system remains the same while its rudders is quite small for the size and weight of the ship, a clear implication that the ship has poor speed and underwater maneuverability and is only capable of basic diving and maneuvering. Kim's choice of nuclear propulsion for his new submarines - with all its advantages in range and speed - was clearly not to keep them close to shore in closely guarded waters. The construction of large surface combatants with good seaworthiness only further proves that.
It was clear that Kim wanted his navy to extend farther offshore, specifically to compete for dominance in the Sea of Japan. But given Germany's past lessons, is it too risky and adventurous to follow that path that has proven to be a costly failure? Or is Kim building his navy on a bet on deep cooperation with Russia and China, which could provide military support (and hopefully not be abandoned or sold out by them)?
However, the "Bastion" concept would probably be more appropriate for the modified Romeos, as their technical characteristics imply that they would probably stick to protected waters - the propulsion system remains the same while its rudders is quite small for the size and weight of the ship, a clear implication that the ship has poor speed and underwater maneuverability and is only capable of basic diving and maneuvering. Kim's choice of nuclear propulsion for his new submarines - with all its advantages in range and speed - was clearly not to keep them close to shore in closely guarded waters. The construction of large surface combatants with good seaworthiness only further proves that.
It was clear that Kim wanted his navy to extend farther offshore, specifically to compete for dominance in the Sea of Japan. But given Germany's past lessons, is it too risky and adventurous to follow that path that has proven to be a costly failure? Or is Kim building his navy on a bet on deep cooperation with Russia and China, which could provide military support (and hopefully not be abandoned or sold out by them)?