Miscellaneous News

ougoah

Brigadier
Registered Member
Loss of export income from China + massive drop of iron ore price (from $238 per tonne in May to $124 now) + massive increase in military spending = tax hike and decrease spending in health, education, environment etc.

Grab some cold drinks and watch as Australia sinks as a dysfunctional banana republic...


View attachment 77179

I wouldn't compare current price with recovery price.

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Like... it's been much cheaper as well.

What can be said in this era of worthless cash and rapidly appreciating... everything, is that it is a clear reduction in Australian income due to economic tensions... caused by China on Australia in response to Australia's increased aggression and enmity on China.

If not for China's trade policies, iron ore no doubt would still be appreciating well past 200. It is the trend for almost everything you can buy with cash.
 

Bellum_Romanum

Brigadier
Registered Member
I wouldnt call this France "blasts" the US. French diplomats needs to come in China and get some training in order to learn to make noises in diplomacy. Become "Wolf Warriors" 2.

Weak statement after you just lost a ~$100 Billion contract..
France's statement of supposed indignation for me is just one of their dog and pony show; or in this case a French poodle show. I don't put a lot of stock into this French whining when we all know that at the end of the day, France and pretty much the whole of western Europe are all in the pocket and control of their Daddy U.S.A. China isn't this stupid to think that France is going to make some moves that is going to finally distant itself away from their Emperor, unless of course President Lafayette is going to actually stand up for France rather than to his neoliberal clansmen.
 
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ZeEa5KPul

Colonel
Registered Member
Why is it fallacious to suggest that ASEAN might develop closer ties rather than bandwagoning with a growing power? Balance of power theory allows for both outcomes, it really just comes down to the way the analysis is framed.
Because the theory is insufficiently constrained. An unconstrained BoP "solution" might naively add up all the ASEAN states into a unified security bloc, but it ignores the difficulties of coordination that I outlined. Namely, the costs of coordinating disparate actors and the fact that upgrading ASEAN to a security partnership won't bring much added economic benefit since the ASEAN economies are already closely intertwined. Neither will it bring much security benefit since even taken together the combined militaries of the ASEAN states would still be feeble.

Even if everything went as well as it possibly could for an ASEAN bloc, it would still suck. Hence, no ASEAN state would want to pay the costs of joining such a bloc.
That's more or less the definition of rationality - but it's an assumption that states always behave rationally and assumptions can be wrong. I would be more comfortable examining the situation through the lens of regional security, as I'm more familiar with security studies, but to analyse the current situation with any degree of accuracy is a daunting task.
I'm of the belief that every actor's behaviour is rational as a first approximation, and most seeming irrationality is a result of incorrectly analyzing that actor's incentives. For example, Australia's antagonistic behaviour toward China might be seen as irrational from an excessively abstract point of view, but it's perfectly rational when you observe Australia's history and note that it values Anglophonic solidarity (the polite way to say racism) more than it does its economic well-being. Furthermore, there is a limit to the economic costs China can impose on Australia since trade is mostly forced. There are things China can only get from Australia and things Australia can only get from China, at least within the horizon in which Australians evaluate these matters, which further strengthens Australia's antagonistic tendencies.

Of course, there's also an element of panic and desperation involved. And when you're Australia in the current environment, there is much to fear.
Either way, things are changing so rapidly in the SEA region that a coin toss might be the most appropriate tool for analysis.
In this case I think past behaviour is the clearest indicator of future behaviour. The regional states, with the clear exception of Japan and Australia, have shown a strong preference for hedging. It doesn't take much to predict that they will continue to hedge for as long as they can. How long is "as long as they can"? A good question to which there isn't a clear answer. The clearest answer is as long as there's no war.

I think it's in both the US and China's interest, for very different reasons, for there to be peace. For the US, it's because that as a status quo power it would have much to lose if a war doesn't go its way. I believe the US is sincere when it says that it doesn't want competition to become conflict, because a conflict could see its post-WWII hegemony go up in flames. Ironically, we can conclude from this that despite its bellicose rhetoric and actions, the US wants peace in perpetuity because this situation is as good as it gets for it.

China, by contrast, wants peace but only for as long as it needs to shift the balance of power to an optimum configuration, i.e., for as long as it needs to complete its development. While China would prefer to attain hegemony without going to war, it would be perfectly willing to go to war if it calculated the odds of victory as favourable. Even more ironically, despite its "dovish" rhetoric and less provocative military posturing, in the long term it's China that's far more dangerous.

I think the prospects for regional peace are good for the next 2 to 3 decades, and they get stronger the farther out into that period we go since launching a pre-emptive war becomes less and less feasible for the US. However, that's only true until we get to that inflection point I described, when China feels assured of victory and would be willing to go to war to establish its hegemony if it judges it can't get there peacefully.
Judging by the style of your analysis, you might find Regional Security Complex Theory (from Buzan and Wæver) to be quite interesting.
Thank you for the recommendation, I'll give that a look.
 

Overbom

Brigadier
Registered Member
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China’s reluctance to cooperate bedeviled the drafting of the report, which is expected to be released this month, the people familiar with the matter said. The Chinese government gave perfunctory responses to the panel’s questions, hindering investigation into a range of issues including ships suspected of engaging in sanctions-busting while operating in Chinese waters, the people said.
Great news. China should start undermining UN sanctions against NK.

Its a whole new world now from 20 years ago.

"It’s not an American problem, it’s a global problem. And it will come back to bite China later on because the North Korean leadership doesn’t like the Chinese that much either,” Mr. Griffiths said.
If you mean "global" = west and its puppets then yes.
NK should be give sanction relief. Now if it does anything crazy to the West then tough luck, the countries affected can come and knock at China's door to discuss it...

Political calculations then changed, with Chinese leader Xi Jinping coming to view North Korea’s weapons program as more of a problem for the U.S. than for China, according to former U.S. officials and Chinese foreign-affairs specialists
Mr.Xi is right

China also refused to investigate potential sanctions violations that appeared in a Danish documentary. “The Mole: Undercover in North Korea” used hidden camera footage to show purported North Korean arms dealers meeting in Beijing.
China’s U.N. mission said the 2020 film “is suspected to be made by illegitimate means” and thus “shall not be taken as a credible source of information,” according to the draft.
Top tier trolling by the Chinese. Nice one
 

Gatekeeper

Brigadier
Registered Member
NZ would not have been invited because of its anti nuclear policy. I cant figure out why they would leave Canada out.

Not sure about that. It isn't just about nuclear subs. You can still be part of the AUKUS without having to have nuclear subs. I suspect they haven't ask NZ to join because they are afraid the answer would be no. And this will blunt their message of a united front.
 

ougoah

Brigadier
Registered Member
At this point, nothing less then the fall of Australia along with the summary destruction of the Australia government with Prime minister crucified at the front of the world stage having his name dragged through the mud in front of the UN and basically forcing there generals and soldiers in front of the world court to have then charged with crime against humanity while having the media report at gun point will satisfy China now given the amount of betrayals of good faith and the stupid amount of actions in making China to be the enemy in front of the world has made it that the moment they forcefully take Taiwan back and the Aussies send there troops, China is going to spare no expense to ensure that Australia will suffer loses in the 10s of thousands to wake them up from the idea that they are incincible

So uncalled for. You are making Chinese people look just as petty as the mouth foam wearing stupid portion of Australia.
 

solarz

Brigadier
We Chinese tried the whole alliance thing back during the Warring State period, turns out it's a rubbish strategy because alliance could always be destroyed from within by exploiting the differences in alliance member's interests and cause them to infight, as China is doing right now in front of our eyes.

People who push for alliances are known as 纵横家 because of Warring State, 纵横术 is considered a solved problem in China and all of its strengths and weaknesses and details on how to defeat it has been carefully recorded down by historians for the benefit of future generations.

The US-led alliances are more like vassalages. There are records on how to defeat those too: destroy the smaller vassals first. Instead of strength, these vassals are actually a source of weakness.

Furthermore, the US has shown no interest in defending Australia from China's economic sanctions. On the contrary, they've taken advantage of those sanctions to make some profit. Which is why I still think this whole AUKUS thing is a money making scheme for the US.
 

ougoah

Brigadier
Registered Member
This stuff is a drop in the bucket. PLAN needed to address USN submarine capabilities and have had that need for half a century. Does everyone believe they haven't been keeping it up? There would be several generations of anti sub technologies developed already. You think the door was wide open since the 1950s?

The USN is a top heavy structure. PLAN wants equal raw power but addressing the threat of USN has always been asymmetric in order to be successful given the force disparity that existed between PLAN and USN.

Look carefully. Three tiered approach in terms of conventional military counters to an overwhelmingly technologically and numerically superior naval force (since 1950s) that is a direct threat since the Korean war.

Since the 2000s there were whispers of assassin's mace weapons in China's possession. These rumoured turned out to be true in the form of AShBM which western naval leaders did not think were possible until they were demonstrated presumably because 1. the tech is already outdated by modern PLA standards and/or 2. the need to give the US some deterrence was urgently required even if it meant revealing certain abilities and details such as flight performance... but I believe the demonstrated missiles were of an previous generation and may have been modified for the demonstration due to opsec concerns. These combined with what we now understand as HGV weapons, form the backbone of PLA's A2AD against USN surface fleets.

Second is the conventional build up. 1950s PLAN disparity with USN isn't even worth mentioning. The desire for slow and steady eventual build up to match USN force strength overall has always been a long term goal. It hasn't served as the primary means of deterring US military attacks. During the era between Korean war and the 2010s when tensions starting building again due to the unpredicted rate of improvement and progress being made by China, the Soviets provided a nuclear umbrella until China developed the fission weapon and then the thermonuclear weapon in the 1960s and then achieved ICBM range covering continental USA with DF-5 by 1980. PLAN still wayyyyy too backwards to deter USN. Clearly the A2AD strategy depended entirely on some form of MAD. These days the PLAN is about half the size of the USN surface capability considering overall strength. That's a long way it came in a short 70 odd years considering China's conditions in the 1950s to 1980s until things finally began to stabilise. The real build up period really began in earnest well into the 2000s.

The third tier is the one that deals with subsurface threats. We see PRC during its weakest phase address requirement for USN deterrence using nuclear MAD which is a terrible position to be in. Then build up while developing A2AD for USN surface fleet. What about the subsurface threat? It is equal in magnitude for PLAN at least ... PLAN build up being the second strategic direction with very long term goals (spanning many decades as opposed to convincing A2AD). This domain is rarely given light and more hidden than even PLA A2AD capabilities. But it is clear what the strategy would involve. Submarines are generally quite a bit slower and useless sitting ducks once they are detected. Detection naturally becomes the priority. They are also EXTREMELY expensive and much more technically difficult boats to build and even engineer than surface warships. A network of underwater sensors and mines has been typical ways of some A2AD for coastal regional waters but also having capable and plentiful UUVs could really benefit the side guarding their waters. All of this rests on being able to detect submarines and China's had a 70 year long requirement to get this one thing done. It's really only had the industrial and technological capability to start working on this in the last few decades but that's long enough to address one of the last and major pieces of existential threats to its long term naval buildup.

To believe that PLA has left the subsurface concerns empty and unaddressed is being so willfully ignorant. This is like investing tens of thousands into home security systems and then still always leaving every window and door open and the systems pointed away from all those entrances.
 

ZeEa5KPul

Colonel
Registered Member
This stuff is a drop in the bucket. PLAN needed to address USN submarine capabilities and have had that need for half a century. Does everyone believe they haven't been keeping it up? There would be several generations of anti sub technologies developed already. You think the door was wide open since the 1950s?

The USN is a top heavy structure. PLAN wants equal raw power but addressing the threat of USN has always been asymmetric in order to be successful given the force disparity that existed between PLAN and USN.

Look carefully. Three tiered approach in terms of conventional military counters to an overwhelmingly technologically and numerically superior naval force (since 1950s) that is a direct threat since the Korean war.

Since the 2000s there were whispers of assassin's mace weapons in China's possession. These rumoured turned out to be true in the form of AShBM which western naval leaders did not think were possible until they were demonstrated presumably because 1. the tech is already outdated by modern PLA standards and/or 2. the need to give the US some deterrence was urgently required even if it meant revealing certain abilities and details such as flight performance... but I believe the demonstrated missiles were of an previous generation and may have been modified for the demonstration due to opsec concerns. These combined with what we now understand as HGV weapons, form the backbone of PLA's A2AD against USN surface fleets.

Second is the conventional build up. 1950s PLAN disparity with USN isn't even worth mentioning. The desire for slow and steady eventual build up to match USN force strength overall has always been a long term goal. It hasn't served as the primary means of deterring US military attacks. During the era between Korean war and the 2010s when tensions starting building again due to the unpredicted rate of improvement and progress being made by China, the Soviets provided a nuclear umbrella until China developed the fission weapon and then the thermonuclear weapon in the 1960s and then achieved ICBM range covering continental USA with DF-5 by 1980. PLAN still wayyyyy too backwards to deter USN. Clearly the A2AD strategy depended entirely on some form of MAD. These days the PLAN is about half the size of the USN surface capability considering overall strength. That's a long way it came in a short 70 odd years considering China's conditions in the 1950s to 1980s until things finally began to stabilise. The real build up period really began in earnest well into the 2000s.

The third tier is the one that deals with subsurface threats. We see PRC during its weakest phase address requirement for USN deterrence using nuclear MAD which is a terrible position to be in. Then build up while developing A2AD for USN surface fleet. What about the subsurface threat? It is equal in magnitude for PLAN at least ... PLAN build up being the second strategic direction with very long term goals (spanning many decades as opposed to convincing A2AD). This domain is rarely given light and more hidden than even PLA A2AD capabilities. But it is clear what the strategy would involve. Submarines are generally quite a bit slower and useless sitting ducks once they are detected. Detection naturally becomes the priority. They are also EXTREMELY expensive and much more technically difficult boats to build and even engineer than surface warships. A network of underwater sensors and mines has been typical ways of some A2AD for coastal regional waters but also having capable and plentiful UUVs could really benefit the side guarding their waters. All of this rests on being able to detect submarines and China's had a 70 year long requirement to get this one thing done. It's really only had the industrial and technological capability to start working on this in the last few decades but that's long enough to address one of the last and major pieces of existential threats to its long term naval buildup.

To believe that PLA has left the subsurface concerns empty and unaddressed is being so willfully ignorant. This is like investing tens of thousands into home security systems and then still always leaving every window and door open and the systems pointed away from all those entrances.
I see the UUV and other ASW not as a substitute for a massive PLAN SSN fleet as an asymmetric strategy would suggest, but as a supplement. Just like the AShBMs are not a substitute for a navy, they are a supplement.
 
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