The last two days the news came up again regarding MH370 about whether they were indeed looking at the wrong location. After some digging around I found this invaluable website with some interesting details:
The Seventh Arc
Pinpointing the Search Arc
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In many ways, this should have been the first article I ever posted here. It goes without saying that we will not find the plane if we fail to look in the right place. And the only places we have looked or seriously considered so far are places that intersect the so-called “7th Arc”. But that Arc, first proposed by Inmarsat and variously updated by Australia’s CSIRO and others is at least 100 kilometers too far southeast. That means no part of the Arc has been searched as of today. None.
In this article I will go through the steps required to check the validity or lack thereof of the Seventh Arc, which I will refer to simply as “The Arc” in the future. Doesn’t hurt anything to continue calling it the 7th Arc, but that is another wrinkle: the 7th Arc does not exist. The 6th Arc is the closest we can reliably get to what Inmarsat dubbed the Seventh Arc. What we call it isn’t a big deal, but we still have to go to it to find the plane. It will not come to us no matter how hard we hope.
The sixth ping and the seventh ping occurred 8 minutes apart. The plane was either out of fuel, or it was in the water shortly after the 6th ping. We simply have to search enough seafloor width to eliminate the possibility we missed a few kilometers because the plane was still in the air by the time the abbreviated pings were picked up at 00:19. That has always been one of our challenges.
It is my belief now that the plane was indeed in the water prior to the seventh ping. I do not care how it got there. For me, that is the only explanation for a thoroughly garbled seventh ping. So yes, I suspect it was piloted to the end, but whether it was or wasn’t isn’t very important, either. We won’t know for sure until we find it.
First: Correcting Inmarsat’s BTO Bias
We begin by examining the BTO pings Inmarsat used to “calibrate” the BTO value. They were published as Table 3 in an article by Chris Ashton, et. al in the September issue of Journal of Navigation (JON).
Here is a copy of the part we want, taken from one of my worksheets. There are 17 BTO values Inmarsat selected to use for calibration purposes. They were not selected randomly. They were hand picked, which itself is problematic. They were all transmitted
from the tarmac prior to the plane’s departure. That time frame was the only acknowledged criterion.
Rows 26 through 34 present my own central tendency calculations. While they are not a truly random sample, I nevertheless use a sample standard deviation metric for variability, shown in line B30: 58.84 microseconds (
µs). If you’re not familiar with variability measures, this is a modest amount of variance. Nothing out of the ordinary.
That standard deviation is also sometimes called 1-sigma. We will use it to estimate how much seafloor we must search to be sure we find the plane where we believe it is, or to be sure our location is wrong if we don’t find it. It is a very simple and common technique that puts a feedback loop in our effort. If we find it, we get an “atta-boy”. If we don’t we get a “try harder”.
Now that we have a sample of pings, we can address the number one issue: average bias across that sample. We prefer to use discrete values for the bias associated with each ping, but Inmarsat and Malaysia have elected to withhold bias data across the board, except for these 17 “calibration pings”. Why? Who knows. It’s disgraceful, but we’re not in a position to do anything about it.
It turns out that the average bias value for all 17 pings in the sample is as you see it in row 24: -495679
µs. It becomes part of a formula used to calculate the plane’s distance from the satellite at each ping.
But wait a second. We see some additional information in the insert below, including the channel from which each calibration ping was taken. And sadly, three different channels sent that information. That’s important because the broadcast channel can have a lot to do with the magnitude of each BTO data value.
It also turns out that all of the “official pings” Inmarsat used came from Channel 4. ONLY Channel 4. It may be that Inmarsat conducted cross channel tests to make sure channels 4, 8, and 11 were comparable, but if they did that they didn’t note it anywhere.
So we’re not going to take a chance by using an average BTO Bias value that appears likely to be incorrect. (We know this was a problem with Channel 10 BTO data, so we aren’t going to take a chance. In fact, the last ping … the infamous 7th ping … came from Channel 10, and we will reject it for the same reason: it transmitted on its own scale and there is NO formal translation back to channel 4 data values. )
The following table shows us the nature of the problem: eight calibration BTO values came from channel 8; seven came from channel 11; and two came from channel 4.