What is the thesis of your essay? Just wondering... are you a story writer or journalist? Proof and sources, please... Making points without proof is a waste of time, I understand emotions points, but a reason would be nice.
Which part are you contesting? I also don't see how the majority of my post is emotional, certainly not the parts directly relating to the topic. Also, my reasons for being against tyranny stem not just from emotion, but from logic as well. I am in the process of writing a book on political philosophy, but it's not my profession.
wait there's something here...
what is it...
Oh YES. You will *never* win hearts because you pick up a manual with your "proven approach". Vietnamese don't want to be your "proven success". Your manipulation will show through in every word you say, every gesture you make, every look in your eye. Their sons and daughters are dying, and they're not there to up your score. That's why they will follow Ho Chi Minh instead, who had it in his heart to be their friend.
Same deal in Iraq. They know after the candy truck passes, they're still just "hajis" to you. They would rather die than have you in their country. And they show it to you everyday.
It's not so much getting them to love us that is the goal inasmuch as it is to get them to consider the occupying force, the government, or forces supporting then government, to be the best option. The goal is to get them to believe that they will be etter off siding with that side, and not with the insurgents. You don't have to get them to love or adore you to meet that goal, and in most cases, such a goal is unrealistic.
In the case of Vietnam and the CAP program, the approach, which is always adapted to the circumstances, entailed several things. First off, there would be a starting point in a major population center. The VC would be cleared out, and a USMC squad or platoon would occupy a village to secure it, and they would be assigned to a Popular Forces unit from the village of a larger size. In this relationship, the Marines would teach the PFs small-unit tactics, would train them, advise them, guide them in combat, etc., while the PFs would teach the Marines about the terrain, how to operate in it, and about the people and the culture.
The Marines would live amongst the villagers, and would live no better or worse than the villagers, and daily interaction was a neccessity. Their relationship to the mass of the populace was to be one which was kind and benevolent, the exception being those who helped the VC, who would be dealt with in a more harsh manner. The Marines would also aid in or directly participate in efforts to build community buildings, such as a school, or provide a service, such as distributing medicine, running a waste and sewage management system, aiding the civil government, and such. Rewards would be given to those who gave accurate intelligence on the VC.
The most important part of all of this is the security aspect. The Marines would defend the village against attack or coercion by the VC (who often resorted to brutal methods to ensure loyalty and get "taxes"). They would, in conjunction with the PFs, do their best to police and secure the village, and root out VC or sympathizers from it. Small unit patrols would patrol the area around the village looking for trouble, and doing things like deliberately walking into ambushes, counter-ambushing, conducting ambushes, searching for intel or VC forces, or just seeing what they could find.
The result of this was that the villagers would feel that they were much better off with the Marines and the PFs, and the VC would lose major ground in the battle for the hearts and minds. The villagers would root out sympathizers themselves, provide intel, and aid in the overall security of the village. More often than not, the VC, out of desperation, and sometimes with NVA support, would assault the post where the troops were stationed in mass assaults, and they were always defeated, such defeat signalling the end of their influence. Once the village was secure, other Marines would move to the outlying villages and pacify them using the same methods, and such a pacification attempt would spread out. Another effect was on the Marines. Living with the people, especially after earning their trust (and it was earned), have them a stake in the conflict, and many would volunteer to stay beyond their one-year tour to ensure the job was done.
The strategies used were principally the attraction and chastisement strategy, first used by the United States to pacify the Philippines (and used by others prior to that), and the inkblot strategy, first used by French general Joseph Gallieni to pacify Tonkin, Senegal, and Madagascar. At the tactical level, there was the interaction and the civil and political efforts with the populace, policing and security techniques, and the use of agrressive small-unit tactics. After the trial of the program, Westmoreland, who inssited on continuing his fruitless earch and destroy missions and conventional operations, refused to expand the program, saying there were not enough personnel, despite that the most liberal estimate to pacify the country would have required less troops than we currently have in Iraq, far below the 500,000 troops that were in-country.
A notable village was that of Binh Nghia, which was a VC strongold. After being pacified, it became so safe and secure, and devoid of the VC (who were non-existent), tha it became a recommended R&R center. There is a good book on the pacification efforts as part of the CAP program in Binh Nghia which I would recommend, titled "The Village", by Captain Francis J. West, Jr., USMC (ret.), who was a participant. Another book which covers the broader subject including this aspect, is Max Boot's "The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power."
As much as it may seem callous to you, and you would think that maybe a methodic approach would turn people off, the approach does work and in vaious forms has been used to win most of the cunterinsurgencies the U.S. has waged, the lessons from these and those learned from the British colonial experience being incorporated into a manual, the Small Wars Manual, which laid out how to fight and win counterinsurgencies, along with other military missions and conflicts short of an actual conventional war. Using human nature, which is fixed, as a starting point, you can come up with a logical strategy and with tactics arising from such strategies, which is a plan, a method, to do this work. When it comes to fighting, while you must be able to adapt, it is best to have a working plan, a strategy. In the case of Iraq, proper pacification efforts, except in a couple of villages, were never undertaken until recently, when General Petraeus took command. He's a student of this style of warfare and wrote the Army's first counterinsurgency manual (the Small Wars Manual preceded it by nearly 7 decades, and was recently updated as a 4th edition), and is rapidly implementing this strategy. It's ultimate effects remain to be seen, but the chances of success, if history is a guide, are high, provided that the Democrats do not push for defeat and win. If this is the case, the PLA, for their own sake if they wish to undergo a pacification operation, should take note and draw the proper lessons from the conflict, rather than improper ones, as was done by the US after Vietnam, culminating in the flawed Powell Doctrine.
ff Sorry, but I think China won (at least draw) in korea but didn't destroy an entire US Army division. 
