Issues/Problems the PLA needs to address

wtlh

Junior Member
My god, as I read over the last few posts I just wonder how that BBC article even passed the common sense test.

Frankly I think anyone with an inkling of understanding of recent PLA news should have guessed something was very very wrong with the conclusions that were made, jeez.
Sometimes the BBC's china correspondents make me want to prepare a series of annotated lectures to show them just how blatantly incorrect they are. Goodness.

There is no use.

These are ideological propagandists, they are not interested in actual facts and logic, they are interested in bending facts and logic to paint a picture already formed in their minds.

Obviously, the picture in the current topic is that of the Stalin era purges, associated with the words "political commissar" and the overall theme of Xi consolidating power (another Stalin in the making).

You can only laugh at those cartoonish people waving the big pen of "truth" at the ignorant. There is no cure. They are paid to do the exact job they are asked and suited to do.

I read BBC only to gather the partial selection of facts they present. For example this article informed us that there may be currently an officer task swapping programme going on in the PLA, and if I want to know more about it, I search the Chinese sources. The rest of the piece are just throwaway packaging. The same applies to most of their reports and analysis on foreign matters, especially on what they consider as non-friendlies. In fact, this applies to the Western MSM in general.
 
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This is a more detailed jamestown foundation article about the exchange programme. I won't copy the entire thing, but there is one important paragraph that basically sums up the goals behind it

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In this dual-command system, the post rotation policy is significant because it helps remove cultural distance between different groups within the PLA by allowing both command track and political track officers to better understand each other’s jobs. Through their rotations to political-track leadership positions, grassroots commanders gain a better understanding of grassroots political work, which is helpful as they move up the career ladder. From a top-down perspective, post rotations could double the number of leaders with experience with both political and military grassroots issues, possibly increasing the number of potential candidates for promotion to higher levels within the political commissar system. Likewise, the “serve in a company” program helps bring senior cadres, particularly those who have never interacted with enlisted soldiers, down to the grassroots level to understand the challenges faced by the “foundation” of the military’s combat power.

Xi Jinping is said to see value in the learning-from-being-in-other-people's-shoes aspect of what he experienced during the Cultural Revolution being sent to work in the countryside, so it's not a surprise that he would be behind a much more nuanced and specific policy in that spirit for the political officers in the PLA. If rural re-education during the Cultural Revolution was like a harsher mandatory version of Americorps for privileged kids, then this would be like a mandatory version of a rotating internship.
 
This is more of an overarching socio-political difference rather than a weakness but there are no chaplains (or equivalents for any religion) in the PLA right?

Since the political officers are responsible for "cultural activities" then are they the ones primarily responsible for the emotional, spiritual, and traditional duties equivalent to those of a chaplain? Or are these duties more shared between the political and the operational officers than in a chaplain-type system?

There is supposedly an ongoing spiritual revival of sorts in Chinese society across all religions and there has been officially recognized religions for a long time in the PRC, so I wonder how the PLA manages the intersection of religion and military life.
 
This is a more detailed jamestown foundation article about the exchange programme. I won't copy the entire thing, but there is one important paragraph that basically sums up the goals behind it

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thanks man for the effort. i agree. sometimes the west produces some really funky stuffs about the chinese military that makes me wonder if they have schizophrenic episodes at the moment of publishing.
 

solarz

Brigadier
This is more of an overarching socio-political difference rather than a weakness but there are no chaplains (or equivalents for any religion) in the PLA right?

Since the political officers are responsible for "cultural activities" then are they the ones primarily responsible for the emotional, spiritual, and traditional duties equivalent to those of a chaplain? Or are these duties more shared between the political and the operational officers than in a chaplain-type system?

There is supposedly an ongoing spiritual revival of sorts in Chinese society across all religions and there has been officially recognized religions for a long time in the PRC, so I wonder how the PLA manages the intersection of religion and military life.

The CPC is officially atheist, and as the military branch of the CPC, so is the PLA, so it's unlikely that there would be any religious figures in the PLA.
 
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China is currently undergoing a new round of widespread and comprehensive military reforms that aim to fundamentally improve the PLA. These efforts, as detailed in the 18th Party Congress’s
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from November 2013, call for such changes as increased jointness, more realistic training, and better military discipline. As China’s leaders search for guidance on how to enact these difficult reforms, they have looked deep into China’s past — all the way back to the First Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895.

The war revolved around control over the Korean Peninsula and included two large naval engagements in which the Imperial Japanese Navy crushed the larger Chinese Beiyang Fleet. China’s defeat was swift and the aftermath was devastating, ceding important territory to Japan and hastening the end of the Qing government’s rule. Especially relevant to the PLA, China’s loss revealed the failures in the Qing’s ambitious military strengthening program, which had begun 30 years earlier, partly to counter foreign encroachment.

The summer of 2014 marked the 120th anniversary of the war. China
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with a flood of essays, speeches, and events analyzing the meaning of the war for modern China. During this time, Qiushi,the official journal of the CCP’s Central Committee,
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of the lessons learned from the war. It was written by General Fan Changlong, one of two vice chairmen of China’s powerful Central Military Commission, which exercises control over the entire military. He is second in command only to President Xi Jinping. The importance of both the author and the publication make the article worth examining in detail.

Fan begins his essay by acknowledging that China’s defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War “humiliated the nation” and “disgraced” the military. He asserts that it is important to study this painful period of history in order to educate military personnel and provide “historical lessons” that can be applicable to modern times.

Fan argues that the major takeaway of the First Sino-Japanese War is that China must build a military that can achieve victory on the battlefield in order to ensure its national security. He goes on to detail the reforms the PLA must carry out in order to reach this goal, using the weaknesses that led to defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War as examples of what to improve. His noted reforms include:

Strategic innovation: Fan points out that the Qing military relied on “outdated” military strategy and operational guidelines since Qing leaders were “ideologically conservative.” He asserts that achieving a strong military requires innovation and urges China to free itself from “conservatism, dogmatism, and parochialism” and to innovate and update military theory, strategic guidance, and military culture.

Indigenous innovation: The essay argues that although the Qing had been modernizing for more than 30 years before the First Sino-Japanese War, the national defense science and technology field was still weak since it was so dependent on other countries. He notes that although China has made great strides in indigenous development, “certain key technologies and vital sectors” remain in others’ hands. He urges China to further improve military S&T and increase indigenous innovation.

Organizational reform: Fan notes that the Qing upgraded the military’s equipment while keeping their organizational structure the same or that they “changed equipment without changing the system.” Because of this, he says, military reforms were only superficial. Fan states that the PLA must modernize military organization, reform joint operational command, improve regulations, and strengthen R&D ties between the military and civilian sectors.

Personnel reform: According to Fan, because the late Qing lacked talented military personnel, they could not truly reform the military in a meaningful way. He states that the PLA must learn from this and recruit talented personnel that truly grasp winning modern wars and conducting joint operations.

Military ethics: The essay puts a special emphasis on discipline and ethics, noting that defeat in the Sino-Japanese War was not just due to weapons and equipment, but also bad discipline, apathy, and corruption. Fan ties this to the importance of the current bout of anti-corruption efforts ongoing throughout China, including within the PLA. He specifically mentions disgraced high-ranking PLA officers Xu Caihou and Gu Junshan as examples of poor ethics and cites Xi Jinping as saying that if a military were corrupt it could not even fight battles, let alone win them.

Fan concludes by emphasizing that it is not enough to study weaknesses in the Qing military and compare them to modern shortcomings: the PLA must fully commit to actually carrying out necessary reforms. Otherwise, if it finds itself in an armed conflict, it will be unprepared and could suffer a disastrous loss similar to that of the First Sino-Japanese War.

Fan’s essay reveals several interesting trends in the PLA leadership’s thinking as the military undergoes extensive reforms. First, the fact that the PLA is looking at the First Sino-Japanese War as a template for reform confirms that China is currently focusing more on improving its organizational, personnel, and disciplinary systems rather than simply upgrading its weapons systems. Indeed, Fan explicitly points out that reform must be systemic rather than superficially technology-based. This indicates that the PLA has recognized fundamental and persistent problems in the Chinese military system that have yet to be solved, and believes that superior technology alone does not necessarily guarantee a victory in the battlefield.

Second, Fan warns that the most important lesson from the First Sino-Japanese War is that China must prepare its military to fight and win wars, or it could risk another devastating loss. Fan makes clear that a strong military is fundamental to China’s national security. This intimates the high stakes and historical significance that Chinese leaders are attaching to the latest round of reforms.

Fan’s analysis of the First Sino-Japanese War implies that Chinese leaders view themselves as vulnerable as they were in the late 19th century, while determined to avoid a similar outcome. This suggests that China’s commitment to military reform might be more than rhetorical, and that Western analysts should be closely monitoring the PLA’s progress in achieving these major goals.

Also saw this a few weeks ago. Kept it around cuz haven't read it. Realized this article might be suitable here.
 

Engineer

Major
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Political officers are experts in Marxist-Leninist theory, not in commanding infantry.
Whenever I read stuffs from BBC now days, I always inserted "according to BBC, a state subsidied news agency, said..."

May be in the UK, political officers cannot command infantry. That's not the case in China though. In a major land exercise back in 2014, the only victory from red force was led by a political officer. I don't have time to translate now, but here is what I found:
“跨越2014-朱日和D”演习,16集团军某旅参战。该旅装备了“万岁军”换下来的“二手”99式主战坦克,其步兵却乘坐古老的63式步兵输送车作战。尽管装备了我军第二强大的主战坦克,其“胜利”也是来之不易,几乎是一场平局。
这是新闻下,68旅留下的记录
他们是如何惨胜的呢?
因为68旅基本是重装甲部队,一堆的99式,在蓝军强有力的电子干扰下,68旅直接回到红军时期,通讯完全靠通讯员传达,任务传达靠口头,分散进军,稀释蓝军空袭效果,靠着99玩命突击蓝军阵地,拼近战。让蓝军5对负重轮扮演的M1A2SEP无法发挥火力优势,同时,使蓝军无法空袭,因为人全混在一块了。
但是这样突击的结果就是红军大量的伤亡,下面基本就是各种开挂了。
1.68旅伤亡70%的两个营居然自动整队成一个混编连向心突击,蓝军都看傻了
2.一线部队全员突击,上了刺刀,炊事员,通讯员都上了,这回是导演部看傻了
3.传言68旅一个连面对195旅一个加强营的冲击,一个战士冲了出来,来了个炸药包钻坦克,加强营的士兵被吓到了
这段基本没那么夸张,其实是一个红军士兵冲过封锁,往蓝军车辆休整的装甲车辆前扔了一个包,之后一躺,引来了导调组,导调组说这是违规。之后这哥们打开了包,里面放满了手雷,说他是敢死队友。之后导演组,红蓝双方都傻了。这个就是士兵“钻”坦克的真相,因为这种行为不值得鼓励,所以不能公开报道,而且因为这事情,演习暂停了两小时,蓝方说是事故,不能算,红方知道不占理,但是也得争啊,为此墨迹两小时,最后导演部给的判决是,红方士兵阵亡,蓝方一辆装甲车被炸,但是里面就一个司机和一个作图参谋。
4.68旅拼到最后,旅长政委阵亡,参谋长接替,参谋长阵亡,炮兵团长接替,到了最后是政治部副主任指挥的最后战斗装甲1营成员扛着机枪跟着步兵打冲锋
5.下面就是红军最后惨胜的关键节点,在争夺一个关键据点的时候,蓝军包围了红军一个班,之后那个班突然杀出三个带刺刀的突围,然后顺便往一个蓝军一辆看起来像指挥车的目标扔了一颗手雷,导演部宣布,蓝军前指瘫痪,前面说到政治部副主任发现战场情况有明显变化,来了一个最后突击,之后拿到了这次演习的红军的胜利,惨胜......

三个士兵突围甩手雷,打到蓝军指挥车,造成蓝军前指瘫痪是这段
在蓝军防御的核心地域xxxx高地东侧,红军“一等战功连”连长郑荣带领7名特战队员,在 “敌”后机降成功,击毁蓝军一辆坦克,一辆装甲指挥车,14个蓝军装甲步兵也随着红军一阵猛烈炮火,被送上了“天”。
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当时是9架直升机带人突击,8架直升机在蓝军火力网打击下被判定击落,仅剩一架直升机幸存,然后他们完成了端掉敌方前指的任务
 
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wtlh

Junior Member
Yep, the political officer in an PLA unit to me functions more like the first officer or the XO in the US military, although they are not really equivalent. Soldiers look to the political officer---who is in charge of the administration side of things---for personal and emotional issues, and it is the political officer's duty to make sure the orders from the officer are understood and carried out by the soldiers.

(If Star Trek TNG is an example, then a political officer is Riker and Councillor Troy rolled into one.)
 

Ultra

Junior Member
I think PLA's biggest weakness comes from its ability to fight biological warfare.
The US and the Russians have for decades preparing for it - The US has USAMRIID and various other well funded research facilities can quickly combat emerging biological threats - eg. the US alone have over 15 BSL-4 labs alone and an amazing 1,356 BSL-3 labs!

The Soviet/Russian has the largest bioweapon research program in the world - the Biopreparat.

It was a vast, ostensibly civilian, network of secret laboratories, each of which focused on a different deadly
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. Its 30,000 employees researched and produced
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for use in a major war. Biopreparat was a system of 18, nominally civilian, research laboratories and centers scattered chiefly around
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, in which a small army of scientists and technicians developed biological weapons such as
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,
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,
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,
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,
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,
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,
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, and
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. It was the largest producer of weaponized anthrax in the Soviet Union and was a leader in the development of new bioweapons technologies.



China on the other hand just finished building its first ever BSL-4 lab 2 weeks ago. While China's offensive biological warfare capability is practically unknown (with only rumors of its existence - not to mention China is a signatory of the
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) - the defensive capability is severely lacking. The avaliability of BSL-4 labs and BSL-3 labs are severely lacking, along with the trained research personnels capable of operating in these facilities.

China also suffers from its inherent urban planning policy which creates even bigger problem for biological warfare defense as hundreds of millions of people are now packed into high-density apartment living life style with extreme close proximity to each other and forced shared access (stairs/elevators). This means it is ripe for bacterial/viral transmission. Couple this with a culture of poor hygiene and a vast transportation / road network and you have perfect recipe for disaster.
 
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I think PLA's biggest weakness comes from its ability to fight biological warfare.
The US and the Russians have for decades preparing for it - The US has USAMRIID and various other well funded research facilities can quickly combat emerging biological threats - eg. the US alone have over 15 BSL-4 labs alone and an amazing 1,356 BSL-3 labs!

The Soviet/Russian has the largest bioweapon research program in the world - the Biopreparat.
...
China on the other hand just finished building its first ever BSL-4 lab 2 weeks ago. While China's offensive biological warfare capability is practically unknown (with only rumors of its existence - not to mention China is a signatory of the
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
) - the defensive capability is severely lacking.
...

I agree and I think this is one of those areas where China's lack of capabilities can be inferred correctly based on its directly related actions from what you mentioned as well as its indirectly related problems trying to deal with repeated outbreaks of contagious diseases like various types of flu or SARS.
 
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