Contributing Editor AIR MARSHAL (Retd) AYAZ AHMED KHAN talks about the faulty procedures in our defence planning and procurement sector and recommends reforms that need to take place urgently
One of the major lessons of the 1965 and 1971 wars was that defence planning and procurement policies should be re-tailored to achieve self-reliance in defence production. The low priority given to indigenize major weapon systems by Islamabad was made clear to the senior officers during the 1972 foreign tour of the first regular National Defence College course to Tehran. General Tofanian, Shah’s defence minister and former commander of the Iranian Air Force, answering a question from a NDC student (late Lt General Fazle Haq, then a Brigadier) said, "Iran -Pakistan defence cooperation has been the victim of "PARALYSIS OF ANALYSIS".
Referring to Shah’s offer to President Ayub Khan for co-assembly, joint-manufacture of main battle tanks (MBT’s) Pakistan’s hesitation and GHQ’s astonishing reply that "tank had no future", left the Iranian General Staff speechless, and the Shah angry. This unwise reply infuriated the Iranian ruler, and stalled the possibilities of self-reliance in the vital field of armour manufacture.
Pakistan Army wiz-kids had gone in circles to prove to the Field Marshal that armour i.e. the tank would be a useless weapon platform in a future war. This reply based on the study carried out by the General Staff or armour specialists reflected a state of mental paralysis which has afflicted our defence planners for a long time. Was such a conclusion based on the fact that during the 1965 war, Pakistani tanks from No1 Armoured Division had got stuck in the paddy fields of Khemkaran, and became easy targets for Indian gunners hiding in sugarcane fields? But then No. 6 Armoured Division did well in the Chawinda area to destroy Indian armour advancing towards Gujranwala. Was such a recommendation made due to the Khemkaran experience, or due to the new weapon systems i.e. ATGM’s and guided missile firing fighters and helicopters being inducted into modern armies, which could destroy exposed tanks. Frankly Field Marshal’s advisors were proven right during the 1967 Arab - Israel war. Nasser’s tanks in the Sinai desert became sitting ducks for the Israeli Air Power. Over eight hundred Egyptian tanks caught in the open were destroyed by Israeli Air force fighters. But it must not be forgotten that before going for the Egyptian armour, Israeli Air Force had caught the Egyption Air Force on the ground and destroyed it. Israeli air force had complete air superiority during the 1967 war.
Pakistan armour was not used to any great effect in the ‘71 war. And Pakistani generals were again right when in the 1973 October war, Egyptian and Syrian armies turned the tables on the Israeli Air Force and Armour by destroying it with shoulder fired SAM;s and ATGM’s. But in spite of the Arab and Israeli armour debacles in the 1967 and 1973 wars, and Pak debacle in the ‘71 war, armies every where stepped up their efforts for more and better quality tanks. India started tank manufacture in earnest, and Arjun MBT after completion of intensive test trials is ready for delivery to Indian Army armoured corps. Pakistan lost a golden opportunity for self-reliance in armour manufacture, primarily because of the inability of our decision makers to take bold and timely decisions viz armour manufacture in Pakistan with Iranian cooperation, which certainly was in our long term national interest.
Al-Kalid MBT is a victim of indecisions, time and cost over- runs, and its series production is nowhere in sight. It is worth mentioning that the first Al-Khalid was demonstrated to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in early 1992, when General Mirza Aslam Beg was the COAS. Had there been consistency in procurement planning, this vital project surely would have taken concrete shape during the last six years, and we would have seen squadrons of Al-Khalid tanks rolling the 23 March Pakistan Day parades.
General Tofanian also referred to Shah’s offer the 1965 war to fund co-assembly and progressive manufacture of French Mirage fighters in Iran and Pakistan. Pakistan again rebuffed Iranian offer. Pakistan Air Force at the time was engaged in urgent plans to procure Mirage Ill’s and V’s from France, and the Air Staff perhaps felt that the Iranian offer would hinder the pace of procurement of the urgently required fighters. But the Iranian offer merited very serious consideration, because it was being funded by Tehran, and would have been a major step towards self - reliance in the vital field of combat aircraft manufacture. The STORY OF PAKISTAN AIR FORCE does not throw any light on this offer from Iran. Senior PAF officer, and PSO’s at the time may wish to throw some light on this matter.
