India Stretches Its Sea Legs
Steven J. Forsberg
Proceedings, March 2007
India's development of Mauritian islands to its southwest could substantially expand the reach of its navy.
CHRIS SATTLER
Under the Indian Navy ensign, the Talwar-class frigate Tabar (background) embarks on a mission in 2006. A lease agreement with Mauritius would give India access to remote Agalega, a naval stepping stone between the Indian coast and shipping lanes of the Mozambique Channel.
In its race to become a regional sea power, India has at times seemed more like a tortoise than a hare. The potential acquisition of an aircraft carrier was an annual story for more than 20 years, and despite the lease of a Soviet nuclear-powered submarine almost two decades ago India's submarine force remains entirely conventional. But even though plans to buy or develop specific systems seem to fall through with regularity, the overall growth trend of the Indian Navy is impressive. History has shown that sea power is not easily acquired in a hurry, and India's sometimes slow but generally systematic growth is a sign of maturity more than a symptom of ineffectiveness. India is thinking ahead.
In particular, the Indian Navy realizes that sea power is more than just a matter of ships. It is also a matter of geography. Since the turn of the 20th century, the Indian Navy has been making more deployments far from its traditional coastal waters, using its vessels as tools of diplomacy more than as warfighting machines. India is systematically cultivating close relationships with key states that can offer its navy a leg up in future contingencies. This highlights the country's long-term naval thinking, which appears designed to make the Indian Ocean a bastion that can serve as a springboard for naval projection against distant points.
Another Little Dot on the Map
It is probably safe to say that most people have never heard of the Agalega Islands. There are two of them, a North and a South Island, located about 425 nautical miles northeast of Madagascar in the Indian Ocean.1 The islands are sovereign territory of Mauritius, which is about 700 miles to the south. Together, the two Agalegas have about 70 square kilometers of land area populated by approximately 300 people.2 The islands' remote location is the key to their importance. They are approximately 1,700 nautical miles southwest of the Indian naval base at Kochin on the southwestern coast of the Indian peninsula. They are approximately 1,200 miles southwest of Addu Atoll in the Maldives. And they are also approximately 960 nautical miles to the west and south of Diego Garcia.
The Mauritian government has offered India a long-term lease of the islands, with an eye toward further development.3 The Indian government has not yet announced any decision, and no reports indicate any military aspect to the talks. The development of the islands could, however, be an important step for the implementation of Indian Navy plans. Agalega can serve as a small yet important stepping stone on the path between India and the important shipping lanes of the Mozambique Channel on the southeast coast of Africa. In addition, it can help India more effectively close the wide gap between Madagascar and its southern tip.
The sea lanes around the Horn of Africa serve as a vital route for supertankers too large for passage through the Suez Canal. Similarly, large amounts of commerce shipping between Europe and the east coast of the Americas travel to Asia by way of Cape Horn, and disruptions in trade routes across the Middle East would make them even more heavily traveled. The route is thus of great importance to India's two chief regional rivals, Pakistan and China, and the ability to interdict traffic there is of great potential value. In addition, southeastern Africa is also valuable in terms of Indian economic investment and diplomacy, and extending Indian naval power into the area will help foster and protect these ties.
Looking for Energy
Energy-hungry India is looking toward Mozambique and Zimbabwe for coal, for example.4 The port of Beira in Mozambique is probably going to be substantially upgraded as a number of foreign investors develop regional resources. Mozambique is also a growing regional source of liquefied natural gas (LNG).5 India has been attempting to establish a significant infrastructure for imported LNG, and looking toward the future, Africa could become an important backstop for supplies from the volatile Middle East.6 Nearby South Africa is India's largest African trade partner and is increasingly becoming a political and economic ally.7
India and Mozambique have signed a wide-ranging defense cooperation pact.8 It envisages joint maritime patrolling of the Mozambique coast as well as training and technology transfer. Like many developing nations, Mozambique is hard-pressed to provide even coast guard-type services, and the assistance of the blue-water Indian fleet could prove very useful. In 2003 and 2004, for example, Indian warships provided security for international conferences being held in Mozambique.9 In 2004, India flew ten aircraft to South Africa to participate in exercises-six Mirage-2000s supported by two Il-78 airborne tankers and two Il-76 transports carrying personnel and supplies. The detachment stopped in Malé, capital city of the Maldives, and at Mauritius to show the flag en-route to South Africa.
Africa is a long way from India, however, and India has been relying on friendly nations such as Mauritius, Mozambique, and South Africa for support in deploying forces. India is beginning to show interest in acquiring its own limited support infrastructure in the region. For example, it is reportedly planning on opening an intelligence-gathering facility on leased land in northern Madagascar.10 Such a facility could greatly enhance the ability of India to interdict vessel traffic along the African coast. Indian facilities in the southwest Indian Ocean will not rival those found to the east, where a separate Far Eastern Naval Command is based in the Andaman Islands. But the existence of even a limited support infrastructure would greatly enhance the ability of India to conduct operations in the region.
A Key Role for Small Islands?
How could the Agalega Islands fit into this strategy? To start, Agalega is not going to become a major base. Indeed, its capabilities will be limited, even with development. The plan is to develop a high-end resort in addition to fish processing facilities. This will entail the construction of such basic infrastructure as electrical production and water and sewage facilities as well as the expansion of the current airstrip. The island lacks a good natural harbor, and it is doubtful India would permanently station many (if any) military people on the island. But remote scraps of land can be of great importance in a number of scenarios. In an emergency, India could deploy a small but significant support detachment to the island for aerial operations as well as for communications and intelligence-gathering.
The island is currently serviced by Dornier 228 aircraft operated by Mauritius. The aircraft are license-built in India, which also operates a number of maritime surveillance versions of the aircraft.11 The aircraft have a maximum range of approximately 1,300 nautical miles, which is about the distance between the Maldives and Agalega. Thus, India could stage the aircraft to Agalega by way of the Maldives, and, operating from those two locations, the aircraft could cover almost the entire Indian Ocean between southwest India and the Mozambique Channel. Agalega could also serve as a refueling stop for flights farther on to Madagascar, the Comoros, Mozambique, or South Africa.
Agalega is also near the maximum range of the Heron unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) when flown from the Indian naval base at Cochin. The very capable medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) UAV could be flown back and forth on autonomous missions. In the other direction, Herons taking off from Agalega could provide substantial loiter time over the Mozambique Channel, perhaps linking directly to the proposed facility on Madagascar. India may soon be operating more than 60 Herons in addition to numerous other UAV systems.12
It had been hoped to expand the runway on Agalega to serve ATR 72 class (72-passenger twin prop) aircraft and perhaps eventually Airbus A 319-class (120 passenger twin-jet) aircraft.13 Any resort development by India would almost certainly entail at least the first level of airport upgrades to serve an upscale client base. It would also allow the island to support operations by larger and more capable aircraft, which would presumably include whatever aircraft India picks in its latest competition for a new maritime patrol aircraft to replace the current Il-38 and Tu-142. That aircraft might be the new Boeing P-8, one of many efforts by U.S. businesses to supply the Indian military in a post-nuclear-sanctions world.14
Agalega might seem a bit superfluous, since India is developing good relations with regional nations. Aircraft could operate from Mauritius, the Seychelles, Madagascar, or Mozambique, but having a separate, isolated, operating location could help India insulate itself from possible political complications. Even though Mauritius would retain sovereignty, it would be at arm's length (similar to the British on Diego Garcia). Nations that are friendly to India might nonetheless be leery of allowing combat aircraft (armed maritime patrol) to operate from their shores. India could use them for discrete intelligence, logistics, and support functions while using Agalega as its "combat" base.
What Is a Combat Base?
Once again, it should be emphasized here what is meant by combat. Agalega is not going to house entire wings of SU-30 aircraft nor are any battles like Midway likely to be fought off of southwest Africa. The most likely requirement for the Indian Navy in that part of the Indian Ocean is to interdict select merchant shipping. The world economy is very intolerant of blanket blockades that affect major shipping lanes. To attempt such a total blockage is to invite interference from other major powers, particularly the United States. Instead, nations must attempt to identify specific vessels and then deal with them, while allowing "protected" or "neutral" vessels reasonably free movement.
To do this, a nation needs first of all good intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. Since the eventual target vessels will be unarmed (or very minimally armed), large amounts of weaponry are generally unnecessary. In interdicting ships going to or coming from Pakistan or China in these waters, for example, the Indians are very unlikely to find any enemy combatants. Instead, they will need to weed through all the traffic, identifying specific vessels to be stopped (boarded or attacked outright). This is often most effectively done using maritime patrol aircraft and UAVs. Small patrol craft can handle needed boarding, and it is handy to have local facilities for intelligence and coordination.
Future Scenario
CIA (MODIFICATION COURTESY OF THE AUTHOR)
Agalega's two islands are approximately 425 nautical miles northeast of Madagascar in the Indian Ocean. The airstrip on Agalega's North Island (pictured here) could serve as a refueling post for light maritime patrol aircraft and staging area for unmanned aerial vehicle flights. NASA
How might a future contingency play out? Suppose India imposes a distant blockade on a regional rival. The tourists on Agalega could be quickly flown off and their quarters filled with an Indian support detachment. First, the island would serve as a refueling post for light maritime patrol aircraft and UAV staging to southwest Africa. Second, it would serve itself as an austere operating facility for said aircraft and UAVs. Flights could be flown between Agalega and southwest India to detect ships attempting to gain access to the Arabian Sea via the blue water to the south of India. Flights could also be flown from Agalega westward, over the Mozambique Channel. UAVs could be flown on autonomous mode to the channel, where real-time control and intelligence analysis could be handled by the Indian facility on Madagascar. With patrol being handled by airborne assets, Indian surface patrol craft could conduct specific interdiction tasks while the Indian "blue-water" fleet was engaged elsewhere.
Indian naval growth toward the southwest Indian Ocean could also serve another important strategic interest. Indian concerns over possible Chinese intervention from the east mirror the concerns of the British over Japanese intervention during World War II. The first option is to block enemy ingress at chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca, but what about a "Plan B" if this strategy fails? In mid-1941 the British Admiralty considered the possibility that Singapore might be neutralized and that the Japanese would gain free access to the Indian Ocean. It decided to develop a fallback line that ran roughly from South Africa to Mauritius to Diego Garcia and then to the Nicobar Islands.15 When the Imperial Japanese Navy did indeed force its way into the Indian Ocean, the British retreated behind this line, protecting the vital sea lanes around South Africa and to the Middle East.
Indian Far East Command
It is possible that the Indian Navy is considering a similar situation. The Indian Far East Command, operating out of the Andaman and Nicobar islands, is positioned to interdict vessels attempting to pass through the Malaccan Straits. But its forward facilities are somewhat limited and, even more important, may in the future be vulnerable to attack from Chinese aircraft operating from Myanmar. If Chinese aircraft could neutralize the island facilities and turn the Bay of Bengal into an aerial contested zone, then there is a possibility that Chinese units (particularly subsurface) might transit the Strait of Malacca into the Indian Ocean. In this case the Indian Navy may decide to retreat behind a defense line similar to the British one, at least until the situation is favorable for its fleet to clear the Bay of Bengal. This would keep supply lines open through the western Indian Ocean and possibly keep Pakistani and Chinese forces from converging.
Naturally, these are potential future contingencies. The actual Chinese presence in Myanmar is minimal, despite continued rumors of bases and outposts in places such as Greater Coco Island, near the Andaman Islands.16 China has not yet demonstrated an expeditionary air force capability beyond its own shores and, even more important, China and India have reasonably good relations today, even going as far as to hold joint naval maneuvers.17 History has shown how growing rival powers can slide into military conflict, however, and given some bitter occurences in the past (including Chinese support of Pakistan), it is reasonable to wonder what the future might bring. The Indian Navy's continued development of ties off the East coast of Africa demonstrates that the Indians are certainly thinking ahead.
Expanding Reach
India continues to systematically expand its naval reach, an important component of which is its growing presence in the southwest Indian Ocean. In recent years Indian combat aircraft have deployed to South Africa and Alaska for exercises. The Indian Navy has conducted a round-the-world cruise with a training ship. Indian warships have recently turned up in places as far flung as Guam and Beirut.18 Whether India will ever have naval hegemony over the Indian Ocean remains to be seen. If it ever does, however, it is possible that small steps (and small islands) such as Agalega will be part of the path it takes.
Winston Churchill once described Russia as "A giant whose nostrils have been plugged up." He was referring to the enclosed and cold waters found on both the Northern and Eastern shores of the nation. India, on the other hand, is a giant whose nostrils are flared. The Arabian Sea to the west, the Bay of Bengal to the east, and large expanses of the Indian Ocean to the south all provide India with free access to the sea.
Farther from Indian shores, however, are a series of geographic chokepoints that limit entry into (and exit from) the Indian Ocean. To the southwest is Cape Horn, to the west the Red Sea. To the east are the Strait of Malacca as well as the Lombok and Sunda straits. To the distant southeast are the waters around Australia. In recent years, Indian naval deployment patterns have demonstrated an appreciation for all these key points.
The development of a Far Eastern Naval Command based in the Andaman Islands has extended the eastward reach of the Indian Navy, and now, developments in Africa are extending its westward reach.
