Really, you should compile all of these into a really nice book. Flesh out the details a little, add the pictures. Get a forward a table of contents, and then self publish it.
History of South American nation inter-rivalry and arms buildup
- Thread starter Jeff Head
- Start date
Miragedriver
Brigadier
Thank you again Jeff. I appreciate the complement. Part six is short, but the last instalment (part seven) has turned out to be very long. I may split the conclusion into two parts.
Since you are a professional writer, if you want to use any of this information to write another novel that takes place in South America, please do so. Maybe a power play for the Antarctic or a large “just discovered” underwater oil field in the Scotia Sea, or the discovery new rare earth mineral on one of the islands?
Something to consider.
I will now get back to bottling my Malbec
Since you are a professional writer, if you want to use any of this information to write another novel that takes place in South America, please do so. Maybe a power play for the Antarctic or a large “just discovered” underwater oil field in the Scotia Sea, or the discovery new rare earth mineral on one of the islands?
Something to consider.
I will now get back to bottling my Malbec
Miragedriver
Brigadier
PART SIX: DOES ARMS RACE EQUAL HOSTILITIES?
A major question that must be raised is whether a South American arms race will necessarily lead to war. As previously explained, even though there are ongoing tensions among a number of South American countries, actual interstate wars are very few and far between, and historically have not been long in duration. Although this could be since neither side had a sufficient advantage, or disadvantage to facilitate a war apart from ongoing regional disputes (usually a result of two countries claiming the same piece of land), there have been a number of “close calls” throughout the decades. However, none of them actually have evolved into open warfare other than those cited earlier. The last major war in the region would have been the Chaco War, almost 80 years ago.
Venezuela’s recent mass purchases of Russian military equipment, as well as ex president Chavez’s (now Maduro) often controversial comments, created a growing concern among his critics that Maduro may make a move "a la Argentina" (Argentine style). In other words, Venezuela may resort to beginning an armed conflict in order to divert attention from ongoing domestic problems, thereby rallying the Venezuelan population behind him. However, Venezuela dismisses such a theory shear propaganda by the west.
Various explanations have been proposed to explain the lack of interstate warfare. Many experts point to U.S. influence, the outreach of the inter-American system, or the technical peace-keeping mechanism provided by the OAS. Another explanation may be that countries are now utilizing legal processes when it comes to resolve possible conflict. For example, Peru and Chile have sent their current maritime border dispute to The Hague. Then there is the theory of the general movement regarding the integration of South America. With easier modes of communication and transportation readily available, general populations and their officials can interact with individuals from other nations, resulting in the possibility of long-term periods of good will. In an interview in Defensa.com, a retired Colombian general explained that relations between the Colombian and Venezuelan militaries are generally good – when differences arise, they tend to be exclusively at the upper political level.
Military officials point to the complications of military diplomacy as deterrents for the outbreak of interstate warfare. In an interview(also in Defensa.com), a senior Peruvian army commander explained that “…the nature of war has changed as exemplified by the American military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq… if you want to occupy a territory you gain through war; you have to figure out what to do with the local population, which nowadays numbers in the millions.”
NEXT: PART SEVEN: FUTURE FOR THE PRESENT AND HISTORICAL POWERS IN SOUTH AMERICA
I will now get back to bottling my Malbec
A major question that must be raised is whether a South American arms race will necessarily lead to war. As previously explained, even though there are ongoing tensions among a number of South American countries, actual interstate wars are very few and far between, and historically have not been long in duration. Although this could be since neither side had a sufficient advantage, or disadvantage to facilitate a war apart from ongoing regional disputes (usually a result of two countries claiming the same piece of land), there have been a number of “close calls” throughout the decades. However, none of them actually have evolved into open warfare other than those cited earlier. The last major war in the region would have been the Chaco War, almost 80 years ago.
Venezuela’s recent mass purchases of Russian military equipment, as well as ex president Chavez’s (now Maduro) often controversial comments, created a growing concern among his critics that Maduro may make a move "a la Argentina" (Argentine style). In other words, Venezuela may resort to beginning an armed conflict in order to divert attention from ongoing domestic problems, thereby rallying the Venezuelan population behind him. However, Venezuela dismisses such a theory shear propaganda by the west.
Various explanations have been proposed to explain the lack of interstate warfare. Many experts point to U.S. influence, the outreach of the inter-American system, or the technical peace-keeping mechanism provided by the OAS. Another explanation may be that countries are now utilizing legal processes when it comes to resolve possible conflict. For example, Peru and Chile have sent their current maritime border dispute to The Hague. Then there is the theory of the general movement regarding the integration of South America. With easier modes of communication and transportation readily available, general populations and their officials can interact with individuals from other nations, resulting in the possibility of long-term periods of good will. In an interview in Defensa.com, a retired Colombian general explained that relations between the Colombian and Venezuelan militaries are generally good – when differences arise, they tend to be exclusively at the upper political level.
Military officials point to the complications of military diplomacy as deterrents for the outbreak of interstate warfare. In an interview(also in Defensa.com), a senior Peruvian army commander explained that “…the nature of war has changed as exemplified by the American military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq… if you want to occupy a territory you gain through war; you have to figure out what to do with the local population, which nowadays numbers in the millions.”
NEXT: PART SEVEN: FUTURE FOR THE PRESENT AND HISTORICAL POWERS IN SOUTH AMERICA
I will now get back to bottling my Malbec
Oh...no, not really, Mirage. I have written a couple of books, but to characterize me as a professional writer is too much of a stretch. LOL!
Those were completely self-published.
I have also had a few articles published over they years...but they were all written more as a part of my passion for Military Technology and/or politics...more of a hobby really.
My profession is what I do for a living, to feed my family. I am afraid we would all starve based on any money I have received from writing.
Miragedriver
Brigadier
PART SEVEN: FUTURE FOR THE PRESENT AND HISTORICAL POWERS IN SOUTH AMERICA
Future of Chile
Two months ago Argentina and Chile united their efforts to counter the unprecedented million square kilometer British claim of the Antarctic, based largely as it is on the disputed Falklands/Malvinas Islands. In early March of this year Argentine and Chilean parliamentarians visited the new Chilean President Michelle Bachelet (note below) and the Argentine Jubany military bases on the Antarctic continent to demonstrate their mutual resolve not to cede either the continent or its outlying shelf to British claims.
But Argentina and Chile have had and still have their own territorial conflicts of interest. In 1978 a dispute over three islands in the Beagle Channel (discussed in earlier sections above) led to both countries dispatching troops to the Patagonia border where a war was narrowly averted by the Pope.
Boundary issues in the Southern Patagonian Ice Field are still a bone of contention between the two nations. Back in 2006 Argentine President Nestor Kirchner offered Chile a plan to define the border, which the Bachelet government declined.
Chile and Argentina, in addition to Britain, claim the entirety of the Antarctic Peninsula, the northernmost part of the continent.
Should Chile ally itself with the West and against Argentina, the latter would be isolated and could become a potential victim of a Falklands War-style defeat should it continue to press its claims. Additionally Russia would also be excluded from its overlapping of the Antarctic.
Back in March of 2006 Chile signed an agreement with Germany to purchase 180 Leopard 2 tanks.
The Leopard 2 is one of the most up-to-date battle tanks in the world. Press reports following the announcement of the agreement included the observation that, “Chile’s acquisitions of military hardware in recent years have stirred criticism among neighbors, especially Peru, who say Chile is upsetting the equilibrium of military power in the Southern Cone region of South America.”
The preceding month Washington delivered the first of 12 new F-16Ds, Block 50, to Chile, part of an arms buildup which also included, In the years that followed two Scorpene class submarines made by a Spanish-French consortium, eight secondhand frigates from Britain and Holland, 180 German-made Leopard tanks and 36 secondhand F-16s from the Dutch air force.”
“While the Chilean government has not disclosed the total cost of its recent military purchases, published reports indicate that the US purchased F-16s alone cost $745 million.
“Air Force Commander Gen. Osvaldo Sarabia said the F-16s (which will replace the force’s French-made Mirages and upgraded F-5E Tiger III) will be stationed in the northern port city of Iquique,” close to both Peru and Bolivia.
Such deployments can only add to the alarm of Chile’s neighbors as, Peru and Chile disagree over their 200-mile maritime boundary, while many Peruvians and Bolivians still hold a grudge over territory lost to Chile in the 1879-84 War of the Pacific See links and comments above).
As does Argentina, which recalls the role of the Pinochet junta in providing surveillance and logistics support to Britain during the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War. Currently Chile in negotiating a deal with the Netherlands to acquire an additional 18 more F-16s at a cost of $278 million. If the deal goes through this will bring the total to 12 Block 60 and 54 MLUs. That is 66 F-16s, by far the largest and most powerful Air Force in all Latin America. And for what purpose?
Future of Brazil
Since before the 1990s, Brazil had capped annual military spending at about $us3 billion, or approximately 1.78 percent of the country’s gross domestic product, as compared to the region’s average of 1.98 percent of GDP. This budget was allocated to equipment acquisition programs as well as to salaries, pensions, maintenance, training and infrastructure development for the three military branches. However, starting in 2004, Brazil’s military expenditures started to climb rapidly.
In 2007, Brazil’s military budget bordered $us3.5 billion; this year, the budget has reached $us5 billion. This is a relatively, astounding, figure which would be difficult for other countries in the region to match, with the probable exception of Venezuela’s armed forces, which is presently involved in a large weapons’ procurement program with Russian and Chinese suppliers, for “petro-dollars.”
Brazil is set to join the select group of countries that have nuclear-powered submarines
However Brazil’s military is at a crossroads. It today faces no external security challenge, no matter what doomsayers may say about the intentions of Venezuela, yet the country does have a dark past in internal security matters (similar to that of Argentina). But today the average Brazilian believes and implicitly respects and trusts in its military, and it can be assumed that the country’s present-day military wants to live up to these expectations.
Future Brazilian Gripen
The Brazilian military is an example of an armed forces which, at least in its own belief, must be prepared to defend its own borders and safeguard its immense treasure trove of natural resources (including recent discoveries of oil and natural gas fields), while projecting its civic strengths to the world, be it through peacekeeping missions in Haiti, military exercises in South Africa, or the acquisition of a nuclear submarine. There is a lot of potential for the expanding role of the Brazilian military in global affairs, but the type of legacy it will want to create is more than just a matter of possessing strong leadership and clearly defined goals – it must also have the means and the agreed-upon military doctrine to carry out its self-perceived mission in a democratic ambience and under total submission to representative civilian rule.
Future of Venezuela
After his death, Hugo Chavez leaves behind a revolutionary process that is not only chaotic but also transnational. He leaves a thirteen year old government that provided him with enough time to purge members of the military and fill the army with loyal officers, many of whom live in luxurious homes and enjoy a life-style not easy to give up. This military is likely to resist change unless a new government provides them with the same conditions (all this assuming that these officers are not opportunists). But even if these officers are true democrats that reject the Chavez revolution, the Venezuelan regime has already in place para-military groups such as the Bolivarian Circles. It has also created a militia that responds directly to the executive branch. As things are defined now, Para-military forces and even militias might be filled with “fighters” from other groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and even Middle Eastern terrorist groups such as Hezbollah; two groups Chavez has embraced.
Secondly, the regime has created a network of people who have benefitted from his regime and would like to see continuity. This includes the “boliburguesia”, which is a business class that has made its wealth not from its hard work and devotion but by virtue of its connections to the state. This is a perfect example of crony capitalism
In this current “power vacuum” after Chavez’s death, nothing is being done by America or other democratic Latin American nations (truly democratic, of which there are few) to hold real free elections in Venezuela now that Chavez is gone. I am reminded of a quote from Winston Churchill who pointed out to his predecessor Neville Chamberlain upon returning from Munich “You were given the choice between war and dishonor. You chose dishonor and you will have war”.
I will say that after the last Summit of the Americas: “You were given the choice between speaking up for freedom and surrender to the majority. You chose against Freedom and will now have tyranny”
Future of Argentina
The Argentine military is at a crossroads in terms of defining its identity and determining its raison d’être ("reason for existence”). Unfortunately for the armed forces, a lack of public interest in its status induces the military to look south, to raise the visibility and vigour of its claim to a section of Antarctica.
Yet unfortunately, for the foreseeable future, the Argentine military will continue to be viewed through the eyes of its actions during the 1976-1983 period of military rule and the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War, when it turned its guns against the nation’s civilians rather than an external enemy. It may take an external treat to awaken the nation, and the politicians, in Argentina to the fact that they can no longer continue to neglect their military. Most nations that neglect their national defence soon become a playground for land acquisition, discontinues being a sovereign nation, or become a puppet of its neighbours.
Argentine destroyer ARA Santisima Trinidad lies on its side at the naval base in Puerto Belgrano, Argentina, Tuesday, Jan. 22, 2013. This is due to lack of maintenance, since the vessel was cannibalized as parts for the sister vessel
Conclusion
Therefore when discussing the current purchase of weaponry throughout South America, there seems to be a universal, if misguided conclusion that all purchases are occurring at the same level, and that they are all potentially of an offensive nature. In terms of methodology, South American countries will be separated into contrasting levels of the intensity of weapons’ purchases in order to better portray which countries are buying the most military equipment, and which might arguably constitute more of a security threat for the region than others.
The idea that an arms race could inevitably lead to interstate warfare is currently being put to the test in South America. It is safe to make this claim today while the continent is embarking on an arms race; however, two factors come into play with such a process: The first is that since World War II, or even since the Chaco War, interstate war has been generally scarce in the region, as well as short lived. The second factor is that the current South American arms race is one of varying levels, in that not every country is carrying out massive military purchases like the case with Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela.
Thus, the question arises whether or not those discussing the possibility of an outbreak of war have some credibility to their position. Predicting warfare is not an inexact science, and, as Latin America has proven so far, massive arms purchases have not so far necessarily provoked interstate war. However, also in the past neither side had a distinct technological or numerical advantage, as is the present situation.
Thank you all
I will now get back to bottling my Malbec
Future of Chile
Two months ago Argentina and Chile united their efforts to counter the unprecedented million square kilometer British claim of the Antarctic, based largely as it is on the disputed Falklands/Malvinas Islands. In early March of this year Argentine and Chilean parliamentarians visited the new Chilean President Michelle Bachelet (note below) and the Argentine Jubany military bases on the Antarctic continent to demonstrate their mutual resolve not to cede either the continent or its outlying shelf to British claims.
(After her return from exile in the German Democratic Republic in 1979, Bachelet studied military strategy at Chile’s National Security Academy and Military War College, attended the Inter-American Defense College in Washington, DC and in 2002 was appointed Defense Minister for the Lagos government.) But Argentina and Chile have had and still have their own territorial conflicts of interest. In 1978 a dispute over three islands in the Beagle Channel (discussed in earlier sections above) led to both countries dispatching troops to the Patagonia border where a war was narrowly averted by the Pope.
Boundary issues in the Southern Patagonian Ice Field are still a bone of contention between the two nations. Back in 2006 Argentine President Nestor Kirchner offered Chile a plan to define the border, which the Bachelet government declined.
Chile and Argentina, in addition to Britain, claim the entirety of the Antarctic Peninsula, the northernmost part of the continent.
Should Chile ally itself with the West and against Argentina, the latter would be isolated and could become a potential victim of a Falklands War-style defeat should it continue to press its claims. Additionally Russia would also be excluded from its overlapping of the Antarctic.
Back in March of 2006 Chile signed an agreement with Germany to purchase 180 Leopard 2 tanks.
The Leopard 2 is one of the most up-to-date battle tanks in the world. Press reports following the announcement of the agreement included the observation that, “Chile’s acquisitions of military hardware in recent years have stirred criticism among neighbors, especially Peru, who say Chile is upsetting the equilibrium of military power in the Southern Cone region of South America.”
The preceding month Washington delivered the first of 12 new F-16Ds, Block 50, to Chile, part of an arms buildup which also included, In the years that followed two Scorpene class submarines made by a Spanish-French consortium, eight secondhand frigates from Britain and Holland, 180 German-made Leopard tanks and 36 secondhand F-16s from the Dutch air force.”
“While the Chilean government has not disclosed the total cost of its recent military purchases, published reports indicate that the US purchased F-16s alone cost $745 million.
“Air Force Commander Gen. Osvaldo Sarabia said the F-16s (which will replace the force’s French-made Mirages and upgraded F-5E Tiger III) will be stationed in the northern port city of Iquique,” close to both Peru and Bolivia.
Such deployments can only add to the alarm of Chile’s neighbors as, Peru and Chile disagree over their 200-mile maritime boundary, while many Peruvians and Bolivians still hold a grudge over territory lost to Chile in the 1879-84 War of the Pacific See links and comments above).
As does Argentina, which recalls the role of the Pinochet junta in providing surveillance and logistics support to Britain during the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War. Currently Chile in negotiating a deal with the Netherlands to acquire an additional 18 more F-16s at a cost of $278 million. If the deal goes through this will bring the total to 12 Block 60 and 54 MLUs. That is 66 F-16s, by far the largest and most powerful Air Force in all Latin America. And for what purpose?
Future of Brazil
Since before the 1990s, Brazil had capped annual military spending at about $us3 billion, or approximately 1.78 percent of the country’s gross domestic product, as compared to the region’s average of 1.98 percent of GDP. This budget was allocated to equipment acquisition programs as well as to salaries, pensions, maintenance, training and infrastructure development for the three military branches. However, starting in 2004, Brazil’s military expenditures started to climb rapidly.
In 2007, Brazil’s military budget bordered $us3.5 billion; this year, the budget has reached $us5 billion. This is a relatively, astounding, figure which would be difficult for other countries in the region to match, with the probable exception of Venezuela’s armed forces, which is presently involved in a large weapons’ procurement program with Russian and Chinese suppliers, for “petro-dollars.”
Brazil is set to join the select group of countries that have nuclear-powered submarines
However Brazil’s military is at a crossroads. It today faces no external security challenge, no matter what doomsayers may say about the intentions of Venezuela, yet the country does have a dark past in internal security matters (similar to that of Argentina). But today the average Brazilian believes and implicitly respects and trusts in its military, and it can be assumed that the country’s present-day military wants to live up to these expectations.
Future Brazilian Gripen
The Brazilian military is an example of an armed forces which, at least in its own belief, must be prepared to defend its own borders and safeguard its immense treasure trove of natural resources (including recent discoveries of oil and natural gas fields), while projecting its civic strengths to the world, be it through peacekeeping missions in Haiti, military exercises in South Africa, or the acquisition of a nuclear submarine. There is a lot of potential for the expanding role of the Brazilian military in global affairs, but the type of legacy it will want to create is more than just a matter of possessing strong leadership and clearly defined goals – it must also have the means and the agreed-upon military doctrine to carry out its self-perceived mission in a democratic ambience and under total submission to representative civilian rule.
Future of Venezuela
After his death, Hugo Chavez leaves behind a revolutionary process that is not only chaotic but also transnational. He leaves a thirteen year old government that provided him with enough time to purge members of the military and fill the army with loyal officers, many of whom live in luxurious homes and enjoy a life-style not easy to give up. This military is likely to resist change unless a new government provides them with the same conditions (all this assuming that these officers are not opportunists). But even if these officers are true democrats that reject the Chavez revolution, the Venezuelan regime has already in place para-military groups such as the Bolivarian Circles. It has also created a militia that responds directly to the executive branch. As things are defined now, Para-military forces and even militias might be filled with “fighters” from other groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and even Middle Eastern terrorist groups such as Hezbollah; two groups Chavez has embraced.
Secondly, the regime has created a network of people who have benefitted from his regime and would like to see continuity. This includes the “boliburguesia”, which is a business class that has made its wealth not from its hard work and devotion but by virtue of its connections to the state. This is a perfect example of crony capitalism
In this current “power vacuum” after Chavez’s death, nothing is being done by America or other democratic Latin American nations (truly democratic, of which there are few) to hold real free elections in Venezuela now that Chavez is gone. I am reminded of a quote from Winston Churchill who pointed out to his predecessor Neville Chamberlain upon returning from Munich “You were given the choice between war and dishonor. You chose dishonor and you will have war”.
I will say that after the last Summit of the Americas: “You were given the choice between speaking up for freedom and surrender to the majority. You chose against Freedom and will now have tyranny”
Future of Argentina
The Argentine military is at a crossroads in terms of defining its identity and determining its raison d’être ("reason for existence”). Unfortunately for the armed forces, a lack of public interest in its status induces the military to look south, to raise the visibility and vigour of its claim to a section of Antarctica.
Yet unfortunately, for the foreseeable future, the Argentine military will continue to be viewed through the eyes of its actions during the 1976-1983 period of military rule and the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War, when it turned its guns against the nation’s civilians rather than an external enemy. It may take an external treat to awaken the nation, and the politicians, in Argentina to the fact that they can no longer continue to neglect their military. Most nations that neglect their national defence soon become a playground for land acquisition, discontinues being a sovereign nation, or become a puppet of its neighbours.
Argentine destroyer ARA Santisima Trinidad lies on its side at the naval base in Puerto Belgrano, Argentina, Tuesday, Jan. 22, 2013. This is due to lack of maintenance, since the vessel was cannibalized as parts for the sister vessel
Conclusion
Therefore when discussing the current purchase of weaponry throughout South America, there seems to be a universal, if misguided conclusion that all purchases are occurring at the same level, and that they are all potentially of an offensive nature. In terms of methodology, South American countries will be separated into contrasting levels of the intensity of weapons’ purchases in order to better portray which countries are buying the most military equipment, and which might arguably constitute more of a security threat for the region than others.
The idea that an arms race could inevitably lead to interstate warfare is currently being put to the test in South America. It is safe to make this claim today while the continent is embarking on an arms race; however, two factors come into play with such a process: The first is that since World War II, or even since the Chaco War, interstate war has been generally scarce in the region, as well as short lived. The second factor is that the current South American arms race is one of varying levels, in that not every country is carrying out massive military purchases like the case with Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela.
Thus, the question arises whether or not those discussing the possibility of an outbreak of war have some credibility to their position. Predicting warfare is not an inexact science, and, as Latin America has proven so far, massive arms purchases have not so far necessarily provoked interstate war. However, also in the past neither side had a distinct technological or numerical advantage, as is the present situation.
Thank you all
I will now get back to bottling my Malbec
Last edited:
Miragedriver
Brigadier
POST SCRIPT: WHAT CAN BE DONE?
For now, nations in Latin America are likely to continue their current spending on weapons. And the regional security picture is likely to become still more complicated, as America’s influence diminishes in Latin America and as regional leaders like Brazil emerge. Brazil will play a greater role, and democratic civilian control over the military faces new challenges, but at the same time will allow Brazil to become the United States in South America.
For US policy makers (still stuck in the twentieth century mind set with Latin America) are confronting a complex dynamic situation, for which they are poorly prepared. The United States is no longer able to act unaccountably as a dominant power, as it did during the “gunboat diplomacy” years. Neither can it treat Latin American nations like a “with us or against us” chessboard, as it did during the cold war.
The United States is still the most powerful nation in the Americas (and the world), a situation that is unlikely to change any time soon. However America must adapt its approach and become more creative. America, while recognizing that it can no longer determine every outcome in Latin America, must orient its policies toward reducing risks to regional security. This essentially means looking beyond narrow “threats” to US interests like Venezuela or Cuba, drugs, or terrorism, and instead work with Latin America to help countries reduce their concerns. Such as: citizen insecurity, organized crime, regional distrust, uneasy civil-military relations, emerging tyrants – that are leading them to increase their defense expenditures.
Unlike in the twentieth century, the hallmarks of US policy should be encouraging demilitarization, strengthening civilian institutions, helping reduce corruption and fostering bilateral and regional dialogues to reduce threats and counteract the impulse to seek military solutions to territorial disputes. This will be a difficult pivot for many in the US defense and foreign policy communities to execute, but today’s complexity makes it clear that there is really no other choice. The United Sates needs the Americas and believe it or not the Americas will respect and follow the United States if it holds out its hand, smiles, and says “follow me brother, let’s work together”.
I will now get back to bottling my Malbec
For now, nations in Latin America are likely to continue their current spending on weapons. And the regional security picture is likely to become still more complicated, as America’s influence diminishes in Latin America and as regional leaders like Brazil emerge. Brazil will play a greater role, and democratic civilian control over the military faces new challenges, but at the same time will allow Brazil to become the United States in South America.
For US policy makers (still stuck in the twentieth century mind set with Latin America) are confronting a complex dynamic situation, for which they are poorly prepared. The United States is no longer able to act unaccountably as a dominant power, as it did during the “gunboat diplomacy” years. Neither can it treat Latin American nations like a “with us or against us” chessboard, as it did during the cold war.
The United States is still the most powerful nation in the Americas (and the world), a situation that is unlikely to change any time soon. However America must adapt its approach and become more creative. America, while recognizing that it can no longer determine every outcome in Latin America, must orient its policies toward reducing risks to regional security. This essentially means looking beyond narrow “threats” to US interests like Venezuela or Cuba, drugs, or terrorism, and instead work with Latin America to help countries reduce their concerns. Such as: citizen insecurity, organized crime, regional distrust, uneasy civil-military relations, emerging tyrants – that are leading them to increase their defense expenditures.
Unlike in the twentieth century, the hallmarks of US policy should be encouraging demilitarization, strengthening civilian institutions, helping reduce corruption and fostering bilateral and regional dialogues to reduce threats and counteract the impulse to seek military solutions to territorial disputes. This will be a difficult pivot for many in the US defense and foreign policy communities to execute, but today’s complexity makes it clear that there is really no other choice. The United Sates needs the Americas and believe it or not the Americas will respect and follow the United States if it holds out its hand, smiles, and says “follow me brother, let’s work together”.
I will now get back to bottling my Malbec
Miragedriver
Brigadier
For my SinoDefense friends that wish to learn more about the happenings in the Latin American defence industry and procurement the can visit thread called Central and South American Military News & discussion in the world military section. There also are several Spanish speaking sites such as Infodefensa, Defensa Latinoamericana and Defensa. There is even the English-language professional and technical press on the subject of Latin American defense. The best sources of current and relatively objective information is from the German-published, Spanish-language journal Tecnología Militar (Military Technology), which also has an English version, Military Technology.
Hope you enjoyed the mini lecture.
I will now get back to bottling my Malbec
Hope you enjoyed the mini lecture.
I will now get back to bottling my Malbec
Miragedriver
Brigadier
I am sorry friend, but could you rephrase your question. I am having difficulty understanding what you are asking. Thank you.
I will now get back to bottling my Malbec
Miragedriver
Brigadier
This just adds more fuel to the fire in the animosity between Argentina and Chile:
After reading this article I am opening a few bottles and having drink.
I will now get back to bottling my Malbec
After reading this article I am opening a few bottles and having drink.
I will now get back to bottling my Malbec