While I agree to ingress at sea level will degrade effective range, that itself does not necessarily exclude it as a viable option. They are not mutually exclusive.
As I mentioned this was the less important reason.
The main question is whether it gets you to your effective launch point even with the airborne sensor net. I don't see a compelling argument you are making that changes the equation.
Okay, let's review again quickly the situation. The PLA is looking to hit a target 1000km away. They sortie J-16s carrying 500km range standoff weapon, and J-16 has to make it 500km to the launch distance of the standoff weapon to successfully deliver the weapon. Agreed?
An AEW&C cruising at 7000m will be able to detect a sea skimming target 370km away; and considering this is a Flanker sized aircraft laden with munitions as well, it is a fairly large sized RCS. Your Flanker+payload is not stealthy at all and it isn't an AShM either -- it's a 4th generation fighter airframe and one of the largest of its generation.
Now, if I were the opfor, I would deploy 2-3 AEW&C doing orbits at least 300km forward of my carriers and bases in the ocean. I will also deploy multiple fighter CAP flights at cruise altitude, 200km ahead of those AEW&C (500km ahead of my carriers and bases, i.e.: a 500km combat radius, which tbh is a bit conservative but for the sake of this discussion let's go with that).
(Also, my carriers and bases would of course be defended by their own surface combatant escorts and ground based radar and SAMs, respectively, but they're not part of the equation here as we are mostly talking about the role of the airborne sensor net)
The AEW&C 300km ahead of my carriers and bases would boast a radar horizon of some 370km away against sea skimming targets, and naturally my AEW&C orbits would act in a manner to overlap each other's coverage in a time sensible manner.
That gives you a 670km early warning distance against non-stealthy sea skimming targets from your carriers/bases, and more than enough time for your fighter CAP flights which are 500km ahead of your carriers and bases to move into position to use BVR weapons to intercept your heavily laden, low flying (and thus lower energy state) Flankers with their standoff payloads.
In such a situation where the airborne AEW&C and airborne CAP fighter line of the opfor is intact and not significantly degraded, I do not believe that J-16s stand a chance to reach their launch point. In fact, I believe doing so would be suicide almost every time, and that to complete such a mission against a well defended target, you require a stealth aircraft to even get within standoff range in the first place.
One other factor which is tangential to this, is that the moment your 4th gen strike fighter is detected, all of your opfor's defenses will be alerted and begin actively emitting in your direction to track both your aircraft and your payload. Somehow, even if your J-16 manages to get to 500km and launch its standoff weapon, the enemy has already been tracking you this entire time and will likely be able to track your standoff weapon as well. Additional CAP to intercept your weapon or even using ship launched SAMs guided by airborne AEW&C or fighter sensors to intercept the standoff weapon will likely occur.
Having the ability to get to your launchpoint with the least amount of warning time is desirable for any kind of weapon, including standoff weapons.
I would differ with your view as to the reason why low level ingress fell out of fashion. Manpad and anti aircraft guns became a problem. Most of the air losses from Iraqi freedom came from it and not from SAMs. The Kosovo campaign had flight restriction on allied aircraft below 10000 feet for the same reason. In the case of an engagement at sea, such problems do not exist.
Considering neither Iraq or Kosovo had any form of AEW&C and certainly not modern SAMs nor modern air forces when they fought their conflicts, the relevance of the Coalition experiences to what we are talking about (a high tech, high intensity conflict) is very limited.
You have yet to demonstrate specific numbers why 4th gen aircraft using standoff weapons cannot achieve the desired end effects. It is not a 4th gen vs 5th gen conversation. It is a 4th gen with stand off delivery vs 5th gen with stand in delivery conversation.
Making a statement of strong airborne and seaborne sensors is meaningless because it is about their relevancy to the equation and not simply their presence.
I agree it is a question of "4th gen +stand off delivery" vs "5th gen + stand off delivery".
But for the life of me I can't understand where your argument is coming from, because it's like saying that for a strike mission over the ocean vs a well defended foe with intact airborne AEW&C and CAP, that a sea skimming F-16 with standoff weapons can be as effective as a F-35 with standoff weapons.
Last edited: