To sum up my views.
1. Sending a target higher does not make it any easier to hit. It not only increases distance, but a higher orbit means a higher orbital speed (I cannot imagine how someone from MIT can make that mistake). What a higher target can do is keep being in the LOS of tracking stations longer, so it is easier to track and therefore send instructions to the missile. However, a change orbit also adds many uncertainty because it is leaving a predefined and known orbit, and a change inserts variables (note Murphy's Law) so new tracking and track calculations have to be made on the fly.
Your inertial navigation systems, flight telemetry, sensors, guidance systems, tracking and tracking control has to be very precise in order to pull something like this, and this are the real issues at hand, because it signifies that China's missile control technologies are nothing more than state of the art. That is what people are getting freaked out about because these abilities are going to be applied on every missile and filter down from everything to an ICBM to a grunt's antitank missile.
2. Despite showing the technological ability to do so, China has on the other hand, has not demonstrated that it has built the actual assets and in the numbers needed to do so. Much of the land based missiles being built are the short ranged ones aimed at Taiwan. DF-21, DF-31, -31A continue to be nuclear based. Every missile in China seems to be on their "usual" business.
3. The idea that they are using Long March rockets is absurd. These missiles take too long to prepare and would have been too obvious. We know for a fact that the ASAT was made by a KT-1 booster, which is a small 13 meter solid fuel booster based on the primary stage of a DF-21. It can be launched from TELs, and for the most part, can be located anywhere and launched like ICBMs. The previous KT-1 launches have been connected with 50kg micro-satellites, so the KKV itself has to be a 50kg micro-satellite. Used on larger rockets with much greater payloads, it is possible to have multiple KKVs in a single rocket.
But I must add that while the potential is there, there does not appear to be any serious action in building up a pool of KT-1 and KT-2 boosters so far that can be used for an operational ASAT system.
4. The small size of the KKV means it can be lauched from ALLVs that can be hosted alight by H-6s, even Flankers or B-737s. Given we have seen some strange things going on with the H-6 program, I would say there is a good serious chance that China's ASAT program is developing the use of air launched methods.
My conclusions is that China's ASAT capability remains mainly in the demonstrative and developmental phase, and not by any means reasonably operational. There is still development among paths with more powerful boosters (KT-2 and KT-2A) and the ALLV project.
I must add this article:
January 18, 2008
By Bill Gertz -
Submarine ASAT
Pentagon officials are increasingly worried that China's military is advancing its clandestine anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons program by building a submarine-launched direct-ascent missile system.
New information indicates the secret ASAT program, which Chinese leaders refused to discuss in recent meetings with visiting U.S. military leaders, will involve a space-capable ASAT warhead for the new JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile. The new missile is being readied for China's new ballistic missile submarine, called the Jin-class, or Type 094. The ASAT submarine will provide the ultimate in stealth weapons and could cripple U.S. satellites.
The reports about submarine ASAT basing followed comments by Gen. James E. Cartwright, the former U.S. Strategic Command commander and current vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who told Congress last year the U.S. military is prepared to use conventional missile strikes on land-based Chinese ASAT launchers if Beijing began shooting down U.S. satellites.
China successfully tested a direct-ascent ASAT missile from a mobile ground-based launcher a year ago, sending thousands of pieces of debris from a destroyed weather satellite into low Earth orbit and threatening U.S. satellites and others.
The new information bolsters theoretical writings by Chinese military officials, which were disclosed in a report to Congress last year by Michael Pillsbury, a former Reagan administration defense official and specialist on China.
Mr. Pillsbury stated in his report, "An Assessment of China's Anti-Satellite and Space Warfare Programs," that China's sea-based and submarine-based ASAT were mentioned in 2004 by Liu Huanyu of the Dalian Naval Academy.
"Nuclear submarines are not only well concealed but can sail for a long period of time," Mr. Liu said. "By deploying just a few anti-satellite nuclear submarines in the ocean, one can seriously threaten the entire military space system of the enemy."
Surface ships also can be built for "anti-satellite operations," he stated.
Mr. Pillsbury's report was produced for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.
Sounds nice in theory but I feel this is more of a red herring and certain quarters in the US still freaked over the ASAT test. Like I said, the real significance lies in the reassessment of the effectiveness of Chinese missiles in all fields.
Putting ASAT launchers on subs only moves their vulnerability from B-2 bombers to SSNs. And I would say they are more vulnerable in water than on land, given the sheer land mass area of China vs. the number of B-2s, compared to the limited sea area vs. the sheer number of SSNs the US can deploy.
Theoritical writings of Chinese officials do not represent official position of the PLA. Its something to be considered, but then whether or not such a program actually exists is a totally separate matter, since the policies of the PLA is not formed from a single opinion. Of course in any organization, the pros and cons of each method would be deeply debated, and so far there is nothing to suggest the PLAN's SSBN program would be used for any ASAT and ditto with the so called antiship-anticarrier ballistic missile effort. As far as it goes, the SSBNs are for the classic nuclear deterrent role.