^ Irrespective of this particular article and its sourcing, I find it plausible that PLAN would seek to build up a force of conventional carriers in the short/medium term, i.e. the 2020s, leaving nuclear carriers for the longer-term, i.e. 2030s. One scenario I raised previously was of a steady-state force consisting of four smaller conventional carriers, of which 003 would be the first representative example, operating primarily throughout the Pacific, coupled with four nuclear-powered supercarriers, operating primarily throughout the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf regions.
Remember that the key objectives are in the 1st Island Chain (Taiwan, ECS, SCS), just next to the Chinese mainland.
If China can secure these, it wins and any conflict is over.
Then there's no reason to get into or continue a high-intensity war with another country.
In the context of a hostile US Navy, 4 smaller Chinese carriers operating between the 1st & 2nd Island Chain is not enough.
Even 8 carriers is questionable.
Going forward, if/when the Chinese Navy have 8 carriers, I agree they will end up operating a carrier in the Indian Ocean or Persian Gulf, during peacetime and for low-intensity conflicts. But it should still be able to quickly return to the Western Pacific for operations.
So for the next 15+ years, I think the Chinese Navy should still keep the vast bulk of their assets at home in a high state of readiness, and focused on contingencies in the Western Pacific.