Future PLAAF fleet procurement and composition

Blitzo

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" I really don't understand why people are so interested in keeping past generation fighters around for longer than necessary. In the past when the PLA did so, it was because technology, production capacity, and funding for procurement were all bottlenecks.:

Is simple, Blitzo, we love the flanker too much. to see it gone. We are suffering from success.

To quote Stephen King -- "kill your darlings".


Ahem, I'd like to ask: if all the "Flanker" fighters are retired, what aircraft will replace specialized electronic warfare fighters like the J-16D?

To clarify, the prior discussion has been about standard vanilla 4.5th gens, which doesn't include J-16D. Specialized EW fighters like J-16D may remain around a bit longer.

But going forwards, J-16D may be replaced either by a manned 5th gen EW variant, or 6th gen aircraft may take on the role as standard, or an unmanned aircraft, or a combination thereof.
 
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siegecrossbow

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To quote Stephen King -- "kill your darlings".




To clarify, the prior discussion has been about standard vanilla 4.5th gens, which doesn't include J-16D. Specialized EW fighters like J-16D may remain around a bit longer.

But going forwards, J-16D may be replaced either by a manned 5th gen EW variant, or 6th gen aircraft may take on the role as standard, or an unmanned aircraft, or a combination thereof.
Plain J-36 can already substitute J-16D in many of its roles.
 

Blitzo

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I think that goes without saying. We are going to see specialization of J-36 much like we see with J-20.

Well, it is a possibility, but as I wrote it is also possible they might end up using unmanned aircraft as the more stand-in component while complementing standard 6th gens.

So it may be a combination of different possibilities and we shouldn't rule anything out yet.
 

reservior dogs

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I think we fail to appreciate how difficult and costly it is to change the supply chains. In theory, China can afford to stop building 4.5 gen planes and focus on 5th gen planes, even though the fifth gen plans cost more to build and operate. Every supply chain has a limit of how much you can ramp up without larger investments. Old supply chains for the 4.5 gen planes are already existing and paid for. To convert Shenyang production lines from J-16 to J-20 requires enormous investment and retooling, not to mention the waste of resources already invested in the supply chains for J-16. When J-16D is going to be relevant for the foreseeable future and when YJ-21 allow for platforms that can function as missile trucks from relative safety, it makes no sense to invest in expanding J-20 production capacity. We also don't know what the future looks like with J-36 rapidly coming online. Maybe with the J-36 and J-50, the drones can do the job better than J-20 or J-35. We have to trust that the PLA does look at these factors and made the right decision.
 

Blitzo

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I think we fail to appreciate how difficult and costly it is to change the supply chains. In theory, China can afford to stop building 4.5 gen planes and focus on 5th gen planes, even though the fifth gen plans cost more to build and operate. Every supply chain has a limit of how much you can ramp up without larger investments. Old supply chains for the 4.5 gen planes are already existing and paid for. To convert Shenyang production lines from J-16 to J-20 requires enormous investment and retooling, not to mention the waste of resources already invested in the supply chains for J-16.

You are correct that it is difficult and costly to change supply chains, but you've taken the completely wrong and opposite conclusion.

First of all -- no one has suggested that J-16 production lines should be converted to J-20. J-20A/S production will of course remain under the purview of Chengdu, and the production rate of J-20A/S probably will not greatly exceed the maximum 120/year that they are said to have attained for a year or two a while ago.

Shenyang's 5th generation production will be J-35/A, and it is those aircraft which will eventually succeed J-16. Some J-35/A production capacity may be converted by existing J-16/other Flanker production capacity over time, but a lot of it is likely to be at their new greenfield facility. Either way, Shenyang's 4.5th gen production capacity is facing its final years, and once Shenyang is done producing 4.5th gen airframes, that 4.5th gen production capacity will have to end up being retooled into something (whether J-35/A, or UCAVs, or something else, who knows).


When J-16D is going to be relevant for the foreseeable future and when YJ-21 allow for platforms that can function as missile trucks from relative safety, it makes no sense to invest in expanding J-20 production capacity. We also don't know what the future looks like with J-36 rapidly coming online. Maybe with the J-36 and J-50, the drones can do the job better than J-20 or J-35. We have to trust that the PLA does look at these factors and made the right decision.

4.5th generation aircraft, and especially 4.5th gen EW planes like J-16D will continue to be relevant, but J-16D (as well as J-15DT) are likely to not continue production beyond 2030.

These are important things to first establish:
1) As of March 2026, the rumours are that vanilla J-16 production has ceased, and production of J-10C for PLA has ceased a year or more previous to that.
2) Based on PLAAF and PLANAF demands for J-16D, and J-15T/DT respectively, they are not likely to have ongoing large scale 4.5th gen production for the PLA beyond 2030. The total requirement for new build 4.5th gen airframes between now and 2030 is probably only 200 airframes.
3) The activity of an active supply chain/logistics chain for an aircraft type is related both to the number of aircraft produced, as well as when the last new aircraft of a given type was produced.
4) Shenyang is expected to massively increase J-35/A production and sustain it for a period (a decade or more from now) and Chengdu is likely to continue ~100ish annual J-20A/S production into the foreseeable future (~100 J-20A/S a year is not an "expanded" production rate but rather a production rate that they have already demonstrated for multiple years and isn't even their peak production rate either).


What this means for the PLA's manned fighter fleet is simple:
A) They massive expand the overall size of their fighter fleet starting from the 2030s, where mass procurement of new 5th gens (and introduction of 6th gens) occurs alongside continued retention of "older" 4.5th gen airframes like J-10C and J-16
OR
B) They do not greatly expand the the overall size of their fighter fleet starting from the 2030s, and "older" 4.5th gen airframes like J-10C and vanilla J-16 are retired or mothballed early in favour of 5th gens (which by that point are likely to outnumber 4.5th gen airframe types, with larger economies of scale, with more active production lines, and also likely with greater depth of logistical supply)

.... OR
C) They do not greatly expand the overall size of the fighter fleet, but that is done by not greatly producing a large number of J-20A/S and J-35/A to begin with -- e.g.: the total fleet of J-20/A/S and J-35/A totals only 600-800 airframes and 5th generation production basically ends in 2030 and doesn't continue at all.




I'm also not sure what YJ-21 has anything to do with it -- as a missile, the YJ-21 is sized for H-6K family aircraft, at this stage there is no indication J-16 can even carry it.



My advice for people to view the 4.5th gen airframes is to first ask themselves:
- What do they envision the PLA's 5th gen production rate to look like between now and 2030, and between now and 2035
- What do they envision the PLA's overall fighter fleet size to look like from 2030 onwards (based on the above)
- What is the most optimal use of personnel, pilots, and basing resources, and in context of likely logistics/supply/spare parts trends, in context of the above two factors


Because I am also a strong believer in the importance of sustaining production lines and supply chains -- but if one accepts that PLA 5th gen production is going to be of large scale from now to 2030/2035, then the spare parts, availability and maintenance of PLA 5th gen fighters by 2030 may well exceed and be superior to that of their 4.5th gen J-10C and J-16s by then, and the J-10C and J-16 fleets may well be a net drag on the force.


As for J-36 and J-XDS; there is no particular reason to think they will "rapidly come online". They may reach IOT&E/very early IOC by 2030, but production will take quite a few years to ramp up after that. I'd be surprised if they reached full rate production before 2035, and even when that happens 5th gen production (likely J-35/A by then) will still take a few years to fully sunset after, likely late 2030s.
 
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Gloire_bb

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As for the bomb truck role; technically there's nothing stopping 5th gens from also adopting that role, not to mention they should have a fair few number of higher end UCAVs that can do the strike role as well.

The reason why keeping 4.5th gens around is a bad idea (if they have the industry and funds to replace them with 5th gens or beyond), is because they are basically only viable for the bomb truck role or doing homeland air patrol roles. But those roles are only really viable if they are capable of attaining air superiority to begin with in the region, and attaining air superiority in the region is both the hardest part and also the part where having excessive overmatch is most sensible if not desirable.
There's some misconception going around about what 'bomb truck' is, it's effectively used as derogative ("not good for anything else").

But this is not the case on so many levels; 'bomb trucks' take longer to hit than F-35, after all, while bringing in many times the stores weight.
In fact F-35s survivability equilibrum appears to work in a way, where they really aren't used all that much with external stores in contested airspace, and their internal stores are at such premium that all the force is being served by 4(F-16CM)/4.5 gen(EA-18) SEAD sorties - rather than F-35s; while decisive forward node isn't really F-35 either, it's MALE drones.

(1)4.5s aren't 1st day aircraft, but they absolutely can operate in suppressed airspace(and they've proven it), as they're designed to survive while being detected.
They appear to be doing it substantially better than 5th gen aircraft with external stores - especially if 5th gens at hand(not imaginary) take operations with external stores as more of an afterthought.
(2)ultimately, external stores are a must, as bay limitations are very significant. Even if bays are extreme, you build one hell of an aircraft over something you could've just bolted to the outside.
(3)4.5s are far more adaptable, as hardware changes in federated system designs just apply easier (contrary to what was promised in software first integrated designs). Chinese export pylons(off the shelf weapon system plug-in) are the most expression of this flexibility.
(4)unrelated to above points, but it turns out that homeland air patrol role(C-UAS) is major role for fighter aircraft, which new generation fighters are absolutely hopeless at. Sadly, as it turns out, just half a decade after rocket salvo meme went outdated, it turned into a source of grief.
 
There's some misconception going around about what 'bomb truck' is, it's effectively used as derogative ("not good for anything else").

But this is not the case on so many levels; 'bomb trucks' take longer to hit than F-35, after all, while bringing in many times the stores weight.
In fact F-35s survivability equilibrum appears to work in a way, where they really aren't used all that much with external stores in contested airspace, and their internal stores are at such premium that all the force is being served by 4(F-16CM)/4.5 gen(EA-18) SEAD sorties - rather than F-35s; while decisive forward node isn't really F-35 either, it's MALE drones.
In future "bomb truck" role may be handled by something akin to a further evolution of the GJ-11 platform. Stealthy, unmanned, networked, sufficient IWB capacity with adequate range and loiter capabilities. Homeland air patrol is another role that may be easily taken over by UCAVs in the near future.
 

Blitzo

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There's some misconception going around about what 'bomb truck' is, it's effectively used as derogative ("not good for anything else").

But this is not the case on so many levels; 'bomb trucks' take longer to hit than F-35, after all, while bringing in many times the stores weight.
In fact F-35s survivability equilibrum appears to work in a way, where they really aren't used all that much with external stores in contested airspace, and their internal stores are at such premium that all the force is being served by 4(F-16CM)/4.5 gen(EA-18) SEAD sorties - rather than F-35s; while decisive forward node isn't really F-35 either, it's MALE drones.

(1)4.5s aren't 1st day aircraft, but they absolutely can operate in suppressed airspace(and they've proven it), as they're designed to survive while being detected.
They appear to be doing it substantially better than 5th gen aircraft with external stores - especially if 5th gens at hand(not imaginary) take operations with external stores as more of an afterthought.
(2)ultimately, external stores are a must, as bay limitations are very significant. Even if bays are extreme, you build one hell of an aircraft over something you could've just bolted to the outside.
(3)4.5s are far more adaptable, as hardware changes in federated system designs just apply easier (contrary to what was promised in software first integrated designs). Chinese export pylons(off the shelf weapon system plug-in) are the most expression of this flexibility.
(4)unrelated to above points, but it turns out that homeland air patrol role(C-UAS) is major role for fighter aircraft, which new generation fighters are absolutely hopeless at. Sadly, as it turns out, just half a decade after rocket salvo meme went outdated, it turned into a source of grief.

If you are suggesting I am describing a "bomb truck" in a derogatory manner, that is very much not the case.
All of the points 1-4 that you raised I fully agree with in the sense that external stores are useful and important (I do not agree that 5th gens are somehow incapable of it or being treated it as an afterthought, but more on this later).


But your points are 1-4 irrelevant to the topic at hand, which is the forthcoming expected PLA growth in sustained 5th gen production.
If one accepts that the PLA will see significant addition of 5th gen airframes from now to 2030 (and afterwards as well), then you only have two options:
- Either expand the overall size of the manned fighter fleet post 2030.
- Or retain about a similar manned fighter fleet size, and retire 4.5th gen aircraft a bit earlier than their airframe lives would project.


Whether the 4.5th gen aircraft can still be useful as bomb trucks or not is irrelevant, because 5th gen aircraft can also be bomb trucks, while also being able to do higher end missions in non-suppressed airspace or doing higher end A2A missions as well -- while 4.5th gen aircraft will be relegated to being bomb trucks only or doing lower end missions in suppressed airspace and incapable of doing higher end A2A missions.

After all, J-20 can carry four large EFTs (we can extrapolate equivalent outsized munitions on those stations), and we know J-35A has four external stations that are likely also capable of carrying fairly large munitions (J-35 has the same, while also having additional pair of underwing outer stations for likely SRAAM) -- and those are in addition to their IWBs, so it's not like the J-20/A/S and J-35/A families will be incapable of doing the bomb truck role or carrying outsized munitions if the situation presents itself.

But let's also remember that the "bomb truck" role or "strike against suppressed adversary" is a relative luxury -- it is something you do after you have been able to contest (or ideally achieve) high end air superiority and attained SEAD/DEAD to begin with. And that high end mission is the most challenging one that any air force must be configured to first attain.


If we do accept large growth in 5th gen airframes, and that the fighter fleet won't hugely grow in size, the benefits of retiring/mothballing 4.5th gens in favour of 5th gens is actually such a no brainer I'm surprised anyone would contest it.

- Logistics/supply: by 2030+ era, PLA 5th gens will be in comparable if not greater numbers than 4.5th gens, and have more "hot" production lines and may well present with superior supply chains, spare parts and availability by that point
- High end capability: for high end A2A and higher end/penetrating strike missions (as well as ISR, EW etc), 5th gens will obviously be superior to 4.5th gens
- Range/endurance: 5th gens will have similar or superior range/endurance to 4.5th gens on internal fuel (aka high end missions), and for low end missions where 5th gens can use EFTs (aka scenarios where 4.5th gens have a chance at operating in) they will almost certainly outrange the 4.5th gens with EFTs as well.
- Low end capability: for air policing, bomb truck roles, or low end strike roles, those are all things J-20/A/S and J-35/A can do as well -- all with four likely fairly hefty external stations for outsized payloads (either unitary payloads or multi-rack stations, and to use similar or greater weapons variety than existing 4.5th gen aircraft). The fact that existing 5th gens so far in the world have yet to integrate a wide variety of munitions onto external stores isn't some limitation of 5th gen aircraft, but rather that few nations have a large number of 5th gen aircraft to begin with and are prioritizing the use of their 5th gen platforms for higher end missions like high end air superiority and stealthy strike first. The fact that they are choosing to integrate weapons onto 4.5th gens rather than the external stores of 5th gens isn't a reflection of 4.5th gen flexibility -- rather it's a reflection that most air forces have far too few 5th gens in their fleet to begin with (though in the case of F-35 it also relates to issues with Lockheed's management of the program).

I.e.: For all of the above elements (logistics/supply, high end capability, range/endurance, low end capability) --- in the PLA, depending on the specific characteristic, 5th gens are likely to end up being at minimum comparable and non-inferior, or at maximum vastly superior, to their 4.5th gen predecessors by 2030.

(And this is ignoring that the "bomb truck" role post 2030 may well be relegated to more survivable and more capable platforms in greater scale like GJ-11s or other UCAVs as well.)
 
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