I thought I would address this post because a few people have commented on it, suggesting it is a good idea.
This kind of procurement strategy would be suicidal in the medium and long term (beyond 5-10 years, and 10-20 years, respectively).
The future orbat composition of China's potential adversaries in 5-10 years and certainly after 10 years, will include many hundreds if not over 1500 5th generation fighters, the majority of which will be F-35s. Going into the 2030s that will likely begin to approach 2000+ F-35s for the US alone.
Furthermore, in the medium term it is likely AEW&C and battle management and EW and ISR aircraft will become very distributed and attritable -- i.e.: instead of single large lumbering aircraft, they will become smaller, perhaps unmanned, where losing one or two aircraft will not bring down the entire battle-space's ability to maintain situational awareness/battle management or ISR or EW.
What all this means is that no, it is not enough to simply "depend" on a relatively small force or a minority fleet of 5th generation fighters supported by 4+ generation fighters, because you are going up against a foe with 1000+ or 2000+ 5th generation fighters (depending on the time period and how you count it), and because the enemy's force multipliers will become more survivable and distributed as well.
This is also ignoring likely advances in unmanned aircraft technology, specifically air to air unmanned loyal wingman type UCAVs that will likely enhance the capability and "fleet size" of the side which fields it, which will augment the capability of manned combat aircraft by acting as secondary sensor and shooter nodes.
All this is to say that going into the next 5, 10 and 15 years, the path that the PLA's combat aviation fleet needs to take is quite obvious:
- try to move to all 5th generation fighter procurement as soon as possible and stop 4+ generation fighter production (likely not possible until the mid 2020s at the earliest), with the goal of procuring as many 5th generation fighters as the budget and fleet requirement allows
- further develop and fast track unmanned aircraft technology, with the goals of operationalizing their own loyal wingman UCAV type aircraft within 5 years, as well as operationalizing their own distributed/attritable ISR/AEWC/ISR/ELINT UAV fleet. Once mature, large scale procurement is necessary.
- 4+ generation fighters will continue to be in service and upgraded, however will be completely non-competitive against a foe who will be operating majority fleet 5th gen fighters supported by a large fleet of their own 4+ fighters and increasingly capable unmanned technologies and pre-existing formidable "legacy" AEW&C/EW/ELINT force multipliers.
- continue to try to fast track and develop 6th generation fighter technologies for a rollout preferably by 2030 if not earlier, even if it is in a "phased" manner where new capabilities are rolled into the aircraft over time.
Obviously in addition to the above fundamentals, seeking greater strike/offensive counter air capability to hit opfor air bases when their aircraft is on the ground is desirable, and that will also be pursued.
But seeking to have an air force that is able to at least match, if not outmatch the enemy in the air if you are unable to greatly hamstring their sortie rate/airbases, IMO is also essential.
.... Now, all of this isn't to say that continuing to have 4+ generation aircraft in your fleet is a bad idea -- but rather what I'm saying is that depending on how large and capable the opfor's 5th generation fleet is, you also need to have a sufficiently large and capable 5th gen fleet of your own.
Say we have three air forces:
Air Force A: has 1000 4+ generation fighters and 200 5th gen fighters
Air Force B: has 400 4+ generation fighters and 60 5th generation fighters
Air Force C: has 600 4+ generation fighters and 700 5th generation fighters
In comparing those three air forces, Air Force A's composition would obviously be able to outmatch Air Force B by virtue of not only having a larger total air fleet of fighters (in both 4+ gen and 5th gen).
However, Air Force A would likely be greatly challenged to face Air Force C which has a 5th generation fleet of 700 fighters versus Air Force A's only 200 5th generation fighters, and Air Force a's 1000 4+ generation fighters will not likely be able to pick up the slack.
In an ideal world, not only is your own air force larger than your opfor's, but also each and every single one of your aircraft is qualitatively superior than your opfor's. I don't need to describe the synergistic effects of this in a system on systems confrontation between two air forces, I'm sure.
In the real world, where air forces are limited by budgets, you have to make do with what you can.
But for the PLA, I think we also have to be realistic wrt the scale of the challenge they will be facing in the near future and how their future procurement may be shaped to approach it.
I suppose what I was suggesting is that the current J-20 configuration is not exactly a finished fifth-gen product. The WS-15 really needs to be brought along to give the J-20 the ability to supercruise, as well as thrust vectoring to make it a lethal dog fighter should a J-20 pilot ever find him/herself at the merge, and only then would it render the J-20 a true fifth-gen platform. Until then, I believe the current J-20A as it stands is a stop-gap variant to answer the PLAAF's current need for a stealth air superiority fighter if a conflict or incursion were to break out in the near future, thus giving Shenyang time and valuable experience to tinker and develop a true fifth-gen platform that can go toe for toe (and hopefully outmatch!) against the Raptor and Fat Amy in both a BVR and dogfight setting. While China's economy is booming undeniably, would it be economically/financially/strategically reasonable or viable to produce a large amount of stopgap solutions when Shenyang is at the cusp of breakthrough?
Factoring the realistic finite resources the PLA is limited to (contrary to the unlimited resources our wet dreams seemingly are made up of that allow the fielding of an all fifth-gen J-20+FC/J-31 fleet ), an air tasking order composed of both forth and fifth-gen fighters I suggested in my original post (quick recap: J-20s knocks enemy aircraft out fo the sky with stealth BVR to achieve air superiority, clearing the skies for J-10/J-11s to perform fighter sweep/AWACS+tanker escort mission while J-16s knocks the door down on the ground) should formulate the backbone of the PLAAF's counter air/anti access area denial strategy within the timeframe of the next 5-10 years until a more mature J-20 and the FC/J-31 can be fielded.
Surely that'd explain why China continues to invest in the Flanker models along side the fielding/development of their fifth-gen fighter projects, progressing the J-11 all the way to the D model (giving it an AESA radar, better flight control system, EW capabilities, the ability to fire BVR PL-15 missles, and seemingly putting it on equal footing with the Su-35 as well as the Super Hornet), while pumping out more J-16s (even developing the J-16D platform to deliver the Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses mission)? I'm sure Trump, Pompeo, and their Sinophobic goons would love to field an Air Force made purely of F-22 and F-35 fighters. But at the end of the day Congress as well as the Defense and Budget subcommittees would say otherwise... and as such why the Viper, both variants of the Eagle, as well as the different variations of the Hornet models continue to play important roles in America's defense strategy as well as her ability to project power around the globe.
If we are to look at the PLAAF's fleet inventory beyond this decade into the 2030s, you'd have to imagine by that time that sixth-gen fighters would have to come into play. We're yet to know what features define the sixth-gen platform, and how these capabilities would alter PLA's strategy and the PLAAF's fleet composition to deliver said strategy. I mean heck, we are even just speculating what the imminent arrival of H-20 means for the PLA, and the objectives it can deliver strategically for the PLAAF (is it a direct parallel to the B-2/B-21? Does it render the H-6/JH-7 obsolete?), and more importantly how it would alter the PLAAF's air tasking order. While we are beginning to see the sixth-gen fighter come into shape, we only know enough to postulate what a sixth-gen fighter can do strategically, and how the PLAAF's combat fleet will be composed of.