2 people agreed that hamburger meat was fine, then the 3rd person demanded steak. So everyone had to have steak. my theory is that the steak person was the problem rather than the hamburger people who were already in agreement.
USN is not responsible for anything wrong with F-35 because USN was
forced to participate in the program.
The most important thing that everyone needs to understand whenever commenting on F-35 is that JSF was never about delivering what any of the services wanted.
JSF was Lockheed's strategy to corner the fighter market. Every problem in the program stems directly from there.
That strategy became a priority for Lockheed when reviews in the 1990s first ended B-2, A-12 and NATF and then reduced number of F-22 planned from 750 to 648 in 1990 to 442 in 1993 to 381 in 1994 to 339 in 1997 etc. Lockheed went deep into debt to acquire necessary capabilities for F-22 including GD's F-16 production line and F-35 was its de facto
lifeline.
Any cuts to F-35 like it happened to F-22 would kill Lockheed due to incurred financial liabilities. What most people tend to forget is that in the 1990s it was in no way obvious that 2000s would involve return to increased defense spending, because both Democrats and Republicans broadly approved of "peace dividend". Even after 2001 majority of additional funding went to finance military operations and procurement very quickly was forced to focus on those needs and those were very different from what was planned in the 80s.
I don't have the article at hand but it described how all the defense companies managed their post-1990 strategies and
Lockheed was the only one which relied on exceedingly aggressive debt-financed acquisitions to generate profits in the long term through market control. All the other companies had more conservative strategies.
But even so the very inception of the program was not rational either.
JSF started with F-35B which was a study by Skunk Works and would be completely unworkable unless USN or USAF covered the development cost. Ut wouldn't be possible otherwise. So F-35B evolved into F-35A which ensured that USMC really paid only for the VTOL R&D. If USAF rejected JSF concept it would never happen beacuse USMC didn't have the funds. USN didn't matter for funding but if it remained outside of the program with Super Hornet in production then Pentagon politics could trigger cuts to either F-35B or F-35A due to the size of the order that would be "safe for the program". For Congress "program" means jobs and the jobs would be held regardless of who ich company was taking over. And that was a risk that Lockheed couldn't take so F-35C was forced on USN to safeguard Lockheed's interest.
The USN wanted a higher end capability if it was going to have to spend all this money.
It was largely an obstruction with an intention to get kicked out from the program. USN didn't want the F-35C. Period. Any money spend on C was money not spent on things USN used or needed.
F-35C is nowhere near what USN wanted in terms of performance.
For its constituent tasks USN wanted NATF and A-12 and for GWoT they preferred the cheaper and more practical SuperHornet. The primary metric for carrier fighters is plane reliability and maintenance turnaround. SuperHornet excels in both, while F-35C is a nightmare.
This is why USN restructured its air wings to 3 squadrons of 10-12 Super Hornets (2 with E, 1 with F) and 1 squadron of 10-12 and up to 24 F-35Cs. There is never more than one squadron of F-35C onboard. Since squadrons are responsible for mission logistics this structure demonstrates Navy's confidence in both aircraft. USN could easily put two squadrons of 10 and keep 4 in reserve but they don't want to because the aircraft is a logistical burden.
USN continues to operate under the same guidelines as developed in the 60s/70s for North Atlantic theater. It includes maintaining a perimeter of air defense that is sufficient for protecting of CSG assets against saturation attacks. This was first achieved with F-14 and AIM-54 and later expanded with AEGIS ships. The deciding factor was
missile technology that would determine
threat parameters.
F-14 was countering Kh-22 launched by Tu-95s and Tu-22Ms. NATF would go against more capable threats. A-12 was the consequence of that defensive perimeter because it needed to be able to strike targets from a distance sufficient to protect the CSG.
Today we know that USN was correct because anyone can compare distances in WestPac against PLA asset ranges but in the 1990s Lockheed wasn't worried about PLA but about whatever other three-letter agency manages corporate bankruptcies and mergers.
there is a direct correlation between the weight of an airplane and its price.
How with all that "factual" knowledge did you ever forget that
F-35 replaces both F-16 and F-15E?
USAF was the primary driver behind the plane's MTOW because USN requirements were always conditional on its participation which wasn't guaranteed in the 1990s. USAF requested higher MTOW because performance of F-16s in Iraq demonstrated viability of light fighters in the role of primary strike aircraft and the main difference between F-16 and F-15E for USAF is not payload but effective combat radius. The additional mass that F-15E can carry over F-16 is for
spare fuel tanks necessary for lo-lo-lo's and not bombs.
And the conflict with Ukraine showed that most 4th gens in current use in Europe are no match for Russian aircraft in service like the Su-35.
What the conflict really showed is that
Su-35 are staying within Russian controlled airspace despite Ukraine having no air force in practical terms and GBAD relying on S-300P and Buk M1.
Su-35s flying alone would be torn to shreds by F-16A MLUs with AIM-120s and supported by ground IADS and guided by an outdated AWACS like NATO E-3A. Anything newer or better has an easier job doing the tearing. And Su-35s can only be flying alone outside of Russian airspace because VKS has only a handful of A-50s and ground radars don't have sufficient reach to stay out of range of missiles.
Without proper situational awareness even a
4th gen like MiG-29 can shoot down a Su-35 but you likely can't even visualise the tactical scenario where that happens.
Besides Su-35S is nothing special. It's late 90s/early 00s level of digital technology with an overclocked Bars radar fitted with a PESA array to brute-force returns from LO/VLO RCS so that Flankers with huge RCS can
attempt to see targets sufficiently far away.
When in 2022 Poland began transferring MiG-29s to Ukraine the MoD requested F-16C as replacement to complement the existing fleet and after US refused it ordered FA-50 Block 20.
This is how afraid we are of Su-35S or Su-30SM2.
But then again Russia is expected to get 5th gens themselves in numbers later this decade
Current production order is sufficient for 36 for Eastern and 36 for Western MD and 4 for test units. So far 10-12 delivered. At this rate half of it will be fully combat ready by 2030. Rest of VKS will be over 600 planes of gen 4/4+ most of which entered service in 2010s. 5gens are cleaerly not necessary vs Russia but just in case we already have orders for
over 400 F-35s by 2035.
In 2030 the Flankers delivered in early 2010s will be 20y.o. In 2040 - 30 y.o. Peak production rate of Su-30/35/34 in 2010s was ~45 planes total. After revision of State Armaments Program it fell to ~25.
Unless Russia manages to increase Su-57 production to 30+ per year by 2030 it won't have the ability to replace obsolete aircraft fast enough to maintain a plausible deterrent.
Now take your fantasies to proper threads. This one is for F-35.