As I've previously written, I think Fujian's configuration makes a lot of sense when it is a 85,000t conventionally powered carrier. Three catapults and two large elevators is absolutely fine.
But if you and others are suggesting that the flight deck configuration of Fujian is optimal for the PLAN's needs, rather than a reflection of a limitation of various (IMO sensible) design measures and risk reduction measures on Fujian, then I strongly disagree with you.
You wrote: "American supercarriers are heretofore peerless, state-of-the-art and best-in-class, so a Chinese Ford is what China should build" as if to demonstrate that it is not a sensible one.
But this is pretty close to what I believe, for the PLAN at this stage of their carrier aviation development, for a number of reasons that includes what I believe PLA requirements for their carriers are, as well as emergence of key vital technologies and greater willingness to take on a clean sheet carrier design, and in the case of flight deck configuration I do believe that the USN's many more years of operating busy flight decks and sortie generation rates aboard their CVNs is something the PLAN would want to emulate and informed emulation of something like flight deck configuration is a no brainer if the rest of the ship allows for it.
The issue I take with basing what is one of China's most, if not the most, strategically significant military programmes on the rationale of emulating the USN's carrier doctrines, which have also seen major recent shifts as brought on by Ford's introduction, is the inherently reactive nature of this proposition, or perhaps more accurately, the "follow-the-puck" aspect of it.
To justify China's building of like-supercarriers that rival the US, I would think the issue invariably revolves around just what the PLAN plans(!) to do with their CVs in the first place, and I would also think there's an exhaustive list of questions we may have to ask ourselves, which, needless to say would be such a lengthy discussion which I must admit I may not have the will to get into the nitty-gritty of it.
[...] may not necessarily apply to the PLAN's own operational needs [...]
That said, going back to my above point, I think the simple truth is that we don't know how the PLAN actually intends to operate their carrier fleets as they continue to expand and mature. I think there'd be little disagreement that they're very much still at the training, exploration and refinement phase of their carrier-operating competency, surely to be compounded by now having a CATOBAR in the mix. Then again, STOBAR was never the end goal to begin with, so the PLAN would have surely and expectedly been training as if they were operating on a CATOBAR platform off site and at sea.
So once the PLAN's carrier fleets (however many that may end up to be) reach the level of matured operability and sortie rates that can be considered as on par with that of the USN, what does the PLAN hope to achieve then?
If I may name just a very few obvious scenarios -
- Do they envision themselves conducting A2AD not just around the 1st and 2nd island chains but beyond? Where?
- Do they expect to conduct expeditionary strikes and policing ops like the US? Against whom?
- Do they expect to pit their own carriers against US carriers? For what purpose would either side do that?
Apart form the prestige and intimidation factor of having the biggest and baddest, just on these circumstances alone how realistically do we think the PLAN would envision themselves conducting these operations/ventures/power projections that would warrant acquiring precisely such compositions and capabilities the USN's CVNs have to offer?
Perhaps I could be misunderstanding what the PLAN's operational requirements actually are, if they've ever published anything recently that I may have missed. Or maybe you could be so kind to elaborate on it.
To the sure, I don't dispute the technological advantages China has undeniably benefited from observing and studying US CVN progress, esp. in nuclear propulsion and EMALS, and quite possibly electronics suites, and improving upon them. That much is obvious.
When it comes the time the PLAN gets around to building a 100,000 ton CVN in earnest, I don't mean to sound arrogant or dismissive, but in terms of emulating the USN down to the way they design, configure and build
their state-of-art carriers which ultimately dictates the fashion in which the USN gets to operate them, however, that's where I think watchers should probably expect the PLAN would pay due consideration to how it may differ, or not, in the capabilities a homegrown 100,000 ton CVN can afford them to achieve in the face of adversarial military assets the PLAN intends to deploy it against, in theatres where the PLAN intends to deploy it, and the roles in which the PLAN intends to employ it, and probably not "what China would do with a CVN like the Ford".
