By this point in the discussion I was simply arguing the case for a deep strike role, since I already pointed out that the Lijian probably isn't intended for that purpose.
I'm not entirely sure I agree with your assessment with how the PLA would deal with Taiwan. While that's certainly the standard outlook and I'm not in disagreement with it, as the PLA's capabilities advance, they may opt for a more surgical strategy to minimize collateral and make the politics easier. That's where deep strike capabilities may come in hand.
In any case, I think the strategic considerations for ASEAN (and India) can change very quickly depending on the US's role in the region. My general inclination is that things won't go south and escalate to the level where those threats become real, but the job of militaries is to assess long term improbabilities.
Well I think we have a difference of opinion on the nature and role of stealthy UCAVs. In my book, stealthy UCAVs are cheap front line bomb trucks. They are intended to hit medium to low value targets in moderately defended areas. I think of them as reusable cruise missiles for targets that are not worth using an actual cruise missile for, but which are in areas too risky for manned conventional strikers.
If there are high value targets deep in enemy territory you need hitting, far better to send a cruise missiles. Your chances of killing that target is better than with a stealthy UCAV, and the cost per strike works out cheaper than if you lost a few UCAVs trying to take out the target.
A war with Taiwan is not going to be a replay of the Gulf War I, where the majority of the action takes place in the air. Don't get me wrong, air strikes would be a central part of the mission, but unlike the US and coalition forces in Iraq, China does not have the luxury of time, and will be fighting against the clock. In addition, it would be all but impossible for air strikes alone to achieve China's goals.
In that regard, China cannot afford to methodically take Taiwan's forces apart over a course of weeks and months before proceeding to the ground war. Because of that, collateral damage and cost efficiency and even casualty rates becomes a distant secondary concern.
Thus, the aim of the PLAAF is not to delicately pick apart Taiwan's defences, but rather to smash down the barn door with maximum prejudice and in the minimal time possible. If there are high value targets behind the lines, they will be overkilled by cruise and ballistic missiles because China cannot afford the time to be precious with its munitions and waste the time to have multiple tries to kill the same target.
The likes of the Sharp Sword will be used to fly into the teeth of Taiwan's front line to take out the air defences and clear the beaches for the PLA amphibious forces, or at the very least soften them up for the manned strikers coming in after them. As such, it would be better for an enemy SAM to go up the tailpipe of a Sharp Sword heading for home after it had dropped all its munitions than for that same SAM to go into the intake of a manned striker still with all its bombs onboard.
As for ASEAN, while it is true that militarise need to try and cover as many bases as possible, the reality is that defence budgets are finite so while militarise will develop scenarios for all sorts of improbable situations, they will only spend their limited R&D and procurement budgets on likely threats. In that regard, an ASEAN with modern AD systems that needs full all aspect stealth is too remote a possibility to carry much weight. In addition, ASEAN is too far away to be of significant concern for China. They can have the best air defences in the world, but that doesn't really matter to China because they are too far away to be able to threaten the Chinese mainland from their own soil.
