The Air Force needs to suppress ground-based air defence systems sufficiently before UAVs can operate more freely.Wouldn't something like iron dome absolutely shred any amount of UAVs you throw at it? It has happened before and the economics definitely favor the defensive even with Chinese cost advantages. You can't even SEAD it properly since it could intercept whatever you're throwing at it.
It doesn't necessarily need to be mobile if the role is defensive.
Wouldn't something like iron dome absolutely shred any amount of UAVs you throw at it? It has happened before and the economics definitely favor the defensive even with Chinese cost advantages. You can't even SEAD it properly since it could intercept whatever you're throwing at it.
It doesn't necessarily need to be mobile if the role is defensive.
A Chinese version of the Shaheed-136 would be likely be around $20K.
At first glance, the Iron Dome missile costs somewhere between $50K-$150K
The economics don't favour Iron Dome as a defender
The effectiveness the TB-2 has demonstrated in the first few months of the Russian-Ukrainian war was apparently an aberration. News have disappeared. So we are back to pre-war verdict about MALE and HALE type drones. They are of limited utility in an intense war. They are useful as frontline ISR assets and for rear area armed patrols against infiltrators. High-endurance drones won't be doing any CAS unless enemy GBAD and air power are rendered ineffective. CAS will be done by fighters and VLO drones in conjunction with SEAD and counter-air operations.My question is how would CAS work in a contested air environment, I'm going to hazard a guess here that the TB-2 is stealthier than the TB001, yet they were made quick work of by GBAD. Although it has very long endurance, but with A variant having 3 engines compared to other single engine UAVs already utilized by the PLA, I doubt it will win on the cost front in an attritional war.
Previous images does show that it can haul a cruise missile sized payload, so there's some potential there as a missile hauler for extended range deep strikes.
The effectiveness the TB-2 has demonstrated in the first few months of the Russian-Ukrainian war was apparently an aberration. News have disappeared. So we are back to pre-war verdict about MALE and HALE type drones. They are of limited utility in an intense war. They are useful as frontline ISR assets and for rear area armed patrols against infiltrators. High-endurance drones won't be doing any CAS unless enemy GBAD and air power are rendered ineffective. CAS will be done by fighters and VLO drones in conjunction with SEAD and counter-air operations.
Already happening. The Turks started developing the Kizilelma drone for example.If everyone had SHORAD like Iron Dome widely deployed then current drones would simply need to evolve.
My point was more against heavily armed, non-stealthy UAV such as TB001, but compared to using patriot or similar technology to defend, it is much cheaper and makes the playing field almost equal for close to even the lowest end of attack UAVs.A Chinese version of the Shaheed-136 would be likely be around $20K.
At first glance, the Iron Dome missile costs somewhere between $50K-$150K
The economics don't favour Iron Dome as a defender
And how many Iron Dome needed to destroy a Shaheed-136 ? 1.5 maybe
The important facts here is that there have been enough batteries available that even a swarm attack of hundreds of rockets was relatively ineffective against such an emplacement.