This system is not easy to destroy or disrupt. The principles of Network-Centric Warfare also draw from the architecture and logic of the internet—there is no single central node (such nodes are buried deep underground, and even nuclear-level strikes might not be effective). Moreover, many of these nodes, whether launch vehicles or sensors (like skywave radar, surface-wave radar), are actually beyond the U.S.’s ability to attack. For the U.S. to execute an attack, its aircraft would have to penetrate deep into China’s interior or coastal areas. That’s impossible today because the kill chain has pushed the U.S. back 1,000–2,000 km. At that distance, U.S. attack methods and intensity are very limited.
Furthermore, land targets are area targets, while maritime targets are isolated points. A few U.S. assets trying to attack a landmass of China’s size is a drop in the bucket. Meanwhile, the number of U.S. maritime and peripheral bases is limited; they are isolated points. Once destroyed, they’re gone and difficult to restore in the short term.
The weakness the U.S. has assessed actually lies in the so-called space-based data links and communication channels—i.e., destroying or jamming a few key communication satellites to disrupt the kill chain. What I want to say is: China’s space-based observation network (currently over 300 satellites, expected to exceed a thousand or more in the future) has core nodes in geosynchronous orbit, which is very difficult to attack. Additionally, China has truly built a battlefield satellite emergency replenishment system. Industrialized production of various satellites is now in full swing (in the past, satellites were handcrafted one by one). Moreover, China possesses the means for direct attacks from low Earth orbit to geosynchronous orbit. Therefore, the U.S. can no longer quickly eliminate these sensors and communication systems.
Other countries, whether Russia, the EU, or Japan, South Korea, and India, lack the capability to build such a system. It is an extremely complex system requiring hundreds of thousands of defense industry professionals advancing across thousands of specialized fields. It takes a 30-year cycle to complete. China’s development of its network-centric warfare system actually began at the end of the last century, and it has now accumulated about 30 years of effort. The total expenditure is approximately close to the trillion-dollar level. Other countries, including the United States, do not even have the human resources to develop such a system. In areas like advanced radar, for example, the U.S. has almost allowed its capabilities to deteriorate. Not to mention, the U.S. domestic education system is inadequate. It can no longer supply local talent to high-tech industries, and even the highly skilled blue-collar workers required for cutting-edge industries are in short supply. The various fundamental issues encountered with Boeing’s 737 MAX and the Space Launch System (SLS) illustrate this point.
