(4) Political activism. The fourth “surprise” in the Chinese public opinion surveys is the high level of political activism. For example, in the 2012 Chinese Labor Dynamics Survey, nearly half of employees mentioned that they had at least one labor dispute in the past two years. In the 2004 Legal Survey, only 6 percent of the respondents chose to do nothing when they were involved in legal disputes, and the rest would try to resolve them by various channels, including the court, the labor mediation bureau, the news media, the internet, petition, and protests.
These findings are consistent with the media reports of the increasing number of mass protests in recent years, particularly at the local level. For example, the New York Times reported that there were 180,000 mass incidents in 2010, compared to only 10,000 in 1994. The scale of these incidents ranges from a few protesters or petitioners to as many as 100,000. Challenging the government is no longer the business of a few dissidents and intellectuals.
Recent high-profile incidents have been widely reported by Western media: the protest against the local government’s handling of a young girl’s drowning in Wengan in 2008, protests against a chef’s death in Shishou in 2009, the land dispute in Wukan in 2011, the mining plant dispute in Shifang in 2012, the wastewater processing plant dispute in Qidong in 2012. These incidents have generated considerable excitement among Chinese dissidents and some Western media outlets, who tend to describe them as harbingers of political change, a stepping stone towards democracy, or the beginning of the collapse of the authoritarian regime.
On the surface, political activism seems to contradict regime support, as the former brings out public political contention against the regime in the conventional belief. Yet, what is remarkable is that in survey data such as the Chinese General Social Survey, trusting the central government makes people protest more. In other words, central government supporters and the protestors are the same people.
Authors such as Keven O’Brien and Li Lianjiang believe that Chinese citizens engage in a clever practice in which they protest against local governments and their bad policies while using the central government’s glorious propaganda about serving the people. According to this belief, the protestors learn to fight for their rights in this process, and eventually will fight against and ultimately bring down the authoritarian regime itself. In contrast, others such as Yanqi Tong and Shaohua Lei and Peter Lorentzen believe that mass protests at the local level are encouraged by the central government either through the CCP’s populist ideology of Mass Line, or to test and identify unpopular local policies and officials. Such a practice will eventually improve public support for the central government. If the second view is true, political activism is an integral component of regime resilience in China.
(5) Government responsiveness. The fifth “surprise” is the high level of government responsiveness. For example, in the second wave of the Asian Barometer Survey conducted in 2008, 78 percent of mainland Chinese respondents agreed that their government would respond to what people needed. In contrast, only 36 percent of Taiwanese respondents agreed with the same statement in the same survey. The percentages are even worse in other East Asian democracies that copied the Western liberal democratic system, including Japan (33 percent), the Philippines (33 percent), Mongolia (25 percent), and South Korea (21 percent).
In a multivariate regression analysis when other factors such as age, education, gender, income, religiosity, and geographic location are taken into consideration, government responsiveness played the single most significant role in promoting regime support in China. Existing studies typically attribute the high level of government support to three things: economic growth, media control, and cultural values. According to these studies, the Chinese are happy with their government because (1) their economic conditions have improved during China’s period of rapid growth; (2) they are brainwashed by the government-controlled media, which always presents a rosy picture of the country; and (3) the Confucian cultural values make people respect political hierarchy and avoid challenging authority. Yet when these three factors are compared with government responsiveness in the same regression model, the latter continues to show the strongest impact in promoting regime support.
One of the most common challenges to the perceived high level of government responsiveness goes like this: the Chinese live in an unfree society so that they have extremely low expectations about what their government can do for them. They tend to be thrilled if their government does a little of something. In a democratic society, the government regularly responds to public demand, yet the public is always grumpy and constantly asks for more. But this view needs to present real evidence that democratic citizens hold higher expectations of their governments than authoritarian citizens. In fact, the high level of public political activism discussed above suggests that Chinese citizens may have high expectations, and that they do not hesitate to challenge their government when they perceive any mistreatment by its officials. Even if the view of low expectations is true, it discounts the importance of public opinion. Positive public opinion of government responsiveness at least demonstrates external political efficacy, a political commodity desired by any government, regardless of how much a government responds.
Another even more provocative explanation of the above finding is that the Chinese authoritarian government is actually more responsive to the public than a democratically elected government such as in Taiwan. Leaders of a democratic government may be hyper-responsive to public opinion only during the election season, and only to their own supporters, but less so once they get elected, between elections, and to those who do not vote for them. In contrast, leaders in authoritarian China do not have the luxury of electoral cycles. The CCP claims to represent the interests of the highest number of people in China, yet it does not have elections as a simple but effective yardstick to measure such representativeness. The CCP becomes paranoid and compelled to respond even when it sees a single protestor on the street. Researchers such as Tong and Lei in their 2014 study of protests in China show that the CCP spends a large amount of time and resources to calm and compensate protestors and petitioners, as an effort to maintain social stability. Perhaps that explains the perception that the CCP spends more on maintaining social stability than on defense.