Chinese Economics Thread

abenomics12345

Junior Member
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Your perspectives are on the marks but your conclusion on global south or BRI is debatable.

First of all, nominal GDP is only good for trading of financial assets. Economic well-beings in each country is largely determined by the real economic activities on the ground. China's real economy is at least 120% of US based on all relevant economic hard numbers, except that Yuan is not a pricing currency but Dollar is.

The incremental contribution of Africa to global economic activities is way undervalued in nominal terms. The significance of BRI is not realized profits for Chinese SOEs, rather it is confidence building and trust. The global reserve currency is not established solely on GDP numbers. The two non-economic pillars of US Dollar are military and finance, which may take decades if not centuries to establish.

Based on my trading insights, I determined that US/CNY should be 1/5 in 2013 based on real economic gauges. Today, it should be at least 1/5 by all practical measures. That is the most important factor that US is waging Cold War 2.0 against China. I don't condone that rationale but I fully understand why US would do that regardless of partisan divisions. You can easily imagine US fiscal picture or living standard if US dollar even split its reserve currency privilege with CNY. If that was the case, for example, TSLA would not enjoy such high multiple vis-a-vis BYD; and this can be extrapolated to FAANG stocks.

Nominal GDP does not make any sense to developing countries. It only makes sense to countries with a significant financial industry.

You're right it's debatable - I am familiar and somewhat sympathetic with the argument about the intrinsic value of the RMB vs. USD. However, I think the point of contention (to borrow from Matt Damon) is the time horizon over which this point matters.

Additionally, the real estate bubble in China is the biggest roadblock to the internationalization of the RMB. There's a reason why China still has FX restrictions in place - and let me tell you it isn't to prevent money from entering the country, it's to prevent a disorderly unwind of the real estate bubble. Coincidentally, the entire crypo mining operation in China was operationalized by the demand for people to move assets out of the country. The fund flows perspective would indicate that the entities with money in China still prefer to diversify their holdings away from China. Anecdotally, on other side, you just need to take a quick look at the luxury real estate market in London, Vancouver, New York to know where the money is coming from.

So like, yes, your argument makes conceptual sense, but the material conditions on the ground isn't reflective of your argument.

The base rate of dominance of empires is calculated in centuries - to quote yourself, USD and US Military took centuries to establish - the same argument can be made for the CNY and Chinese military influence, as can be made for the decline of USD and US Military influence. You might be right that it will happen, but if it happens in 2123 - none of us here on this forum will be around. So practically speaking it really is irrelevant from a practical perspective.

But I do agree with your assessment of the magnitude of problems in the US *if* that were to happen.

Can you credibly lay out the rationale for the CNY overtaking USD as the reserve currency in the next 5-10 years?
 
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ZeEa5KPul

Colonel
Registered Member
Shut up SleepyStudent
Don't be so quick on the draw. Sleepy has a collection of subjects and threads he's obsessed with and his writing is very distinctive.
Additionally, the real estate bubble in China is the biggest roadblock to the internationalization of the RMB. There's a reason why China still has FX restrictions in place - and let me tell you it isn't to prevent money from entering the country, it's to prevent a disorderly unwind of the real estate bubble.
Unfortunately, I entirely agree with this. It's more than just the real estate bubble, it has to do with the most fundamental governance principles of China and America. In China, billionaires are subject to the law while in America billionaires are the law. If you had a large sum of money, would you want to be accountable to a powerful government or be able to purchase the government?

I don't think there's ever going to be an easy solution to this, not 10 or 100 years from now.
 

AndrewS

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Registered Member
2023 growth will be on the stronger side than potential growth given the low base effect from 2022 pandemic controls. However, I've dug into that so called 'pent up savings' - it's actually not nearly as big as otherwise would be indicated. I've seen data that decomposes the savings by region and its in poor regions that people have saved - rich regions (Zhejiang/Jiangsu) have actually seen savings run-rate decline. I've seen a study that's decomposed the contribution of the reduction in Retail Sales we saw in 2022 vs run-rate (pre-pandemic), and it has been driven largely by income reduction (~60%), reduced propensity to consume (~60%), and the last part excess savings (20%).

Families have suffered significant negative wealth effect as a result of 1) reduced property price growth expectations (and in certain cases have seen their property prices drop); 2) stock market investments shrinking as a result of the mini-bubble in 2021 deflating in equity markets.

As a result (partially) of 1) - people have substantially reduced property purchases in 2022 vs. 2021 - with sales down some 30%. As a result of the high economic exposure to real estate (20-30%, depending on who you ask, including the secondary/tertiary multipliers) in the overall economy, income growth expectations are now lower. So we've seen a bit of a vicious cycle in expectations. Three red lines implemented in 2020 to reign back this also has been contractionary. Overall this is the controlled demolition of the real estate sector - and the slowdown we are seeing is a feature, not the bug, of said policies. However they've started stimulating to stabilize the economy.

Longer term though, growth will not be as high as it was in the 2000s/2010s - if you read the more optimistic economists (Justin Lin Yifu, for example), they would argue that potential growth is in the mid-5% range for China; pessimistic economists out there believe China is stuck in the middle income trap already (capital formation as driver of GDP is tapped out given debt/GDP, population growth has reached its end, and they do not believe productivity growth will come). This is of course the center of debate as it relate to industrial upgrade in various sectors, which is the key to driving productivity growth (robots making more things faster, for example).

In short, China is in a bit of a liquidity trap with weak, but notably improving consumer/business confidence. I'm fairly optimistic that 2023 will see some bounce back - but the longer term is not as rosy as it was pre-Shanghai - that really changed the fundamental behaviour/expectations. I've met with some Chinese companies' management teams lately, and we are seeing some green shoots, 2023 should be much better than 2022.

I don't see how what you've written contradicts the FT article

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"family bank balances are up 42 per cent, or $4.8tn, since the start of 2020 — an amount that is larger than the UK’s GDP."

Source below
ft.com/content/e592033b-9e34-4e3d-ae53-17fa34c16009?sharetype=blocked
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2 years of 20% excess savings gets you to a 42% figure ($4.8Tn)

That represents circa 25% of China's GDP, which is why I said growth expectations for 2023 aren't really dependent on external sources.
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
Longer term though, growth will not be as high as it was in the 2000s/2010s - if you read the more optimistic economists (Justin Lin Yifu, for example), they would argue that potential growth is in the mid-5% range for China; pessimistic economists out there believe China is stuck in the middle income trap already (capital formation as driver of GDP is tapped out given debt/GDP, population growth has reached its end, and they do not believe productivity growth will come). This is of course the center of debate as it relate to industrial upgrade in various sectors, which is the key to driving productivity growth (robots making more things faster, for example).

In short, China is in a bit of a liquidity trap with weak, but notably improving consumer/business confidence. I'm fairly optimistic that 2023 will see some bounce back - but the longer term is not as rosy as it was pre-Shanghai - that really changed the fundamental behaviour/expectations. I've met with some Chinese companies' management teams lately, and we are seeing some green shoots, 2023 should be much better than 2022.


Also, you have to understand the transition to a 3rd Industrial Revolution requires a higher ratio of Debt to GDP, as the previous ratios are seen in the 2nd Industrial Revolution is no longer relevant.

As per Rifkind's analysis/work on productivity, less than 14% of economic growth is from the combination of capital formation and labour improvements. 86% is accounted for by "aggregate energy efficiency" with Energy generation and transportation as 2 of the 3 key elements.

The 2nd Industrial Revolution is overwhelmingly powered by the internal combustion engine and coal electricity generation, which have comparatively low upfront capital costs and much larger operating costs.

In the 3rd Industrial revolution, when you look at Solar, Wind, Nuclear and Electric transport, these are all capital intensive with large upfront costs and low operating costs.

So this will require economies to run higher debt ratios, at least at the beginning of the 3rd Industrial Revolution where we are now.

Here's something I wrote a few months ago

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At a micro-level, I see Chinese companies having a unique combination of advantages in terms of:

1. A huge domestic market.
China has a population larger than the combined West. For example, this means more smartphones are consumed by China every year than in the combined West.

2. Ample development and production resources
In terms of available financing, scientific personnel, technical personnel and production personnel etc. 30% of global manufacturing resides in China, which is more than the USA, Japan and Germany combined. The Nikkei recently also reported that China has passed the USA in terms of the quantity and quality of scientific research papers. Batelle and the NSF are reporting that Chinese R&D spending is comparable (or has exceeded) the USA these days.

3. Middle-income cost levels in China versus higher costs in the developed West

4. Speed of execution


So given time, Chinese companies can leverage world-class technology development at a lower cost and faster speed than their counterparts in the developed West.

Chinese companies can put these products into production faster. They'll find ready customers in the vast Chinese market, and therefore be able to produce at scale and at lower cost than their competitors.

So Chinese companies should be able to catchup and then compete with foreign rivals on a global basis in every sector. Of course, foreign companies can invest in China as well to take advantage of these factors. Just look at Tesla which has made Shanghai their main production and export location and also to tap into the Chinese market which accounts for 60% of the world's electric vehicle sales. But foreign companies are generally slower and less attuned to local tastes than domestic Chinese companies like BYD which has a dominant position in the Chinese electric vehicle market.

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China is still only a middle-income country which is not yet fully urbanised, so there is still significant growth yet from urbanisation.

China also has an exceptionally high level of R&D spending at 2.4% of GDP. This is exceptionally higher (more than twice as high) as any other low-income or middle-income country. They are all stuck around the 1% mark.

If China was stuck in the middle-income trap, it means this level of R&D spending is being wasted, since most R&D spending is conducted by private companies (as per The Economist). And if these private companies are wasting money on R&D, then they should have gone bankrupt or reduced R&D spending.

But that is not what we are seeing reported by the vast majority of Chinese companies. Furthermore, overall Chinese R&D spending is still growing explosively every year and I expect it to reach 3% of GDP in 5 years time. The implication is that Chinese R&D spending is profitable and finding a market for its products, which would make sense given the advantages outlined previously.

And on a historical note, Chinese R&D spending has seen significant increases over the past 20 years, as per OECD figures. So this isn't a new thing, but something which has been sustained for decades.

And if Chinese R&D spending reaches 3% of GDP - that would be comparable to Germany and the USA. After that there are only a handful of countries (all high-income) with higher levels of R&D spending. And the implication is that a hi-tech China becomes wealthy.

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Looking further to the future, the Chinese economy is roughly equal to the US, when looking at the PPP and nominal figures. But China has a population some 4x larger than the USA, so China is still only a middle-income country. Therefore China does still have a lot more growth potential than a mature US.

China already has a commanding overall lead in the technologies underpinning the Third Industrial Revolution (eg. Solar, Wind, Batteries, Electric Vehicles, 5G/IOT, AI/ML). Rifkind's book "The Third Industrial Revolution" outlines this.

So like the UK and USA in the 2 prior industrial revolutions, what are the chances of China becoming a wealthy, hi-tech nation? And given that China has 4x the population of the USA, you would expect the Chinese economy to become 4x larger.

Of course, this hasn't happened yet and will take another 20+ years to play out.

But it is easy to imagine:
1. China with higher military spending than the US
2. China driving the clean energy revolution globally and mitigating the worst effects of climate change
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
Can you credibly lay out the rationale for the CNY overtaking USD as the reserve currency in the next 5-10 years?

I've just laid out a summary of why the USD would lose reserve currency status in the event of a China-US war, irrespective of how such a war starts or ends.
Note this doesn't require or mean that the CNY will replace the USD as the global reserve currency

So just to summarise, we can see Central Banks developing an alternative to the US dollar system, as per the Bloomberg article.
And that whilst the USD is safe for now, they recognise that there will come a day when they have to dump the dollar, and the value of the USD crashes.

Note the huge twin trade and budget deficits that the US runs every year, which is not sustainable in the long-term

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The USA has already imposed USD sanctions on North Korea, Iran and Russia. So the next likely candidate is China, which that means Central Banks are preparing for a day when the US imposes USD sanctions on China.

Given that China produces 90% of the world's antibiotic precursors and China's role in the global economy, we can see why the world wants to continue trading with China even if the US imposes USD sanctions. Note that the non-Western world accounts for 60% of Global economic activity and that share is increasing every year. So why should countries be subject to US control?

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We can also see Western Investment Banks recognise this, and that they are preparing for the day when the world dumps the dollar, as per the previous Credit Suisse report.

And something that will definitely trigger this will be a China-US war.

So a China-US war will mean the end of the dollar as the global reserve currency, no matter how such a war starts or ends.

Comments?


The entire thread is only 2 pages long, but there's quite a lot in the links and references from the articles.

sinodefenceforum.com/t/renminbi-rmb-yuan-appreciation-internationalization.9038/

It should make sense after that. You have the Singapore governments publicy saying

"“The US dollar is a hex on all of us,” George Yeo, former foreign minister of Singapore, said at the conference hosted by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. “If you weaponize the international financial system, alternatives will grow to replace it” and the US dollar will lose its advantage. "

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Also, you have to look at Ray Dalio's work which quantifies the relationship between imperial decline and the loss of reserve currency status. The Youtube summary is below and there's also the longer book version which explains in more detail with all the numbers

youtube.com/watch?v=xguam0TKMw8
 
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AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
Yes, this is the right way to think about it. Folks who don't have an economic background should read some books like How Asia Works (Studwell) / Collapse (Zubok) to get a sense of how institutions actually work/fail.

Indonesia's logistics industry is never going to be as competitive as countries like China given how many islands it has - nobody wants to build factories whose supply chains can be interrupted by a typhoon. And even if they do, its not nearly as efficient as what you have in China. Vietnam has very good prospects, but like I said, it's the population of Henan and GDP of Heilongjiang *yawn*. It's quite irrelevant in the grand scheme of things.

Whilst you are correct that Indonesian logistics overall will never be as competitive as Chinas, remember that the island of Java has 150 Mn people and it is densely populated.

Therefore the logistics industry on Java can be as competitive as Chinas. A population of 150 Mn people is larger than any single province in China. It is also more people than Japan for example

Furthermore, Java accounts for over half the population, so has an outsized effect on the country's overall competitiveness.

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And if I look at GDP per capita in Vietnam or Indonesia, it's $13-15K.
So that's a combined population of 400 Mn people who aren't that far off from China's current level of $22K.
Call it a maximum of 10 years before they reach this level

That is pretty significant from China's perspective.
 

4Runner

Junior Member
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[Comments]
The China trade 2022 numbers may have been posted here already. I use above article to point out USD877B. That is China trade surplus in 2022. If I take face values of western MSM on China economy throughout 2022, it would give me an impression that China economy is collapsing. Well, OK, fine with USD877B trade surplus I guess, in the middle of Covid-19, Ukraine war and the Great Decoupling. China 扯那 OK。
 

abenomics12345

Junior Member
Registered Member
I've just laid out a summary of why the USD would lose reserve currency status in the event of a China-US war, irrespective of how such a war starts or ends.
Note this doesn't require or mean that the CNY will replace the USD as the global reserve currency




The entire thread is only 2 pages long, but there's quite a lot in the links and references from the articles.

sinodefenceforum.com/t/renminbi-rmb-yuan-appreciation-internationalization.9038/

It should make sense after that. You have the Singapore governments publicy saying

"“The US dollar is a hex on all of us,” George Yeo, former foreign minister of Singapore, said at the conference hosted by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. “If you weaponize the international financial system, alternatives will grow to replace it” and the US dollar will lose its advantage. "

---

Also, you have to look at Ray Dalio's work which quantifies the relationship between imperial decline and the loss of reserve currency status. The Youtube summary is below and there's also the longer book version which explains in more detail with all the numbers

youtube.com/watch?v=xguam0TKMw8
I've not read the book on the Third Industrial Revolution - will comment after I read the book - it's on the to-read list - thank you for the recommendation. I am familiar with Ray Dalio/Zoltan Pozsar's PoV on this - and agree with the long term implications of where this is headed - but where I push back is the immediate catalyst of that happening.

Reserve currency is the ultimate two-sided network effect - it will continue to be used grudgingly as much as everyone gripes about the cost of such a setup (does anyone not complain about Visa/Mastercard rail fees? is anyone ex-China making a tangible dent on the dominance of the V/MA rails? Before anyone says buH mY BNPL - all the BNPL networks use V/MA's debit networks) - it clearly is unsustainable - but the market stays irrational longer than you can stay solvent - so you need a catalyst to get the timing right. Like, everyone knows Alipay/Wechat Pay is superior to Visa/Mastercard as a model, yet it's not adopted globally by non-Chinese people for non-China related purchases, but if you whip out your Visa/Mastercard, it is accepted everywhere. My view is that things like this don't change just because they 'should' change - there needs to be a credible catalyst path for things to change.

Which is why I get back to my original question, specifically what you see in the next 5-10 years to change this. I'm familiar with all the long-term arguments and agree with them.

War would be certainly a catalyst, but the destructive costs certainly is not preferable.
Whilst you are correct that Indonesian logistics overall will never be as competitive as Chinas, remember that the island of Java has 150 Mn people and it is densely populated.

Therefore the logistics industry on Java can be as competitive as Chinas. A population of 150 Mn people is larger than any single province in China. It is also more people than Japan for example

Furthermore, Java accounts for over half the population, so has an outsized effect on the country's overall competitiveness.

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And if I look at GDP per capita in Vietnam or Indonesia, it's $13-15K.
So that's a combined population of 400 Mn people who aren't that far off from China's current level of $22K.
Call it a maximum of 10 years before they reach this level

That is pretty significant from China's perspective.

I'm using nominal GDP because living standards of developing nations gets crushed every time Fed prints or tightens - LatAM in the 80s, ASEAN in the 90s (including Korea, which had to get an IMF bailout), and now - almost every country in the world has been importing American inflation.

China is a separate case given price controls on basic commodities - but that's another can of worms that's not quite relevant for this specific instance.

I'm skeptical about the population argument on Indonesia - the institutions haven't been built by Sukarno/Suharto to enable development. By that logic, Brazil, with over 200mln people, should also be a force to be reckoned with - yet Brazil is the chicken that never takes flight (if you talk to Brazilians this is what they will tell you).

Your argument for Indonesia to 'work' - has to be backed with how you believe the country can get its' shit together under Widodo. (if I'm putting on my Studwell hat here - it would be a combination of land reforms, export discipline, and capital controls - basically the Asian Tigers + China playbook)
 
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