China's transport, tanker & heavy lift aircraft
- Thread starter Totoro
- Start date
To be fair, that wording is ambiguous but doesn't strictly claim both performance indicators can be achieved at the same time. So, it may be saying the Y-20 can carry two Type 15 (perhaps moderately surprising in and of itself) and it is also able to deploy (with an unspecified load) over a 7800km range, but that two Type 15 can be flown that far isn't necessarily the intended meaning.
Well, without a load figure, the 7800 km number is meaningless. As that's well within the expected range capability for such a plane. It's neither likely that's the max payload figure nor is it likely it's the max range figure. The two type 15 piece of info is thus more interesting, though again we don't have actual precise confirmation of Type 15's weight.
Absolutely, since when can we expect mass media to place aircraft specs in proper context though
Especially range figures in fact, they rarely come with all the relevant caveats even in the specialized press.
Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
The COV 19 pandemic provide a real test of the newly revamped Logistic system of the PLA We know they passed the test with flying color Here is outsider analysis of the effort Excerpt for complete article here is the link
Responding to the Epidemic in Wuhan: Insights into Chinese Military Logistics
Publication: China Brief Volume: 20 Issue: 7
By:
April 13, 2020 04:01 PM Age: 1 day
Image: PLA Army medics arrive at Tianhe International Airport in Wuhan (Hubei Province) on February 13 to assist with COVID-19 medical relief efforts in the city.
Per state media coverage, the flights that brought these and other PLA medical personnel to Wuhan represented “the first time for China's domestically developed large transport aircraft Y-20 to take part in [a] non-military action… [and] the first time for the Air Force to send large and medium transport aircraft on active service to carry out urgent air transport tasks on a large scale.” (Source: China Daily, March 3)
Introduction
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has portrayed its response to the novel coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan in heroic terms: battling against an insidious enemy, PLA personnel courageously and tirelessly helped to mitigate the disaster in the epidemic-ravaged city. The PLA has even made the amazing (and highly improbable) claim that it accomplished this while suffering zero infections within its own ranks (, March 3). Despite the hype, the crisis has provided an opportunity for the PLA’s newly reformed logistics system to test its ability to mobilize resources in exigent circumstances.
The Joint Logistic Support Force (联勤保障部队, Lianqin Baozhang Budui) or JLSF, which was created in September 2016 as part of Xi Jinping’s larger overhaul of the military, has been at the forefront of the PLA’s response. [1] The JLSF’s role in Wuhan illuminated several key strengths of the PLA logistics system—including centralized control, effective use of information technology, and civil-military coordination—while also suggesting potential deficiencies. At a minimum, the crisis likely resulted in “lessons learned” that could improve the JLSF’s role in supporting commanders during wartime.
An Evolving Logistics Force
A key dilemma for PLA logistics is how troops and materiel can be transported across long distances and sustained away from their home bases. Such operations could be required in a variety of circumstances—including a large-scale natural disaster, civil unrest, or as part of a wartime mobilization in which reinforcements would be sent from the interior to the frontlines.
For two decades, the PLA has made progress in alleviating this challenge, through measures such as: introducing regulations under which supplies could be requisitioned from the local economy; building civilian transportation infrastructure to military standards; and upgrading information support for logistics operations. Various exercises have also been held to test the PLA’s ability to operate across theaters. [2] However, the organization of the logistics system posed a continuing obstacle: key capabilities were balkanized between the General Logistics Department and the seven Military Regions, each of which controlled separate Joint Logistics Departments.
Reforms to the PLA’s logistics system aimed to diminish this challenge by promoting a centralized organizational structure. Cobbled together from the previous system, the JLSF consists of a headquarters (coincidentally located in Wuhan) and five Joint Logistic Support Centers (联勤保障中心, lian qin baozhang zhongxin), or JLSCs, each aligned with one of the five Theater Commands [3].
The JLSCs in turn oversee a vast array of resources, including mobile logistics brigades, refueling stations, supply depots, and military hospitals. This system encourages visibility and standardization across the joint logistics enterprise, while diminishing the influence of the theaters: JLSF headquarters, responding to Central Military Commission (CMC) orders, can facilitate the timely movement of critical resources across theater boundaries. While the JLSF has supported more than 50 PLA exercises (, October 21, 2019), the Wuhan crisis was the first time it was put into practice to respond to a national emergency.
Contributions to Epidemic Control in Wuhan
The JLSF’s response to the COVID-19 epidemic occurred in roughly three phases between January and March 2020. Although the coronavirus had been circulating in Wuhan since November, JLSF involvement did not occur until the week of January 21. This coincided with Xi’s January 20 remarks to the Politburo on the need to strengthen epidemic control, though it is unclear whether he provided specific guidance to the PLA in his capacity as CMC chairman that triggered the mobilization: none was publicly reported. [4]
Nevertheless, within a week the Central Theater Command General Hospital (subordinate to the Zhengzhou JLSC) had dispatched 66 doctors to two civilian hospitals in Wuhan; the JLSF had arranged transportation and housing for 450 medics from three cities (, March 12); and three JLSCs (Zhengzhou, Guilin, and Shenyang) had assembled and transferred medical gear to Wuhan via rail, including 200,000 masks and 10,000 sets of protective clothing (, January 26).
Next, on February 1-2, the JLSF facilitated the transit of 950 medics, as well as 70 tons of medical supplies, from several parts of the country to Wuhan. Chinese media reported that these personnel, some of whom possessed experience dealing with the SARS and Ebola epidemics, were drawn from hospitals subordinate to the five JLSCs, and arrived via a combination of air, rail, and bus transportation (which included both civilian assets and military units, such as the PLA Air Force’s relatively new Y-20 heavy transport aircraft) (, February 25). These medics supported the transfer of the Huoshenshan (火神山) Hospital, which had been hastily constructed as a makeshift treatment location, from the Wuhan city government to the JLSF, and treated patients at that facility.
Finally, between February 13 and 17, the JLSF coordinated the arrival of another 2,600 military medics in two batches. These personnel, who represented all of the PLA’s services, departed from 19 cities and arrived in Wuhan via bus, air, and rail transportation (, February 13). In total, the JLSF coordinated transportation and sustainment for more than 4,000 military medics from its subordinate units and other parts of the PLA, and brought thousands of units of critical medical supplies to Wuhan over a six week period.
Responding to the Epidemic in Wuhan: Insights into Chinese Military Logistics
Publication: China Brief Volume: 20 Issue: 7
By:
April 13, 2020 04:01 PM Age: 1 day
Image: PLA Army medics arrive at Tianhe International Airport in Wuhan (Hubei Province) on February 13 to assist with COVID-19 medical relief efforts in the city.
Per state media coverage, the flights that brought these and other PLA medical personnel to Wuhan represented “the first time for China's domestically developed large transport aircraft Y-20 to take part in [a] non-military action… [and] the first time for the Air Force to send large and medium transport aircraft on active service to carry out urgent air transport tasks on a large scale.” (Source: China Daily, March 3)
Introduction
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has portrayed its response to the novel coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan in heroic terms: battling against an insidious enemy, PLA personnel courageously and tirelessly helped to mitigate the disaster in the epidemic-ravaged city. The PLA has even made the amazing (and highly improbable) claim that it accomplished this while suffering zero infections within its own ranks (, March 3). Despite the hype, the crisis has provided an opportunity for the PLA’s newly reformed logistics system to test its ability to mobilize resources in exigent circumstances.
The Joint Logistic Support Force (联勤保障部队, Lianqin Baozhang Budui) or JLSF, which was created in September 2016 as part of Xi Jinping’s larger overhaul of the military, has been at the forefront of the PLA’s response. [1] The JLSF’s role in Wuhan illuminated several key strengths of the PLA logistics system—including centralized control, effective use of information technology, and civil-military coordination—while also suggesting potential deficiencies. At a minimum, the crisis likely resulted in “lessons learned” that could improve the JLSF’s role in supporting commanders during wartime.
An Evolving Logistics Force
A key dilemma for PLA logistics is how troops and materiel can be transported across long distances and sustained away from their home bases. Such operations could be required in a variety of circumstances—including a large-scale natural disaster, civil unrest, or as part of a wartime mobilization in which reinforcements would be sent from the interior to the frontlines.
For two decades, the PLA has made progress in alleviating this challenge, through measures such as: introducing regulations under which supplies could be requisitioned from the local economy; building civilian transportation infrastructure to military standards; and upgrading information support for logistics operations. Various exercises have also been held to test the PLA’s ability to operate across theaters. [2] However, the organization of the logistics system posed a continuing obstacle: key capabilities were balkanized between the General Logistics Department and the seven Military Regions, each of which controlled separate Joint Logistics Departments.
Reforms to the PLA’s logistics system aimed to diminish this challenge by promoting a centralized organizational structure. Cobbled together from the previous system, the JLSF consists of a headquarters (coincidentally located in Wuhan) and five Joint Logistic Support Centers (联勤保障中心, lian qin baozhang zhongxin), or JLSCs, each aligned with one of the five Theater Commands [3].
The JLSCs in turn oversee a vast array of resources, including mobile logistics brigades, refueling stations, supply depots, and military hospitals. This system encourages visibility and standardization across the joint logistics enterprise, while diminishing the influence of the theaters: JLSF headquarters, responding to Central Military Commission (CMC) orders, can facilitate the timely movement of critical resources across theater boundaries. While the JLSF has supported more than 50 PLA exercises (, October 21, 2019), the Wuhan crisis was the first time it was put into practice to respond to a national emergency.
Contributions to Epidemic Control in Wuhan
The JLSF’s response to the COVID-19 epidemic occurred in roughly three phases between January and March 2020. Although the coronavirus had been circulating in Wuhan since November, JLSF involvement did not occur until the week of January 21. This coincided with Xi’s January 20 remarks to the Politburo on the need to strengthen epidemic control, though it is unclear whether he provided specific guidance to the PLA in his capacity as CMC chairman that triggered the mobilization: none was publicly reported. [4]
Nevertheless, within a week the Central Theater Command General Hospital (subordinate to the Zhengzhou JLSC) had dispatched 66 doctors to two civilian hospitals in Wuhan; the JLSF had arranged transportation and housing for 450 medics from three cities (, March 12); and three JLSCs (Zhengzhou, Guilin, and Shenyang) had assembled and transferred medical gear to Wuhan via rail, including 200,000 masks and 10,000 sets of protective clothing (, January 26).
Next, on February 1-2, the JLSF facilitated the transit of 950 medics, as well as 70 tons of medical supplies, from several parts of the country to Wuhan. Chinese media reported that these personnel, some of whom possessed experience dealing with the SARS and Ebola epidemics, were drawn from hospitals subordinate to the five JLSCs, and arrived via a combination of air, rail, and bus transportation (which included both civilian assets and military units, such as the PLA Air Force’s relatively new Y-20 heavy transport aircraft) (, February 25). These medics supported the transfer of the Huoshenshan (火神山) Hospital, which had been hastily constructed as a makeshift treatment location, from the Wuhan city government to the JLSF, and treated patients at that facility.
Finally, between February 13 and 17, the JLSF coordinated the arrival of another 2,600 military medics in two batches. These personnel, who represented all of the PLA’s services, departed from 19 cities and arrived in Wuhan via bus, air, and rail transportation (, February 13). In total, the JLSF coordinated transportation and sustainment for more than 4,000 military medics from its subordinate units and other parts of the PLA, and brought thousands of units of critical medical supplies to Wuhan over a six week period.
This is the first international mission for the Y-20, according to the news report.
may be he is one of u living in USA like rest other members.
antiterror13
Brigadier
?????????may be he is one of u living in USA like rest other members.