Do you have any official paper, ppt to show of this 8 meter variant? Or are you confusing the later 3.5 stage CZ-9 with earlier 2.5 stage CZ-9?
There are two alternatives. What you are talking about is aternative a that only involves CZ-5DY being launched multiple times. What I talked about is alternative b which involves CZ-9. This CZ-9 is the earliest known CZ-9 config that uses tank of 9 metre class (8 to 10 metres). See the highlight of item e.
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First of all, the literature you posted actually became widely known on the internet largely due to my efforts (I was the first to provide a detailed interpretation). Between 2015 and 2020, I repeatedly mentioned its contents in discussions. During the major debate about CZ-10 and CZ-9 in 2020, to prove that CZ-9 and CZ-10 were not in a competitive or replacement relationship, I posted screenshots of the entire literature along with relevant interpretations. Within a day, the related content spread across the entire aerospace social media sphere.
In the summary section of this literature, Academician Long Lehao made it very clear that, in order to achieve the manned lunar landing program around 2024 (the earliest target milestone, i.e., the first phase), the dual-launch mode of CZ-5DY would be used, possibly supplemented by a single launch of CZ-5A (with a total LTO capacity of 30-40 tons). By 2030 (the second phase), one of the cargo rockets would be replaced by CZ-9.
China’s early lunar landing models were primarily planned based on low Earth orbit docking (similar to the U.S. Ares V back then). That’s why the CZ-5DY and CZ-9 you see are both two-and-a-half-stage configurations, with no three-and-a-half-stage capability (due to rocket height limitations). For low-orbit docking, CZ-5A must be used for the manned mission. However, the diagram you posted also mentions that four different docking modes were actually studied. When adopting the three modes other than low-orbit docking, CZ-5A could no longer launch the manned part, and CZ-5DY would take the lead.
Before 2010, the total scale of China’s first manned lunar landing model was smaller than that of the Apollo program (with a total multi-launch LTO capacity of 45-50 tons). It was roughly comparable to or slightly larger than the Soviet Union’s N1. After 2010, the first manned lunar landing aimed for a total LTO capacity of 50+ tons. With the introduction of CZ-9, the actual total LTO capacity reached 75-85 tons (for heavy payload manned lunar missions). This actually aligns with the lunar mission capacity scale of the Ares V.
As a long-time enthusiast and observer of China’s heavy-lift rockets, I have been tracking the development details of CZ-9 for over 10 years. In the early literature, the diagrams of the 8-meter version of CZ-9 (three-and-a-half-stage configuration) never showed the upper attachment point of the boosters connected to the lower edge of the second stage. Therefore, I made a series of inferences years ago, speculating that due to certain issues (namely the first stage being necessarily short), the upper attachment point of the boosters might be connected to the second stage of the rocket.
This diagram (the first of its kind on the internet) confirms that my inference was valid. Indeed, CZ-9 has considered this design.
The image below is a diagram from the literature on the 8-meter version of CZ-9 that I provided during the major discussion in 2020. It primarily explains why the 8-meter version of the Long March 9 was not selected for the 2017 version of CZ-9. The reason is that the effective payload section of the 8-meter version was not tall enough. It also explains why the first stage of the 9.5-meter CZ-9 was designed with a "spread-out" configuration. Back then, all Chinese space enthusiasts were criticizing the structural design of CZ-9, particularly the "spread-out" first stage. However, no one truly understood the underlying reason for this design choice—except for me. Based on this understanding, I made two predictions: one was that the first stage of subsequent versions of CZ-9 would be lengthened (this has been confirmed between 2022 and 2023), and the other was that part of the boosters might be attached to the second stage (as seen in this recent literature).
If you compare the internal structure of this older 8-meter version of the Long March 9 (the third stage and payload section) with the third stage and payload section of the 8-meter version in this latest literature, you’ll understand why the first stage is shorter and why the upper attachment point of the boosters is connected to the lower part of the second stage.
This is also the reason why I have been critical of Starship. I’m not particularly interested in theoretical payload capacity; instead, I focus on the volume of the payload bay and the ability to release payloads in a single mission. This is the core reason why I don’t hold Starship in high regard. From the evolution of the different configurations of CZ-9, I’ve come to understand the problems that the official design aims to solve, which is why I predicted the future development trends of such configurations (to put it bluntly, why the first stage can’t be too long). Now, I’ve noticed that the first stage of the new Long March 9 has also been deliberately shortened, leaving more vertical space and payload envelope for the payload section.
Do you know what kind of inferences can be made based on this discovery? Observing whether my inferences align with future trends is the joy of my research.