China's SCS Strategy Thread

Totoro

Major
VIP Professional
Hypothetically, what effect would a Chinese pledge to give the Phillipines 10 billion dollars of aid each year (their govt budget is 75 billion) have, as long as they are to trade with China by a few percent more each year (even if it means it is at the expense of other countries)?
 

plawolf

Lieutenant General
Hypothetically, what effect would a Chinese pledge to give the Phillipines 10 billion dollars of aid each year (their govt budget is 75 billion) have, as long as they are to trade with China by a few percent more each year (even if it means it is at the expense of other countries)?

And why would China do that? $10bn per year is a ridiculously vast sum, especially when you consider that the Philippines only imports about $25bn from China (including HK) annually at current rates.

The latest trade figures available (May 2018) already shows a 19% increase compared to May2017, so that further undermines the case for such a lavish aid for trade programme since trade with China is already growing incredibly fast as is.

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!


The economic and geographic realities in Asia means China wields enormous economic levers from just its normal trade with its neighbors, with little to no need to have to supplement that with additional aid handouts.

Besides, China seems to be conceptual adversed to the practice of handing out aid money. It only tend to do so in the event of major disasters.

For routine assistance, the Chinese prefer low or no interest loans tied to investment far more.

I personally think the idea is the ‘teach a guy to fish’ philosophy, whereby China thinks handing out aid will only encourage recipients to become dependent on such handouts(which might be the whole point in certain countries preferring aid, as a means of ensuring continued dependence, and obedience); whereas getting countries to invest that money is a far more long term and sustainable way of helping those countries to stand on their own eventually.
 

Totoro

Major
VIP Professional
The whole question is how much would what level of "friendship" cost China. Imagine a full alliance, kind of US enjoys with Japan, where Japan gives bases. Imagine Chinese bases all around Philippines and how much that would be worth. Granted, that may not cost just 10 billion a year but more.

Point is, having access to extra bases farther into Pacific is of such immeasurable worth militarily wise that monetary price can't really put on it.

A) it threatens Guam with a wider range of weapons, as distance from nearest bases is now 2100 km.

B) it threatens Taiwan and Okinawa from an additional direction, complicating their defenses.

C) it secures SCS and south Chinese coast to a much greater degree.

D) it ties up a lot more of US assets as US suddenly has to keep monitoring the entire area between first and second island chain.

E) it basically gives PLAN proper access into pacific, with a fair chance of survival for it's various submarines as they are entering it. (Both for ssn and ssbn) That in turn ties a lot more us subs and assets to a vast area of pacific.

Basically, if compared to how much money is spent on various other stuff, including certain aspects of the military budget, the return on investment could be much, much better.

*IF* friendship can be bought with money. Which likely may not be the case. And certainly US would cry foul and portray such aid as something unholy and might respond with getting much, much more aggressive towards China.
 

Equation

Lieutenant General
The whole question is how much would what level of "friendship" cost China. Imagine a full alliance, kind of US enjoys with Japan, where Japan gives bases. Imagine Chinese bases all around Philippines and how much that would be worth. Granted, that may not cost just 10 billion a year but more.

No the US occupied Japan right after nuking them and made it to be a vassal state for the US interests during the Cold War era.

Point is, having access to extra bases farther into Pacific is of such immeasurable worth militarily wise that monetary price can't really put on it.
That's what air craft carriers are for and nuclear subs as well.

A) it threatens Guam with a wider range of weapons, as distance from nearest bases is now 2100 km.
H-20 and China's long range missiles are plenty not to mention with the future H-20 coming in 2025.

B) it threatens Taiwan and Okinawa from an additional direction, complicating their defenses.
China's continuing upgrade of it's surface vessels into a blue water navy are already plenty.

C) it secures SCS and south Chinese coast to a much greater degree.
China's artificial islands to secure it's sovereignty has already existed.

D) it ties up a lot more of US assets as US suddenly has to keep monitoring the entire area between first and second island chain.
China's rise has already tied up the US monitoring in every facets from military, space, intelligence, AI research, quantum researches, and super computers. Not to China's rising economy and international influences without regime changing has won many friends.

E) it basically gives PLAN proper access into pacific, with a fair chance of survival for it's various submarines as they are entering it. (Both for ssn and ssbn) That in turn ties a lot more us subs and assets to a vast area of pacific.
The deep waters in the SCS has provided that already. China's submarines don't need a clean clear avenues of approach in order to access to the ocean.

.
 

plawolf

Lieutenant General
The whole question is how much would what level of "friendship" cost China. Imagine a full alliance, kind of US enjoys with Japan, where Japan gives bases. Imagine Chinese bases all around Philippines and how much that would be worth. Granted, that may not cost just 10 billion a year but more.

Point is, having access to extra bases farther into Pacific is of such immeasurable worth militarily wise that monetary price can't really put on it.

A) it threatens Guam with a wider range of weapons, as distance from nearest bases is now 2100 km.

B) it threatens Taiwan and Okinawa from an additional direction, complicating their defenses.

C) it secures SCS and south Chinese coast to a much greater degree.

D) it ties up a lot more of US assets as US suddenly has to keep monitoring the entire area between first and second island chain.

E) it basically gives PLAN proper access into pacific, with a fair chance of survival for it's various submarines as they are entering it. (Both for ssn and ssbn) That in turn ties a lot more us subs and assets to a vast area of pacific.

Basically, if compared to how much money is spent on various other stuff, including certain aspects of the military budget, the return on investment could be much, much better.

*IF* friendship can be bought with money. Which likely may not be the case. And certainly US would cry foul and portray such aid as something unholy and might respond with getting much, much more aggressive towards China.

A weak ally is worse than no ally, and one you can buy with money could just as easily be bought by someone else.

It was only a few short years ago when the US was signing agreements to re-establish their old military bases in the Philippines. What assurances would China have that the Phillipines won’t just flip flop back if America makes them a better offer?

The Phillipines is too weak and chaotic as is, if they swing fully into China’s camp and allowed China to set up military bases all over their territory, you can pretty much guarantee that the CIA will be throwing everything they have into staging a coup. Failing that, they will just light the fires for a civil war and keep throwing petrol on it until the whole place implodes like Syria.

Just look at how Russia was sucked into the whole Syrian mess to bail out their weak ally Assad. Going further back, America has also tasted the bitter blowback from failed attempts to prop up weak allies as was the case in the Korean and Vietnam wars. While the Soviet Union had similar nightmares in Afghanistan.

The Philippines is also too far from China, making supply lines for any Chinese forces based in country long and difficult to secure.

You also have to take into account all the other relationships your allies have, since such a strong embrace of the Philippines would almost certainly make the neighbours they have conflicting territorial claims feel like China is now going to take the side of the Philippines, which may cause them to also seek stronger protectors themselves.

If China was seriously worried about breaking into the Pacific deep waters, securing Taiwan would be a far far more worthwhile play. Might as well promise Taiwan $10bn in ‘aid’ every year if they peacefully reunite with the mainland. Or buy $10bn more arms every year in preparation for taking Taiwan by force.

If push comes to shove, China’s military options are far more robust in a Taiwan scenario than trying to prop up the Philippines government in the face of an American orchestrated civil war, and later direct US military intervention in said civil war, going by the Libyan and Syrian playbooks.

If anything, such an extended military campaign will likely weaken Chinese capabilities to take Taiwan by force if separatist forces seek to capitalise on China already being extended in the Philippines to declare independence.

Pushing deeper into the Pacific via the Philippines only really makes sense if China was seeking to try to take the fight to the Americans.

That is simply too ambitious for China’s military capabilities, and will be an unwise play for probably decades at current trends.

Besides, I don’t really see the point in obsessing with breaking through the various island chains.

China is building the SCS up as its SSBN bastion.

The SCS is large and deep enough to easily allow Chinese boomers to disappear, and the new gen SLBMs China is developing should give those boats enough reach to hit all of the US without having to leave the SCS.

That is a far more secure second strike capability than having your SSBNs playing hide and seek unsupported by friendly forces while being effectively surrounded by hostile ASW assets, as they would be in the Pacific.
 
The whole question is how much would what level of "friendship" cost China. Imagine a full alliance, kind of US enjoys with Japan, where Japan gives bases. Imagine Chinese bases all around Philippines and how much that would be worth. Granted, that may not cost just 10 billion a year but more.

Point is, having access to extra bases farther into Pacific is of such immeasurable worth militarily wise that monetary price can't really put on it.

A) it threatens Guam with a wider range of weapons, as distance from nearest bases is now 2100 km.

B) it threatens Taiwan and Okinawa from an additional direction, complicating their defenses.

C) it secures SCS and south Chinese coast to a much greater degree.

D) it ties up a lot more of US assets as US suddenly has to keep monitoring the entire area between first and second island chain.

E) it basically gives PLAN proper access into pacific, with a fair chance of survival for it's various submarines as they are entering it. (Both for ssn and ssbn) That in turn ties a lot more us subs and assets to a vast area of pacific.

Basically, if compared to how much money is spent on various other stuff, including certain aspects of the military budget, the return on investment could be much, much better.

*IF* friendship can be bought with money. Which likely may not be the case. And certainly US would cry foul and portray such aid as something unholy and might respond with getting much, much more aggressive towards China.

As far as I know, The Philippine Constitution currently prohibits foreign military bases on Philippine territories. This is why the US troops are considered visitors and not allowed to have a permanent base in Philippine soil. Hence any discussion on this matter is a waste of time.
 

Totoro

Major
VIP Professional
The whole underlying point of my post is basically this: Bases are much, much more cost effective than long range aircraft, carriers, missiles etc. (which is why all those islands in SCS are so powerful) That's not to say bases aren't hugely expensive. They are, more so than carriers, planes etc. But they also have persistence, making them much more powerful. So instead of investing just in weapons, is there any political opportunity for China to invest in some bases that would protect China from US? Basically, I see only Philippines as any sort of opportunity for China there, in the coming decades. Certainly Taiwan will remain a status quo (though if possible to "buy" its friendship with mere dozens of billions per year, it'd be more than worth it). And I don't see Japan kicking out US out in our lifetimes.
 

Equation

Lieutenant General
The whole underlying point of my post is basically this: Bases are much, much more cost effective than long range aircraft, carriers, missiles etc. (which is why all those islands in SCS are so powerful) That's not to say bases aren't hugely expensive. They are, more so than carriers, planes etc. But they also have persistence, making them much more powerful. So instead of investing just in weapons, is there any political opportunity for China to invest in some bases that would protect China from US? Basically, I see only Philippines as any sort of opportunity for China there, in the coming decades. Certainly Taiwan will remain a status quo (though if possible to "buy" its friendship with mere dozens of billions per year, it'd be more than worth it). And I don't see Japan kicking out US out in our lifetimes.

Bottom line it doesn't matter what Japan, US, or Taiwan regime are trying to do to check China. It is costing them more money and lives as China continues to grow stronger militarily and economically to eventually upstage the current status quo.
 
... what I now noticed, which is (dated August 16, 2018) PHL eyes to complete repair of Pagasa Island runway in 2019
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana said that the target is to complete the beaching ramp in Pagasa Island this year for the repair of runway be implemented next year.

“Currently, they are trying to build the beaching ramp, we need the beaching ramp because without that, we cannot bring in equipment. We cannot bring in the bulldozers, the graders plus the materials to rebuild the runway,” Lorenzana said on Tuesday.

If the projections on the repair of Pagasa Island facilities run smoothly, a Philippine Air Force (PAF) C-130 aircraft will be able to land at the said island any day.

“Now the target for building the beaching ramp is December of this year so that by the whole of next year is repairing the runway. So by the end of 2019 we can bring the C130s there any day,” the defense chief said.

Secretary Lorenzana made the statement after US transferred Special Airborne Mission Installation and Response (SABIR) system, installed on PAF C-130 aircraft.

“The transfer of the SABIR system today, along with the Scan Eagle system this past March, and the C-208 aircraft in August 2017, represents our steadfast commitment to enhancing the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,” said US Ambassador to the Philippines Sung Y. Kim.

The SABIR, a bolt-on avionics module, upgrades the aircraft with advanced command and control, communications, computer, and surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities without sacrificing the aircraft’s primary function as a cargo plane.

Sources:
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
(they're talking
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
)
 
Top