...Continued
The Best Response: Transition to a Stable and Mutually Beneficial Balance in Asia
Given the strategic circumstances outlined above, fundamental U.S. security interests are best served by maintaining the credibility of our defense arrangements in East Asia while focusing on economic development over military rivalry. At the same time, it is necessary to recognize and take into account China’s own vital security interests and concerns, which include keeping Taiwan within a one China framework and defending its homeland against external threats.
The security imperatives of China and the United States are potentially, but not inherently, incompatible. They become incompatible only if neither side is willing to accommodate, in some fashion, to the other’s fundamental interests.
The solution is not for the United States to double down militarily, spending vast amounts of money in a futile attempt to remain militarily predominant across all of maritime East Asia. Such an approach would be virtually certain to result in an intensifying arms race and political rivalry with Beijing that would undermine the basis for vital Sino-U.S. cooperation in other areas. At worst, it could generate a new Cold War that benefits no one.
Washington also needs to adapt its security posture in the region to one that the U.S. economy can sustain, and the U.S. polity can endorse, especially given America’s myriad domestic priorities.
We judge that the United States can best meet all these requirements and best protect its interests—and those of its allies and partners in the region—by working with China and other countries to transition toward a stable balance of power in East Asia, and a more integrated and dynamic regional economic network that benefits all.
Maintaining a stable security environment requires retaining a robust U.S. alliance network, supplemented by an expanding set of mutually verifiable understandings with Beijing, U.S. allies and other Asian powers.
These understandings would be aimed at stabilizing the military balance with China at a level both sides can live with. Each side would possess capabilities sufficient to deter the other from using force to resolve serious differences, but would lack the clear superiority that could, in the eyes of the other, foster aggressive intentions or stimulate an arms race.
Such understandings must also aim at defusing and demilitarizing the most contentious issues in the region, from North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs—which threaten to restrict U.S. freedom of action in defending itself and its allies—to Taiwan and the maritime disputes across the Asian littoral. Managing or resolving these issues can be achieved most optimally in the context of a regional balance.
Achieving a more integrated and dynamic economic region would require the United States, China and other Asian economies to strengthen their domestic economic growth and to rationalize their trade relationships. Most importantly, successful long-term economic integration will depend on Beijing and Washington agreeing to join a common trade architecture, creating an eventual region-wide free-trade agreement. This will require more active and focused U.S. economic diplomacy that maximizes Chinese incentives to work with Washington to strengthen the global economic structure.
For Washington, this process will require a consistency of purpose that goes beyond tactical short-term cooperation with Beijing on bilateral issues, while hedging against downside scenarios by reconfiguring U.S. military capabilities and selectively strengthening our alliances in the region. It will also require strengthening diplomatic efforts and coordinating them more closely with our military efforts. Economically, it will require—but will also facilitate, by making our East Asia strategy more cost-effective—the rejuvenation of the vital foundations of American growth, such as improving national infrastructure, managing the nation’s mounting national debt, reducing income inequality and limiting spiraling entitlements.
For Beijing, which is confronting its own domestic priorities, this process will similarly require better policy coordination and consistency. But it should also promote stable economic and social development inside China. Beijing’s many problems and needs strongly suggest that it would be receptive to reaching the kind of stable and mutually beneficial balance outlined above.
Working From Strength, Not Weakness
If mishandled, the above approach could be perceived as a sign of weakening U.S. resolve to preserve a military environment in East Asia sufficient to reassure our allies and friends. This risk is well worth taking, however, and can be minimized or eliminated altogether through strong U.S. initiatives that more effectively leverage America’s many strengths and a clear recognition by all of the even greater dangers posed by efforts to dominate East Asia or to “muddle through” on a piecemeal basis.
This pursuit of a stable U.S.-China balance and greater economic integration in East Asia is an approach better suited to what our economy can sustain over the long run and strikes a better balance between our external security interests, our international responsibilities and our domestic requirements. It rests on the effective use of America’s substantial military and economic power, both globally and regionally, and anticipates that the United States will remain a powerful and influential nation in the world for decades to come. And it assumes that Washington, with the support of its allies and friends, can retain a leadership role in Asia in a manner that is reassuring to all regional powers, including China.
Joseph W. Prueher is a former career U.S. Naval officer, having served as Commander of the Pacific Command, and after retiring from the Navy, as U.S. Ambassador to China for Presidents Clinton and Bush (1999-2001). He has also worked in academia and serves on the boards of U.S. corporations and nonprofit organizations.
J. Stapleton Roy is a former senior career U.S. diplomat specializing in Asian affairs. He served as U.S. ambassador in Singapore (1984–86), the People's Republic of China (1991–95), and Indonesia (1996–99). He was also director of the Kissinger Institute for Chinese-U.S. Studies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
Paul Heer is a former career U.S. intelligence official who served as National Intelligence Officer for East Asia from 2007 to 2015. During 2015-6, he was a Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow at the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
David M. Lampton is Professor and Director of China Studies at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and is former President of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations.
Michael D. Swaine is a career policy analyst specializing in Asian security issues, especially those involving the U.S.-China relationship. He was a Senior Political Scientist at The RAND Corporation from 1989-2001 and is currently a Senior Fellow in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Ezra Vogel is Henry Ford II Professor of the Social Sciences Emeritus, Harvard University, a former director of the Asia Center and Fairbank Center, Harvard University, and served as National Intelligence Officer for East Asia from 1993 to 1995.
