Last week the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled overwhelmingly in favor of the Philippines in its case against China’s South China Sea (SCS) claims. The nearly 500 page ruling undercut Beijing’s claims to control all the land features and water inside China’s nine-dash line and concluded that the disputed land features are either rocks that generate small (12 nautical miles) territorial seas or low-tide elevations that convey no exclusive rights to exploit resources. Although the ruling—and much of the surrounding analysis—has necessarily placed considerable emphasis on sovereignty disputes in the SCS, less attention has been given to the underlying incentives that drive claimant positions and behaviors.
Given its power and recent assertiveness in the South China Sea, China’s interests deserve special attention. Aside from enlarging China’s security perimeter, China’s regional interests can be roughly lumped into three “P”s—politics, petroleum, and proteins (fish). The last of these interests, competition over dwindling SCS fisheries, may be most consequential in driving competition, but has not received sufficient analytic attention.
Although the SCS covers only 2.5 percent of the Earth’s surface, it is home to some of the world’s richest reef systems and over 3,000 indigenous and migratory fish species, comprising some 12 percent of the total global fish catch. Unfortunately, the region’s fisheries are in serious jeopardy. As of 2008, virtually all
are collapsed (roughly 25 percent), over-exploited (roughly 25 percent), or fully-exploited (roughly 50 percent). The situation is only worsening.
The most important aspect of the Spratly Island disputes is not oil or sovereignty—it is whether or not SCS fish continue to appear on Asia’s menus. Four trends in particular are important: sustainability, economic importance, rising demand, and declining access.
The First Trend: Sustainability
Three indicators reveal the extent of SCS fishery degradation. First, catches have remained an unsustainable 10-12 million tons per year for decades—
when Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing is incorporated. Steady catches mask a serious problem: catches increasingly consist of smaller species whose populations have boomed as natural predators have been overfished—a phenomenon commonly referred to as “fishing down the food web.”
Secondly, fishermen Catch Per Unit Effort (CPUE)
over the last several decades as fishermen are forced to spend more time and fuel to bring in the same amount of fish from shrinking fisheries. Destructive practices, including the use of coral-damaging bottom trawlers, muro-ami nets, or even dynamite and cyanide are often employed to squeeze more from dwindling fisheries.
Third, critical habitats are disappearing. A
of maritime studies found that in just the last 10-15 years, SCS coral coverage rates in disputed regions have declined from over 60 percent to just 20 percent. Reefs along China’s coastline are in even worse shape, and have declined over 80 percent in the last several decades.
The Second Trend: Economic Importance
The fishing industry continues to be critical to China’s economy. Fishing revenues make up about 3 percent of China’s GDP and
(1.732 trillion RMB) annually. Perhaps more importantly, China employs between 7 and 9 million fishermen (over 14 million industry-wide) who operate
(nearly 200,000 are ocean-going vessels) comprising the largest fleet on Earth. Many of these workers have little option for alternative employment.
The Third Trend: Rising Demand
Fish is increasingly important to the Chinese diet. China’s fish consumption grew annually at 6 percent between 1990 and 2010, and China consumes 34 percent of the global fish food supply, nearly triple that of Europe and Central Asia combined, and over five times the amount of North America. Furthermore,
estimates China’s fish consumption will increase 30 percent to over 41 kilograms per capita by 2030, more than double the projected global average. Although aquaculture accounts for the majority of China’s fish production (73.6 percent), growing demand threatens to outstrip supply, necessitating ongoing expansion of maritime fishing operations—the vast majority of which (78 percent) occur in Chinese-claimed waters, including the South China Sea.
The Fourth Trend: Declining Access
China perceives its access to disputed fisheries as declining. Three categories of grievances are commonly cited. First, China’s fishing bans and sustainability efforts are commonly ignored by foreigners, leading to complaints that Chinese restrictions allow foreigners free access to fish without Chinese competition. In
, Vietnamese fishermen reportedly caught 110,000 tons of SCS tuna compared to China’s 300 tons; a data point that seemingly confirmed fears that regulations undercut China’s potential profits.
Second,
foreign fishermen are “killing the chicken to harvest its eggs” (杀鸡取卵) through overfishing or using destructive practices. Some of this is understandable—while China has made gains in domestic regulation, the millions of “small-boat” fishermen employed by the region’s developing economies pose a serious challenge to governance and sustainability.
Third, Chinese fishermen widely complain of foreign harassment.
that between 1989 and 2011 there were over 360 cases of attacks, robberies, detainments, or shootings, with 25 Chinese fishermen killed or missing. Fear of interference has reportedly deterred Chinese fishermen from venturing into some disputed fisheries—although China historically issues around 500 Spratly Island fishing permits, far less fishermen reportedly travel to the region (prior to 2013) due to concerns over interference.
