Imo, the PLAGF + PLANMC together with the 500k or so PAP should be enough for simultaneous LSCO against Japan/ROC, India, and on the Korean peninsula, which is the most that would realistically happen (perhaps with a small force left to deter Vietnam). Imo only personnel who train regularly with mechanized combat and other high end capabilities like we see the PAP do would be realistically useful in combat in these HIC contingencies, reserves & militia let alone retirees can be basically discounted.
China's Auxiliary Forces - PAP and Militia
- Thread starter tamsen_ikard
- Start date
Can you please enlighten how will PLA manage the desired force ratios in Taiwan Strait, East China Sea & in both Tibet and Xinjiang Military Regions & also take care of SCS.
Just for your information latest US DoD report assessed Tibet Military Region as having 4 Combined-Arms Brigades
While better technology, unlimited production capacities are very good, boots on ground are also required
Would be grateful for the basis of your Assessment
WTC with a moderate amount of reinforcement from other TCs (particularly STC) should be enough to handle any necessary offensive operations against India (I primarily envision offensive ops into Zangnan/the rest of NE India). The NTC similarly reinforced (CTC) will be enough to roll over the ROK + USFK, assuming the DPRK permits an invasion. The PLANMC & PLAGF amphibious brigades can handle any island seizure operations within the 1IC. The PLA will not realistically be doing anything else (ie invading Japanese home islands, Philippines etc) anyway. No other ground forces need be committed against the US or allies because it's an aeronaval war.
Any offensive operations would probably still fall exclusively onto PLAGF units to execute but the PAP can play a crucial role in supporting/cleanup ops to free up GF units for redeployment.
Any invasion of Taiwan does not need to be rushed and if necessary can be delayed (with blockade/aerial campaign in place) until operations elsewhere conclude and forces freed up.
The scenario above would probably be close to the maximum feasible though, for example another simultaneous ground campaign against Vietnam might be too much for the current ground forces to handle, but that's just unrealistic.
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Regarding overall personnel numbers, my understanding is that the three uniformed services (PLA, PAP, Militia) have:
- PLA, active force: 2,035,000
- PLA, reserve force: 510,000 (lower confidence, given current restructuring, but unlikely to be higher)
- PAP, active force: 500,000 (includes the Coast Guard)
- Militia (primary): 8,000,000 (includes the Maritime Militia)
- Militia (ordinary): Theoretically massive, but in practice more-or-less indinstinguishable from drafting untrained recruits
We're discussing ground forces... The PLAGF has about 960k active.
Then it'd be:
- PLA, active ground forces elements (PLAA, PLANMC, PLAAFAC): 1,035,000
- PLA, reserve ground forces elements: 459,000 (AFAIK ~90% of reserve personnel)
- PAP, active ground forces elements: 460,000 (without the Coast Guard)
- Militia (primary): 6,300,000? (without the Maritime Militia - note the MM figure of 1.7 million is *very* dated)
Do PMCs count
The latest images of PAP members' shooting training show a relatively high usage rate of scopes.
