China IRBM/SRBM (and non-ICBM/SLBM) thread

[nativechicken]

China's production capacity for special heavy-duty truck chassis is very strong. Globally, the only countries that previously had mass production capabilities for such chassis were Russia (almost all multi-axle off-road chassis for heavy ballistic missiles were developed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War; Chinese research literature in this area basically has no reference points other than the Soviet Union/Russia). Europe, Japan, and the U.S. all produce heavy trucks, but they are essentially standard highway types. Considering current industrial capabilities and the state of Russia's automotive industry, China is now the world's largest producer and consumer of multi-axle off-road heavy trucks. China's advanced heavy trucks (pure electric, hybrid + autonomous driving) have already begun to be used in mining and transportation construction (a famous 5G+AI demonstration by Huawei involves hundreds of unmanned new-energy heavy trucks and machinery participating in unmanned excavation and transportation in mining areas/transportation projects).
Therefore, I don't quite understand why there would be a limit of 300 launch vehicles. Of course, if you're referring to organizational constraints within China, I acknowledge that.
Actually, someone earlier mentioned that the quantity and scale of China's medium-range ballistic missiles might not match Iran's. I actually agree with that statement.
The reason is simple: they involve two different technologies. Iran's medium-range ballistic missiles are primarily liquid toxic-fuel missiles at the level of DF-1/DF-2/DF-3/DF-4/HQ-2 modifications. China's ballistic missiles have long been entirely solid-fuel rockets.
Liquid-fuel missile production and management are relatively simpler. Solid-fuel missiles are a different matter entirely, especially regarding fuel casting and curing, which have a cycle.
Simply put, what limits the production of DF-26/27/31/41/61 is actually the cycle of the casting line and fuel curing/demolding.
So, mass production of solid-fuel missiles definitely cannot achieve the level of Iran's liquid ballistic missiles, which produce hundreds per month—at least not currently.
However, based on my estimates, China should currently have the capacity to produce 150-200 solid-fuel ballistic missiles per year at the DF-31/DF-41/DF-61 level and above.
Among these, a capacity of about 100 missiles per year was likely added around 2020. This is because China earlier established a requirement for rapid-response rockets, with a planned usage of about 20 launches per year, targeting deployment around 2020. The required rapid-response rockets are at the scale of the CZ-11. Most of the civilian solid-fuel rocket plans you see now are targeting this market. Rapid-response rockets are for emergency satellite replenishment launches, requiring launch windows to be completed within 1-2 days. The scale of the CZ-11 rocket is roughly at the DF-41/DF-61 level, which is comparable to the Trident II D5—about 60 tons. China could also build at the MX Peacekeeper scale, but that's somewhat too large.
The fuel casting weight for one DF-31 is about twice that of a DF-26, and for a DF-41/61, it's about 3 to 3.5 times that of a DF-26.
So, you can calculate China's annual production of solid-fuel medium-range ballistic missiles.
My data is self-collected and only approximate, with no authority—just take it as you will.
The production scale of solid-fuel ballistic missiles mainly depends on fuel casting plants, as well as casting processes and facilities. China is number one in specialized mixers and spent some years resolving this (before 2010).
China has long envied the large solid-fuel casting capabilities of the U.S., Europe, and India. Before 2020, China's solid-fuel casting was mainly focused on the tens-of-tons scale (not exceeding 50 tons), not the 600-800 ton continuous casting capacity of the U.S. Europe and India had achieved hundred-ton-level continuous casting.
It was only after 2015 that China determined to develop heavy solid launch vehicles (targeting the Space Shuttle, Ares, SLS solid booster scale), with completion planned for 2030-2035.
Currently (around 2024-2025), China has surpassed Europe and India in hundred-ton-level solid-fuel rocket technology.
Believe me, the Chinese understand their specific shortcomings and aspirations better than you might think. China has long had the technical capability to develop hundred-ton-level solid-fuel launch vehicle technology. Why was it suppressed for many years? The core reason was to first allow the transition to liquid fuel, especially the new generation of low-temperature non-toxic fuels. Within the space enthusiast community, the entire aerospace and military industry has endured 10-20 years of criticism and ridicule for lagging behind Japan and India in certain areas. They've long been holding back frustration.
Don't worry about China's ballistic missile production capacity. To put it bluntly, most of Iran's produced ballistic missiles are short-range liquid-fuel missiles with ranges under 1000 km. Their actual propellant load is mostly under 10 tons. China's production capacity is sufficient, and the production bases and equipment are much smaller. In the future, combined with hypersonic technology (hypersonic vehicles as the second stage of rockets), the firepower intensity for 2000 km+ ranges should still be quite impressive.

 

[ismellcopium]

China's production capacity for special heavy-duty truck chassis is very strong. Globally, the only countries that previously had mass production capabilities for such chassis were Russia (almost all multi-axle off-road chassis for heavy ballistic missiles were developed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War; Chinese research literature in this area basically has no reference points other than the Soviet Union/Russia). Europe, Japan, and the U.S. all produce heavy trucks, but they are essentially standard highway types. Considering current industrial capabilities and the state of Russia's automotive industry, China is now the world's largest producer and consumer of multi-axle off-road heavy trucks. China's advanced heavy trucks (pure electric, hybrid + autonomous driving) have already begun to be used in mining and transportation construction (a famous 5G+AI demonstration by Huawei involves hundreds of unmanned new-energy heavy trucks and machinery participating in unmanned excavation and transportation in mining areas/transportation projects).
Therefore, I don't quite understand why there would be a limit of 300 launch vehicles. Of course, if you're referring to organizational constraints within China, I acknowledge that.
Actually, someone earlier mentioned that the quantity and scale of China's medium-range ballistic missiles might not match Iran's. I actually agree with that statement.
The reason is simple: they involve two different technologies. Iran's medium-range ballistic missiles are primarily liquid toxic-fuel missiles at the level of DF-1/DF-2/DF-3/DF-4/HQ-2 modifications. China's ballistic missiles have long been entirely solid-fuel rockets.
Liquid-fuel missile production and management are relatively simpler. Solid-fuel missiles are a different matter entirely, especially regarding fuel casting and curing, which have a cycle.
Simply put, what limits the production of DF-26/27/31/41/61 is actually the cycle of the casting line and fuel curing/demolding.
So, mass production of solid-fuel missiles definitely cannot achieve the level of Iran's liquid ballistic missiles, which produce hundreds per month—at least not currently.
However, based on my estimates, China should currently have the capacity to produce 150-200 solid-fuel ballistic missiles per year at the DF-31/DF-41/DF-61 level and above.
Among these, a capacity of about 100 missiles per year was likely added around 2020. This is because China earlier established a requirement for rapid-response rockets, with a planned usage of about 20 launches per year, targeting deployment around 2020. The required rapid-response rockets are at the scale of the CZ-11. Most of the civilian solid-fuel rocket plans you see now are targeting this market. Rapid-response rockets are for emergency satellite replenishment launches, requiring launch windows to be completed within 1-2 days. The scale of the CZ-11 rocket is roughly at the DF-41/DF-61 level, which is comparable to the Trident II D5—about 60 tons. China could also build at the MX Peacekeeper scale, but that's somewhat too large.
The fuel casting weight for one DF-31 is about twice that of a DF-26, and for a DF-41/61, it's about 3 to 3.5 times that of a DF-26.
So, you can calculate China's annual production of solid-fuel medium-range ballistic missiles.
My data is self-collected and only approximate, with no authority—just take it as you will.
The production scale of solid-fuel ballistic missiles mainly depends on fuel casting plants, as well as casting processes and facilities. China is number one in specialized mixers and spent some years resolving this (before 2010).
China has long envied the large solid-fuel casting capabilities of the U.S., Europe, and India. Before 2020, China's solid-fuel casting was mainly focused on the tens-of-tons scale (not exceeding 50 tons), not the 600-800 ton continuous casting capacity of the U.S. Europe and India had achieved hundred-ton-level continuous casting.
It was only after 2015 that China determined to develop heavy solid launch vehicles (targeting the Space Shuttle, Ares, SLS solid booster scale), with completion planned for 2030-2035.
Currently (around 2024-2025), China has surpassed Europe and India in hundred-ton-level solid-fuel rocket technology.
Believe me, the Chinese understand their specific shortcomings and aspirations better than you might think. China has long had the technical capability to develop hundred-ton-level solid-fuel launch vehicle technology. Why was it suppressed for many years? The core reason was to first allow the transition to liquid fuel, especially the new generation of low-temperature non-toxic fuels. Within the space enthusiast community, the entire aerospace and military industry has endured 10-20 years of criticism and ridicule for lagging behind Japan and India in certain areas. They've long been holding back frustration.
Don't worry about China's ballistic missile production capacity. To put it bluntly, most of Iran's produced ballistic missiles are short-range liquid-fuel missiles with ranges under 1000 km. Their actual propellant load is mostly under 10 tons. China's production capacity is sufficient, and the production bases and equipment are much smaller. In the future, combined with hypersonic technology (hypersonic vehicles as the second stage of rockets), the firepower intensity for 2000 km+ ranges should still be quite impressive.

The US produced more than 30 solid fueled ICBMs every month in the 60s. Those "estimates" seem pulled out of your ass.

 

[nativechicken]

The US produced more than 30 solid fueled ICBMs every month in the 60s. Those "estimates" seem pulled out of your ass.

I’m a bit puzzled about what I said that made you so agitated. In this post, I don’t seem to have mentioned any comparison with the peak production numbers of U.S. ballistic missiles. I only mentioned that, based on my current estimate, China’s intercontinental ballistic missile production capacity is around 150–200 units per year. Through a comparison of propellant loading, I suggested that everyone could roughly calculate China’s medium-range ballistic missile production capability themselves.

What I’ve been explaining is that China’s production capacity for solid-fuel medium-range ballistic missiles cannot exceed Iran’s claimed monthly output of hundreds of liquid-fuel medium-range ballistic missiles (according to Chinese military enthusiasts, Iran’s figure is 350–450 per month).

I’m not sure why you’re angry or think I’m talking nonsense by dismissing the U.S.’s Minuteman III production capacity of 30 units per month in the 1960s. I don’t recall saying anything like that.

What I said was about China’s ballistic missile launch vehicles: multi-axle off-road heavy trucks. China currently has the world’s largest production capacity for such vehicles. Has the U.S. ever developed launch vehicles of this type? The Minuteman III and Peacekeeper MX are silo-based ICBMs; only the Midgetman was road-mobile, and that vehicle was highway-configured, possibly even a semi-trailer—I can’t recall exactly. The Peacekeeper might have considered mobile launch options, but it wasn’t an off-road heavy truck either. This is in response to someone earlier who thought China only had 300 launch vehicles (mainly for medium-range ballistic missiles). My point is that, in this regard, China’s production capacity isn’t constrained. If needed, hundreds or even thousands of such specialized off-road heavy trucks could be added in a single year.

 

[nativechicken]

The US produced more than 30 solid fueled ICBMs every month in the 60s. Those "estimates" seem pulled out of your ass.

However, since you brought up the production capacity of U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles, I should note that I also consider the U.S.’s claimed production rate of 30 Minuteman missiles per month in the 1960s to be just roughly that. China’s current production capacity actually surpasses the peak U.S. ICBM production capacity of that era.
First, you must understand that the several variants of the U.S. Minuteman III fall in the 31–35 ton range. They were mass-produced between 1962 and 1969, and oddly enough, many were replaced and retired just 2–3 years after deployment. Moreover, there is no record of a large number of actual booster launches. According to U.S. data, during these years, the U.S. produced a total of 2,100 Minuteman III missiles of various types, but the peak deployment ceiling for the Minuteman program during the same period was only 1,000.
Do you know how I think about this? During the U.S.-Soviet rivalry, in the blind rush to produce ICBMs, due to new technology and excessively rapid production expansion, a large number of substandard Minuteman III missiles were actually manufactured. This explains why over 2,100 Minuteman III missiles, across four versions, were quickly produced between 1962 and 1969. More than 1,000 of the early versions were quickly retired (after only 3–4 years of deployment) and destroyed.
Therefore, your so-called production capacity of 30 ICBMs per month essentially refers to a batch of substandard, defective missiles. It’s not very meaningful.
Second, the Minuteman III is a 31–35 ton ICBM. I’m comparing it to the DF-31 series, which starts at 40 tons. The DF-41/DF-61 are at the level of the Trident II D5—60-ton class ICBMs.
Thus, the production capacity for one DF-41/DF-61 is at least equivalent to that of two Minuteman III-class ICBMs (in reality, it’s more).
Third, the technology of the Minuteman III is actually quite old. Its fuel composition and airframe materials are no longer used by China. In fact, the technical level of the Minuteman III is similar to that of China’s DF-31, which was test-fired before the 1999 military parade. However, China hardly deployed that generation of DF-31. Of course, I also have doubts about the Minuteman III’s data. The U.S. standard for ICBMs is based on its main rival, the Soviet Union—any missile with a range exceeding 5,500 km is called an ICBM (China defines an ICBM as having a range over 8,000 km). The U.S. and other Western countries, when describing weapons and equipment, tend to deliberately combine various extreme values (even theoretical calculations) to cite maximum figures. This is a typical marketing strategy of the military-industrial complex. If China and the U.S. were to strike each other, the distances are similar. For missiles of comparable technical level at this range, under the laws of geophysics, the range and payload should be nearly identical. However, Chinese military enthusiasts have consistently found that Chinese missiles of the same range have significantly lower payloads than their U.S. counterparts. Can you guess why? Look at how much the U.S. has exaggerated (or outright fabricated) in its weapons development. This scared the Chinese military-industrial system into working tirelessly for decades, only to eventually find itself unintentionally becoming the world leader. From the F-22’s lift coefficient, to the range and propulsion method of the AIM-120D, to the parameters of submarine high-strength steel, and even the pie-in-the-sky promises about sixth-generation fighters—before the truth came out, Chinese military enthusiasts were often mocked and disparaged by enthusiasts from other regions (mainly from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan).
In reality, the Minuteman’s level isn’t that high. Its rocket casing is steel, whereas the Trident II D5, Peacekeeper, and Midgetman use advanced composite materials. Moreover, the energetic materials in the rockets are vastly different (the Minuteman III is relatively ordinary, similar to the fuel used in civilian solid launch vehicles), and the design of the propellant grain core—which greatly affects production capacity—is also different.
Producing composite casings is much more troublesome than metal ones. Advanced energetic materials also lead to significantly different casting processes and risks. The complexity of the grain core design involves the sequence and process control of casting, as well as a series of details in demolding. The Minuteman III simply cannot be compared to advanced 21st-century ballistic missiles. The Minuteman III is a first-generation product in this industry, while China’s DF-41/DF-61 are third-generation products (the DF-26/DF-31AG are at the 2nd-3rd generation level).
Therefore, the annual production capacity of 150–200 Chinese ICBMs I mentioned is roughly equivalent to, if not exceeding, a production rate of 30 Minuteman IIIs per month. Do not doubt the capability of China, the largest industrial power in world history. During peacetime, China’s ICBM production capacity can easily surpass the peak production levels of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry era. What you should worry about is how much of the U.S.’s post-industrial era chemical industry capability and advanced high-energy material solid casting capacity remain. Although the SLS booster has a large propellant load (around 800 tons, I believe), its fuel composition is similar to the Minuteman III’s (a first-generation product). Moreover, a few months ago, a large U.S. solid rocket assembly plant exploded—some said it was for SLS boosters (I didn’t verify, as I’m not that concerned anymore). Nowadays, many seasoned military enthusiasts (and space enthusiasts) like myself no longer take the U.S. military industry seriously. The reason is simple: the highly skilled blue-collar workforce (what China calls "master craftsmen of a great nation") that the U.S. possessed before the 1990s is gone. The workers in today’s U.S. military-industrial system are often drug users, lack professional background, or are immigrants from Latin America or India. We (and I’m not alone) believe that unless the U.S. spends 30 years solving the systemic problems in its basic and higher education, it cannot fix this. Do you think the U.S. can solve it? Are you that confident? Therefore, in reality, the U.S. has permanently lost its qualification to be a peer competitor to China in military and industrial terms.
I hope you can understand what I’m saying.

 

[ismellcopium]

Therefore, the annual production capacity of 150–200 Chinese ICBMs

Ignoring all the other random, somewhat amusing nonsense spewed above, all I asked was how you derived this figure, of China's current production capacity, which you still haven't provided any evidence for.

 

[nativechicken]

Ignoring all the other random, somewhat amusing nonsense spewed above, all I asked was how you derived this figure, of China's current production capacity, which you still haven't provided any evidence for.

Around 2020, China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) each established new production lines capable of producing 20–30 solid-fuel launch vehicles per year. This was driven by the fast-response rocket market and the commercial satellite launch market. This is the designed capacity, though it hasn’t been fully utilized. The smallest fast-response solid launch vehicle is around 30 tons, as the satellites it launches need to meet requirements (small satellites of 100 kg). A 20-ton class vehicle like the DF-26 would only have an orbital payload of about 50 kg, and even that would require an integrated fairing and payload design (if a separable fairing is used, the payload would essentially be zero).

Previously, there was also the production capacity for intercontinental ballistic missiles, with at least 50 units per year.

Considering the timing of China’s construction of wind power bases (likely referring to silo construction), mid-course and exo-atmospheric missile defense, anti-satellite operations, and the deployment of submarine-based and land-based ICBMs, along with fast-response and commercial solid launch vehicles, a total production capacity reaching 150–200 units per year seems quite reasonable to me. The ballistic missiles required for these scenarios are all in the 30-ton class and above.

Finally, as I mentioned earlier, this is my personal estimate based on collected information. You can believe it or not—it doesn’t really matter to me. In fact, many are aware of a milestone around 2027 (I heard about this as early as 2017). China has always been preparing. There are reports that China has stockpiled many strategic key materials for up to 20 years (don’t ask me—Jin Canrong mentioned this; he learned it from U.S. think tanks and only then dared to discuss the 2027 matter. There are videos online; you can look them up). Back then, many opinions suggested China would build 320 wind power bases and fill them over 10 years. I can only say: if you think China would build hundreds of such facilities and leave most of them idle for a decade, I have nothing to add. There was also a time when it was believed China had only a few hundred strategic nuclear warheads, a figure recently adjusted to 1,000–1,500 by 2030. Again, I have nothing to refute.

I simply believe that China has the need, before 2027, to possess a genuine nuclear retaliatory capability sufficient to achieve mutual assured destruction with the United States. This must also account for attrition by U.S. missile defense systems, anticipated attacks on China’s satellite systems, and the possibility of some strategic weapons being destroyed in a first strike. Therefore, it would be best to have a reserve of 800–1,000 delivery vehicles capable of striking the U.S. mainland (with an estimated one-third actually launchable) to completely deter the U.S. from considering a tactical or strategic nuclear surprise attack on China. Hence, maintaining multiple production bases with a combined capacity of 150–200 units per year (accounting for redundancy) is not an unreasonable expectation.

 

[nativechicken]

Ignoring all the other random, somewhat amusing nonsense spewed above, all I asked was how you derived this figure, of China's current production capacity, which you still haven't provided any evidence for.

Some of the latest claims (as of 2026; you can find some of this data online using AI and Google Chinese search—I'm merely relaying) suggest:
China has approximately 10–12 DF-31 brigades. Assuming each brigade has 12 launcher vehicles and one reload per launcher, the maximum would be 12 × 12 × 2 = 288 DF-31s.
China has approximately 4–6 DF-41/61 brigades. Using the same calculation, the maximum would be 6 × 12 × 2 = 144 DF-41/61s.
The number of Type 094/094A submarines is roughly 6–9, with a maximum of 9 × 12 = 108 JL-2/JL-3 SLBMs.
The above maximum total is about 540 ICBMs (mobile + sea‑launched); a conservative estimate is 408 ICBMs.
Additionally, foreign media report that China has built three new heavy ballistic missile launch sites in the northwest, comprising roughly 320–360 silo‑based systems (Western analysts generally believe these silos would take 10–15 years to fully load, and that they are for DF‑31s; most Chinese military enthusiasts believe they are for upgraded DF‑41 variants like the DF‑61 and will be ready before 2027).
Plus the older liquid‑fueled, silo‑based DF‑5X systems, numbering 26–30 (this has been a long‑standing rumor, roughly that figure).
Furthermore, the Type 094/096 submarine program continues; the future total may reach about 20 boats (this is a long‑term projection, not within the 2027 timeframe).
China also has a rail‑based ICBM system (based on the DF‑41 class, possibly actually the DF‑61). Western outlets have reported test launches (China itself hasn’t officially acknowledged it), and it’s unclear whether it has been formally deployed.
Adding all the above together, the conservative figure is about 800, and a more aggressive estimate is around 900 heavy ICBM delivery vehicles.
In reality, China’s recognition that a nuclear conflict with the U.S. was possible emerged after Donald Trump took office in 2016–2017. In 2016, China and the U.S. nearly clashed in a large‑scale naval confrontation in the South China Sea. The U.S. strategy to strangle China had become unmistakably clear. At that time, China only had a few DF‑31 brigades, and outside observers often assumed each brigade had only six launchers. The U.S. began extensively simulating how to intervene in a Taiwan Strait conflict, with many scenarios including tactical nuclear strikes against Chinese coastal ports, especially naval bases. Later, China spoke of “changes unseen in a century,” and the 2027 timeline began circulating. The specific details are quite interesting, but I dare not elaborate here (though they have long been circulating within insider enthusiast circles; you can infer from what Jin Canrong has said). China then started preparing. In fact, as early as 2018–2019, people around me were trying to participate in the construction of those northwestern defense projects (just hoping to get a piece of the outermost earthwork contracts for profit).
Considering the plans for commercial rockets, fast‑response rockets, and the demand for high‑orbit interceptors, have you ever thought about this: if a full‑scale war breaks out between China and the U.S., assuming it doesn’t immediately escalate to nuclear annihilation, but merely involves attacks and defenses of space‑based satellite systems, how many replacement satellites would be needed? Currently, China’s various space‑based Earth‑observation constellations total about 500 satellites (I haven’t verified), and the U.S. military satellite fleet is at least 500–800. Low‑orbit anti‑satellite missiles don’t actually need to reach orbital velocity—a missile roughly the size of a Standard‑3 or slightly larger would suffice (for geosynchronous orbit, a 20–30‑ton class vehicle might be required). But for emergency satellite replenishment, 20 fast‑response rockets would be far from enough; at least 100 would be needed, because the payload of a fast‑response rocket likely wouldn’t exceed 450 kg (about the capacity of a CZ‑11). These are small satellites; both emergency replenishment and orbital maneuvering for reconnaissance consume fuel, so the operational lifespan of such replacement satellites isn’t very long.
Therefore, in the short term (actually within 6–7 years, accounting for decision‑making, coordination, construction, deployment of production bases, and training lead‑time), there is a demand for roughly 1,000 solid‑fuel rockets of 40 tons or more. That’s why I estimated a total annual production capacity of around 150–200 ICBMs (production capacity reserve and actual output are two different things—for example, China’s automotive industry has a total capacity of about 50 million vehicles, but actual utilization is around 35 million).