The reloads correlate with old DOD/CSBA numbers previously published IIRC.
Whether these are accurate today is another question
China IRBM/SRBM (and non-ICBM/SLBM) thread
- Thread starter Blitzo
- Start date
The reloads correlate with old DOD/CSBA numbers previously published IIRC.
Whether these are accurate today is another question
The PLARF has been retiring SRBMs and replacing them with longer-range missiles.
Some of the SRBM missions have been given to the Army.
But given we're likely to see Chinese military overmatch within a 1000km SRBM range, and SRBMs are relatively expensive.
Glide bombs and low-cost cruise missiles (such as Shaheeds) are a better option for large volumes of munitions.
There are still some advantages to SRBMs, mainly prompt striking capability.
Yes.
But then the lower cost glide bombs and cruise missiles will arrive a few hours afterwards, and China should have something like air superiority to cover the arrival of these munitions.
Looking at the overall ORBAT and from a requirements perspective, I think they would want to:
1. increase the number of reloads for the DF-26 and DF-17
2. ramp up DF-27 as fast as possible
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The rationale is that the Chinese Air Force can obtain air superiority close to mainland China, so the PLARF should focus on more distant targets in a protracted war scenario.
EDIT
If we're talking about 10 aircraft carriers, 10 LHDs, 80 Destroyers, 20 replenishment ships, plus Guam, and given the SM-3 and SM-6 production ramps - then my guess is that even 2000 DF-26 missiles isn't enough.
1. increase the number of reloads for the DF-26 and DF-17
2. ramp up DF-27 as fast as possible
---
The rationale is that the Chinese Air Force can obtain air superiority close to mainland China, so the PLARF should focus on more distant targets in a protracted war scenario.
EDIT
If we're talking about 10 aircraft carriers, 10 LHDs, 80 Destroyers, 20 replenishment ships, plus Guam, and given the SM-3 and SM-6 production ramps - then my guess is that even 2000 DF-26 missiles isn't enough.
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As mentioned, rightmost column is by far the most speculative. Numbers presented are really bottom estimates, maybe there should've been a "+" with every estimate. And indeed, reload multipliers are sort of leaning onto DoD reports on China estimates.
Iran comparison may or may not be apt. Iran doesn't have anything else but missiles and attack drones. So missiles are their only real way of heavily hitting something. It's perfectly plausible they *might* have more reloads per launcher than China's Rocket Force, on the average. Remember that a lot of Iranian launchers are short ranged systems which likely have many reloads. China has a much more powerful air force to rely on as well, in terms on bombs and other stand off weapons. And, unlike Iran, both China's air force, Army and Navy have additional missiles in stock. Remember that the Rocket Force is just one of several branches. The Chinese Army in particular might be considered a worthy unmentioned addition here - as it operates short range ballistic missile launchers. With so many PHL16 launchers, it is probably analogous to the whole lower third of the entire iranian BM arsenal. Yet those 300+ km ranged missiles are not included in this rocket force orbat because, clearly, they're army's systems, not rocket force's. Surely those PHL16s have a higher reload multiplier than rocket force's.
But I really don't want to get bogged down into that rightmost column of the PDF. That's least consequential. If anyone has further data that could help add missing brigades or identify systems in unknown brigades or update any figures on number of launchers etc - please do. That's much more important.
Iran comparison may or may not be apt. Iran doesn't have anything else but missiles and attack drones. So missiles are their only real way of heavily hitting something. It's perfectly plausible they *might* have more reloads per launcher than China's Rocket Force, on the average. Remember that a lot of Iranian launchers are short ranged systems which likely have many reloads. China has a much more powerful air force to rely on as well, in terms on bombs and other stand off weapons. And, unlike Iran, both China's air force, Army and Navy have additional missiles in stock. Remember that the Rocket Force is just one of several branches. The Chinese Army in particular might be considered a worthy unmentioned addition here - as it operates short range ballistic missile launchers. With so many PHL16 launchers, it is probably analogous to the whole lower third of the entire iranian BM arsenal. Yet those 300+ km ranged missiles are not included in this rocket force orbat because, clearly, they're army's systems, not rocket force's. Surely those PHL16s have a higher reload multiplier than rocket force's.
But I really don't want to get bogged down into that rightmost column of the PDF. That's least consequential. If anyone has further data that could help add missing brigades or identify systems in unknown brigades or update any figures on number of launchers etc - please do. That's much more important.
Though not in nuclear thread, it shows how absurd the FAS estimation of 620 warhead is given that this orbat is on the lower end of calculation.
Assuming that each nuclear capable missile estimated to exist has an estimated nuclear warhead ready for it is also an absurd proposition for an active and rapidly moving nuclear program like this one.
At the end of the day, estimations are simply that. Getting either offended or excited by them is an exercise in adolescent futility.
You’re overthinking it. Even at the peak of its strength, the U.S. military couldn’t possibly launch an attack with 10 aircraft carriers, 10 amphibious assault ships, and 80 destroyers all at once.
Also, you’ve missed a key point: SM-3 and SM-6 are essentially useless against real ASBMs. Iran’s ASBMs are actually quite primitive—their speed is low, and their accuracy is questionable (as seen in the terminal trajectory footage from Iran’s strikes on Israel, the technology appears to be at the level of the U.S. and USSR in the 1970s). Therefore, they pose very limited (almost negligible) threat to aircraft carriers. Most likely, the carriers could evade the attacks safely without even needing to use anti-aircraft missiles.
China’s ASBMs are on a different level. If you look deeply into the details of terminal guidance (there’s plenty of literature on this), you’ll see that SM-3 and SM-6 are basically ineffective. (SM-3 is designed for exo-atmospheric interception above 100 km, mainly for mid-course interception, not terminal phase. SM-6, developed from the SM-2, is intended for engaging sea-skimming low-altitude targets beyond 200 km and can also strike land or ship targets—it’s not designed for ballistic missile defense.)
So, apart from Guam, with 1,000 medium-range ballistic missiles, you could allocate nearly 10 missiles per ship. For aircraft carriers, China would consider a maximum of 7 missiles in a coordinated strike (ensuring warhead impact times are nearly simultaneous). Facing such a high-speed, precise, and saturated attack, survival is virtually impossible (and that includes China’s own forces—PS, as a military enthusiast, I’ve never considered U.S. anti-aircraft missile capabilities to be particularly strong).
Interesting math.
Assuming US and their allies at max strength and some, China will need:
100 x DF26 for 10 carriers
100 x DF26 for other large vessels such as supply ship and helicopter carrier
300 x DF26 for all targets on Guam, assuming all are hardened and require direct hit
300 x DF26 for Darwin airfield
200 x DF26 for other targets of opportunity
500 x DF26 in reserve
Altogether 1500 DF26, assuming 5 missiles per launcher that is 300 launchers. I think building 1500 DF26 requires very little effort, but 300 launchers they might be short, especially in trained personnel.