I noticed that everyone has been discussing a lot about using conventional ballistic missiles to target fleets as far as the Second Island Chain and beyond. However, I have two questions regarding this matter:
1. When deploying large numbers of conventional anti-ship ballistic missiles with ranges approaching or even reaching intercontinental levels, could this trigger nuclear misjudgment and subsequently lead to nuclear escalation?
I think in today's day and age with lots of countries especially China possessing (less-than-ICBM-range) ballistic missile capabilities, the threshold for nuclear miscalculation is thankfully likely to be higher than it would have been during the Cold War. If China launches 2 dozen DF-26s at Guam, the US is probably going to assume a conventional rather than a nuclear attack, for example. OTOH if one of those warheads turns out to be nuclear, the US is obviously going to assume every ballistic missile from then on is nuclear until proven otherwise.
2. Whether from Cold War experience or today"s context, detecting and tracking aircraft carriers remains crucial (one might argue it"s even more important than striking them). During the DF-21D era, we developed the WJ-8 as part of its supporting systems. Although space-based capabilities and other confirmed reconnaissance methods have emerged and strengthened, I believe stable tracking near the First Island Chain is feasible, but I have doubts about capabilities in more distant areas.
I"d like to hear everyone"s thoughts on these two issues.
I actually wouldn't even be remotely surprised if the Chinese military could now monitor the entire WestPac and nearby regions, i.e. Eastern Indian Ocean/Bay of Bengal, Singapore/Malacca Straits, Indonesia, PNG, Korea, Japan, Kurils, the Philippines, Australia, NZ, Guam, etc. by satellite. That entire strip of the world would need to be monitored for USN activity, especially in the leadup to a go at AR by China.
