If you're up against a peer opponent then your sparse network will get eaten alive by their full network, which is why you need tankers, forward bases, and/or carriers to project your own full network out to the relevant battlespace. And if you lack sufficient control within FIC to push your vulnerable support assets up that far, then the answer is to focus on securing that control instead of trying to half-ass a sparse SIC network.
"Sparseness" is a relative term
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By 2030, I expect the First Island Chain to be "secure"
China is producing over 100 5th gen fighters per year, and the indications are that this is ramping to more than 150. So by 2030, that's over 1200.
Combine this with developments elsewhere in the Air Force, Rocket Force and Navy.
So you end up with a comprehensive battle network with thousands? of nodes.
It looks like the Chinese military will have the capability to obtain air superiority over Japan, if required, despite any US actions.
That means Japan would face an indefinite air-sea blockade and see targets everywhere in Japan under attack.
It would not be credible for significant military forces to operate in Japan.
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So the First Island Chain is "secure"
Then you have the Second Island Chain, anchored by Guam some 3000km away.
It is impossible to have the same density of Chinese capabilities at this distance.
But the US faces a similar problem in the Guam area
Basically a single, small island plus at most 4 deployed aircraft carriers.
That's a handful of airbases - which are distant and isolated.
In contrast, China has 100? potential airbases which can host aircraft suitable for a Guam contingency 3000km away.
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So in the Guam area, once there are significant numbers of J-36s (timelines after 2035):
1. I expect the Chinese battle network to be "sparse" compared to what China has in the First Island Chain.
2. But this "sparse" Chinese battle will be far more dense than whatever the US military can bring to an isolated patch of the Pacific Ocean
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China building a blue-water Navy to outmatch the US Navy - would take a minimum of 15 years, and likely longer.
And you missed the point that converting SAMs for ground attack is different from converting AAMs for the same. S-300 for example has also been used in that role. But aside from some brief experimenting with AIM-9X, nobody uses AAMs as AGMs. USAF did not invest in a very diverse AGM arsenal because they lacked AAMs to convert.
Remember that the USAF operates with the assumption that they will have not just air superiority, but air dominance.
In such an environment, it is way better to use purpose-built AGMs.
As a shift in air combat philosophy, J-36 should be designed to the maximum capability it's intended VCE engines can provide it and not tailored to legacy tech like WS-15.
It would be idiotic to think the J-36 should be tailored to use the WS-15.
Of course it should be designed with VCE in mind.
But if VCE is not available, using WS-15 is a temporary measure.
The worse case scenario for a J-36 with WS-15 engines is merely 50%? extra electricity generation compared to a J-20.
That is still worth it.
Then as soon as VCE are available, it makes sense to swap out the engines.