CH-148 Cyclone Contract in Peril

kwaigonegin said:

most military project debacles due to things like scope creep, cost overruns, delays, interface and compatibility problems etc are due mainly to the pencil pushers and bad project managers and seldom due purely to technical issues or a bad product. You throw a couple of politicians, lawyers and all sorts of middlemen in there wanting to get their fair share of the cut it's a wonder how any procurement gets done at all!

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...I've worked as a PM in IT and think the job exists to have my own head chopped off. As the PM, you have little authority over people, you're not their real manager, and you have to go to their real manager to beg for resources. If Stakeholders decide to change project scope, any PM who decides to fight will be in a losing battle. Seems that everyone else has more authority than you, including the secretary who books over your scheduled meetings because she wanted your meeting room for her boss. When you finally do get some resources, the team manager gave you their least productive people, black sheeps, and folks with communication issues who cannot look at you in the eye and respond to questions with "um... um... um..."

Of course, when projects run behind with delays, it's all your fault because you read PMBOK and is supposed to know how to wave a magical wand and make rainbows appear in the sky. There's a good reason why PMO in many companies have high turnover.

Jeff Head said:

The idea that Sikorsky cannot porvide any aircraft that could meet the Canadian naval needs, or one that runs out of oil oil and overheats within the required range of the aircraft, is just not credible or belivable to me.

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No, engine/gear oil, not fuel. The engine must be able to run for a certain amount of time without engine oil.

Sorry, I was confused the Cyclone with anther copter:

the statement of claim accused Sikorsky of using a "flawed" analysis to claim its chopper could run without oil in the main gearbox for 30 minutes.

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Jeff Head said:

Can you link to official reports indicating that such a "pass" was given? Or is this the press or the opinion of people pitted against the Sikorsky award and finding reasons for it to be negated?

.Again, do you have a link to support such an allegation from an official source, either in the project office for the Canadian military or from the defence ministry?

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There was an article in the Canadian Naval Review that pretty much explains what happened:

For example, while Agusta Westland and Lockheed Martin had to provide video footage of the EH-101 and NH90, respectively, showing the blade and tail automatic and manual folding procedures in order to prove compliance with the requirements, Sikorsky did not. It could not because the blade and tail-fold capabilities were still under development.

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Also, the Auditor General's Report also explains touches on some of the issues as well:

Jeff Head said:

But, I do find it difficult to believe that any helicopter produced by Sikorsky would end up as you say:

<I>"...cannot be certified as being airworthy for anything more than daytime, fair weather, over land operations at best."{/I}

The design itself is based on a civilian helicopter that operates in many weather conditions and over land and sea. So that does not jive with what you are saying about it being able to operate only in fair weather over land at best.

Sikorsky has unbelievable good experience in developing all-weather, ASW naval helicopters...some of the best in the world.

I have to believe that there is more to it than that.

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This is what was explained to me from someone who is involved in the project:

Without getting too technical:

The "drivetrain" (engines and main gear box) are inadequate. New engines and a new MGB are currently in development but will not be ready in time for the amended late delivery date of June 2012. There is no guarantee that the engines and MGB under development will meet the original requirement.

Airframe vibration and flutter grossly exceed the contract standard... there is no easy fix for this.

There are a number of outstanding issues related to the airworthiness of the Fly-by-Wire flight control system. Procedural "work-arounds" may end up being the only way to deal with some but there are still matters of robustness and lack of maturity that remain basic safety concerns.

There remain unresolved landing gear and blade fold concerns that impact ship compatibility.

There are still a few remaining Mission System integration matters to be resolved, but except for one of them potentially, I believe that none can be classified as show stoppers and so I felt that they were not worth highlighting. They are mainly software-related and those troubles are invariably curable over time.

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Basically, while Sikorsky claimed that the CH-148 was based off an existing aircraft, it is in reality, a whole new aircraft that happens to look like a existing design. There are a number of changes, the biggest of which is listed below:
1. Folding head and tail which in turn means different main rotor blades. Different rotor head. Different Nr.

2. The cockpits look similar and share some of the same controls and displays but a number of changes were made to account for the different aircraft systems functionality. Different FMCDU from commercial S-92s. Armoured Seats. The addition of the Cable Angle hover. Interface between mission system and the FMCDU.

3. Different variant of the same engine to produce more power.

4. Different Landing Gear and the addition of the RAST probe.

5. Changes to fuel sponsons to make them ballistically tolerant. Different amount of fuel.

6. Different All-up-weight. (ie changes again to flight envelope)

7. Changes to both the electrical and hydraulic systems (mostly to account for the mission system).

8. Changes to the MGB.

9. Changes to the anti-ice system.

10. Changes to the Cabin to include new main door, 2 x GPMG mounts, changes to various avionics racks/storage, basic cabin layout is all new. Requires completely different egress certification.

11. Different Radio Fit and new ICS.

12. All new fly-by-wire flight control systems. The aircraft subsequently have different handling and flight envelopes that requires a significant amount of certification. For example the Auto-rotation envelope for the S-92 and CH-148 will be different as will basically all flight maneuvers.

Jeff Head said:

Agreed that that is precisely what the Canadian Military needs.

I also believe that Sikorsky is perfectly capable of providing it, and that they have a good track record with other programs of doing so.

As I said with my original post, it will be a shame if the Canadian government and Sikorsky cannot work it out, after all of this effort and cost, to make that happen with the Cyclone.

I personally believe the platform itself is capable of it...whether they will ever get there with it is the question...and it appears at this point that public and a lot of political perceptiona and sentiment has been influenced against it.

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When Sikorsky was announced as the winner of the MHP project, everyone was surprised that Sikorsky won the contract. Everyone knew that the Sikorsky solution was a developmental platform in a competition that was supposed to be 'off-the-shelf'. The helicopter has been in trouble pretty much from the beginning. It's just that things are coming to a head now and it isn't going to be pretty for Sikorsky.

adeptitus said:

...I've worked as a PM in IT and think the job exists to have my own head chopped off. As the PM, you have little authority over people, you're not their real manager, and you have to go to their real manager to beg for resources. If Stakeholders decide to change project scope, any PM who decides to fight will be in a losing battle. Seems that everyone else has more authority than you, including the secretary who books over your scheduled meetings because she wanted your meeting room for her boss. When you finally do get some resources, the team manager gave you their least productive people, black sheeps, and folks with communication issues who cannot look at you in the eye and respond to questions with "um... um... um..."

Of course, when projects run behind with delays, it's all your fault because you read PMBOK and is supposed to know how to wave a magical wand and make rainbows appear in the sky. There's a good reason why PMO in many companies have high turnover.

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I don't disagree with your assessment however when I say project managers I meant in a general sense and not PM as defined by the PMO etc. I agree that a lot of PMs or even general or group managers takes the brunt of the blame when they are just a cog in the wheel themselves.

Pointblank said:

- Folding head and tail which in turn means different main rotor blades. Different rotor head.

- All new fly-by-wire flight control systems. The aircraft subsequently have different handling and flight envelopes that requires a significant amount of certification.

The Sikorsky solution was a developmental platform in a competition that was supposed to be 'off-the-shelf'.

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Well, almost everything you listed would be things that would have to be done to upgrade any COTS aircraft to a Military one. Including the folding head and tail.

However, the complete upgrade to fly-by-wire is not necessarily something that would have to be done if the avionics of the commercial system and its flight controls were adequate. Understanding that decision and what all went into it would be an important part of consideration.

If the Canadian Program Team felt that the requirements to change the COTS aircraft to a Navalized one were either too expensive, would represent too massive a change, or unacceptably lengthen the schedule, then the principle responsibility was theirs to evaluate the submittal versus what the existing aircraft can do and question the supplier, or come to a determination that it was not doable within the constraints of the requirements document.

It sounds like there is a mixture between the two following fundamental issues:

1) The S-92 as a commercial aircraft was not a good fit to the requirements for the Canadian Naval requirements and was going to require too many revisions, and that some of those revisions were not going to fit into the cost or time scheduled desired by Canada. This can only occur because for three reasons:

a - The Program Management team was not savvy enough, or experienced enough to recognize the mismatch
b - Sikorsky oversold their capabilities to cost effectively make the changes and meet the schedule.
c - The desired changes pushed the envelope too much and they were unprepared for the necessary changes.

(My guess is that it is a healthy mixture of all three)

2) There was either favoritism or not enough knowledge on the part of the governmental team evaluating this regarding the review of the bids and the decisions regarding them.

My experience has shown that in the end, these issues are rarely completely one sided. Usually, both sides have a price to pay either to make the contract work...or to back out of it. If they end up backing out of it, Sikorsky may hurt over it...but so will the Canadian government, and by extension the Canadian people.

In the end, some program management and perhaps higher placed people on both sides may lose their jobs, and both sides will probably lose money if they back out. If they desire to find a way to proceed, then they have to balance off the extra cost and slippage in schedule against the life of the contract and determine which of those two options is the least cost and impact, both financially, militarily...and also politically is my guess.

In the overall scheme of things as far as military contracts for Sikorsky go, this is not a show stopper for them, and they have plenty of business to move forward from this. In the end, so will Canaad (move forward) once the people make their displeasure known if it has impact on the vote.

Jeff Head said:

However, the complete upgrade to fly-by-wire is not necessarily something that would have to be done if the avionics of the commercial system and its flight controls were adequate. Understanding that decision and what all went into it would be an important part of consideration.

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The problem was that Sikorsky proposed the S-92 with a fly-by-wire control system. This is really the first Sikorsky helicopter equipped with a fly-by-wire flight control system. Coupled with the major modifications to the S-92 for the mission (The replacement of the engine, avionics, rotor and other segments, structural reinforcement of the airframe, the addition of weapon systems, and a bunch of other milspec things), in reality this was a full blown development program. Sikorsky should have never been sold as an 'off-the-shelf' aircraft, and DND should have never accepted its characterization as one. There were several legitimate competitors that could have done the job.

The politics behind the purchase pretty much made it a forgone conclusion that any option other than the EH-101 would be selected. For the then Liberal government in 2004 to purchase the exact same helicopter it cancelled with great fanfare in 1993 for a cancellation penalty of half a billion dollars was politically unacceptable. When the military managed to get the EH-101 purchased as the CH-149 Cormorant, there was a massive internal political backlash within the Liberal Party over the purchase, with some inquiries by the government in power to see if they could override the decision.

So in short, we had a situation where the supplier over-promised, and the bureaucrats, with the politicians breathing down their necks to not buy the same helicopter it cancelled back in 1993, accepted the promises of the supplier.

Another article that alludes to the issues surrounding flight worthiness of the CH-148:

New Cyclone choppers beset with technical snags
Helicopters meant to replace Sea Kings could be susceptible to sudden engine shutdowns

Canadian air force engineers and flight-certification officials are grappling with serious concerns related to the electronics aboard the CH-148 Cyclone helicopters that are supposed to replace the geriatric Sea Kings.

That's the word from defence sources with intimate knowledge of the troubled program.

The federal government has refused to accept four test helicopters, currently parked at the Canadian Forces facility in Shearwater, N.S., on the basis they are "non-compliant" — and most of the public explanation has related to software issues.

But the sources say there's concern that delicate flight systems, including a computer that runs the engines, are not sufficiently shielded against powerful electromagnetic waves, such as those produced by military-grade radar on frigates.

The interference has the potential of blanking out the digital instruments and possibly shutting down the engines.

The directorate of air worthiness at National Defence issued a restricted flight certificate in July and imposed restrictions on the helicopter's operations specifically because of so-called E-3 concerns — electromagnetic compatibility, electromagnetic vulnerability and electromagnetic interference.

'Potential show-stoppers'

"Each of them are potential show-stoppers," said one source, who asked for anonymity.

"The vulnerability depends on the frequency and the strength of the signal. You have the potential of losing your instruments and not knowing where you are, and having to take visual cues from outside your aircraft to get down safely."

The Cyclone, meant to replace 50-year-old CH-124 Sea Kings, was cleared to fly within sight of the ground only during daylight hours as part of a long-delayed flight test program that was to have been carried out last month in Nova Scotia.

It also cannot fly over water because of separate, unresolved concerns about the flotation system.

The Conservative government signalled last week it is examining "other" options to the Sikorsky-built helicopter, which is five years behind schedule and overbudget.

Debate within the military test community has revolved around whether the electromagnetic issue is a fatal blow to the program, since the Cyclone's design was based on a less-rugged civilian variant.

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More trouble brewing on the horizon: the government has requested information on 4 helicopters (Sikorsky's SH-60R, Agusta Westland's AW101 and AW159 Wildcat, and NHI's NH-90).

Sea King replacements could be smaller, cheaper helicopters
Government could be set to follow through on its threat to scrap the $5-billion helicopter contract

CBC News has learned the government is considering a major rethink of how the military uses its helicopters at sea. The change, if implemented, would spell the end for a five-year-old, $5-billion contract with Sikorsky to replace Canada's aging fleet of Sea Kings, instead opting for smaller, cheaper helicopters.

he possible shift comes as part of a data-gathering engagement initiated earlier this month in which three rival helicopter manufacturers were asked to provide information about possible alternatives to the CH-148 Cyclone, including two much smaller choppers that could save the government billions of dollars.

The government wants the information by next Tuesday — an indication it may be preparing to end the nearly 25-year-long saga to replace the navy's Sea Kings and a procurement process that the then-Minister of Defence Peter MacKay called "the worst in the history of Canada."

The attempt to chart a new course for the long-delayed helicopter replacement program took place in Ottawa last Thursday at a meeting between government officials and executives of helicopter-makers Agusta Westland, Eurocopter subsidiary NH Industries and Cyclone manufacturer Sikorsky.

The fast-tracked process is an indication the government may be close to giving up on the $5-billion contract with Sikorsky for 28 Cyclone helicopters meant to replace the military workhorse Sea Kings which have been relied on for 50 years.

CBC News has learned there are four helicopters being considered, including the MH-60 Sea Hawk – a naval version of Sikorsky’s Blackhawk used by various branches of the U.S. Armed Forces – as well as Augusta Westland’s 159 and HM-1 Merlin, which are about a third the size of the Sea King and Cyclone. NH Industries was also asked about its medium-sized NH-90 chopper.

However, while a smaller helicopter could cost less and would likely be delivered much faster than the stalled Cyclone, it would require the military to completely rethink the way it uses helicopters at sea.

A smaller helicopter could work for anti-submarine warfare, search and rescue, cargo carrying and transporting naval boarding parties, reports the CBC’s James Cudmore, who has been covering the helicopter procurement process. But he says it couldn’t do all those things at the same time like the much larger Sea King or Cyclone.

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