Bluffer’s Guide: Fortress Taiwan

Excellent article. I took the liberty of correcting some directional errors (such as airbase locations), but overall there's very little to fault.

I think the survivability issue is a big one, and not one simply limited to SAMs. The Air Force also has problems with runway and hangar usability as it's likely that quite a few PLA ballistic missiles will get through regardless of the extensive SAM network. This is why 2nd strike survivability is so important, and definitely a place where more investment is required. (hardening of runways and shelters, for example) I don't think there's really much you can do about the vulnerability of hillside batteries, though, as there are practical reasons to have SAMs located close to each other to make it easier to coordinate.

Taiwan just has a real problem with the fact that based on its strategic situation it has to deal with certain limitations, one of them being a massive Chinese first strike that they will have had a long time to plan. I think right now the best solutions for Taiwan are investing in hardening their runways and aircraft shelters and creating decoys, and getting their hands on more (and mobile) radars. All of these things wouldn't be too difficult, as hardening facilities doesn't require foreign involvement and wouldn't inspire much political debate. Radars would be more difficult, but again they aren't exactly big attention getting items so it might be easier to import some than, say, F-16s.

Personally I think that given its situation Taiwan has done a fairly good job of creating a SAM network but they would still sustain heavy losses to all of their AD assets in a Chinese first strike. There is safety in numbers, and the PAC 3s and further TK-II batteries will help. However I think that Taiwan should transition towards a more asymmetric strategy overall; a part of that is an emphasis on mobile SAM systems.

The_Zergling said:

I don't think there's really much you can do about the vulnerability of hillside batteries, though, as there are practical reasons to have SAMs located close to each other to make it easier to coordinate.

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Well it's interesting that Raytheon hasn't done more to improve separation of Patriot battery components. The MBDA SAMP/T (land version of Aster 30) can separate the components by up to 4km! Separation causes its own operational challenges but if that's the cost of survivability then it seems a reasonable avenue of development.

In Taiwan's case they could lay comms cables to pre-arranged locations and therefore separate the components by hundreds of KM in extreme cases. Imagine flying over Penghu where the radars have been knocked out, and a radar on the main island acquires you from 50km in front of you, it launches a SAM which is a node in its distributed network... that SAM is on Penghu and right beneath you! I don't get why SAM systems aren't built that way but hey I'm an amateur! Line of sight laser comms, virtually un-jammable, could also be used up to several miles. Attach the dishes to masts in the forest etc.

Thanks for the post Planeman, it's great just like the Fortress China post.

It's interesting to note that the Taiwan ROC Navy's AA capabilities clearly outmatch anything the PLAN has, including the newest 051C, 052C, and 054.

Given the small geographic area involved and being on the defensive, the influence of land-based AA is probably to the Taiwan ROC's tactical advantage.

It's interesting to note that the Taiwan ROC Navy's AA capabilities clearly outmatch anything the PLAN has, including the newest 051C, 052C, and 054.

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Can you elaborate a little bit.
I think for its size, the navy has done a good job maintain a credible air defense, but to say they have outmatched anything PLAN has, is a little over confident.

planeman said:

Well it's interesting that Raytheon hasn't done more to improve separation of Patriot battery components. The MBDA SAMP/T (land version of Aster 30) can separate the components by up to 4km! Separation causes its own operational challenges but if that's the cost of survivability then it seems a reasonable avenue of development.

In Taiwan's case they could lay comms cables to pre-arranged locations and therefore separate the components by hundreds of KM in extreme cases. Imagine flying over Penghu where the radars have been knocked out, and a radar on the main island acquires you from 50km in front of you, it launches a SAM which is a node in its distributed network... that SAM is on Penghu and right beneath you! I don't get why SAM systems aren't built that way but hey I'm an amateur! Line of sight laser comms, virtually un-jammable, could also be used up to several miles. Attach the dishes to masts in the forest etc.

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I'd expect the PLAAF to have done something like that earlier to deal with US PGMs after seeing the experiences of the Gulf War, Kosovo and Iraq.

PanAsian said:

It's interesting to note that the Taiwan ROC Navy's AA capabilities clearly outmatch anything the PLAN has, including the newest 051C, 052C, and 054.

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I disgree entirely actually but that's for a different bluffer's guide

Re-reading my earlier post, I was probably wrong to say that the ROCN AA assets 'outmatch' what the PLAN has.

Rather, I think ROCN force has a tactical advantage over the PLAN. My thinking was:

PLAN:
051C x 2 x 48 S300 x 90km
052C x 2 x 48 HQ-9 x 200km
052B x 2 x 48 SA-N-12/HQ-16 x 38km
054A x 6 x 32 SA-N-12/HQ-16 x 38km

ROCN:
Kidd x 4 x 66 SM-2 Block IIIA x 165km
Oliver Hazard Perry x 8 x 40 SM-1 x 75km
Knox modified x 8 x 10 SM-1 x 75km

So the ROCN has more missiles with (mostly) more range spread out among more (but not too many) platforms. Therefore the ROCN assets can probably be used in more survivable, better layered and redundant AA formations.

PanAsian said:

Re-reading my earlier post, I was probably wrong to say that the ROCN AA assets 'outmatch' what the PLAN has.

Rather, I think ROCN force has a tactical advantage over the PLAN. My thinking was:

PLAN:
051C x 2 x 48 S300 x 90km
052C x 2 x 48 HQ-9 x 200km
052B x 2 x 48 SA-N-12/HQ-16 x 38km
054A x 6 x 32 SA-N-12/HQ-16 x 38km

ROCN:
Kidd x 4 x 66 SM-2 Block IIIA x 165km
Oliver Hazard Perry x 8 x 40 SM-1 x 75km
Knox modified x 8 x 10 SM-1 x 75km

So the ROCN has more missiles with (mostly) more range spread out among more (but not too many) platforms. Therefore the ROCN assets can probably be used in more survivable, better layered and redundant AA formations.

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You forgot the:
956EM x2: 48x3-M80MBE, 200km

In the end all of those ROCN vessel are bought, and in a naval battle, PLAN has the advantage of manufacturing vessel are a large scale if the situation calls for it while ROCN has no manufacturing capabilities in naval vessel in the class of frigates-destroyers. End of the day is its not numbers. Remember China ground HQ-9, S-300 can cover 1/3 of the whole Tawain mainland and basically all of the Tawain strait.

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